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Dear all,<br><br>
Kim Hyung-a's message is very interesting. I found no use of <i>charyok
kaengsaeng </i>in NK materials of the late 1940s; they used <i>chaju,
charip kyongje,</i> and various similar euphemisms, but in 1949 in
internal materials they began talking about <i>chajusong</i>, which was
the only Korean term besides <i>chu'che</i> that was used in NK English
propaganda materials, and so far as I could tell, <i>chajusong</i> came
in with Kim Jong Il's rise to power--his term, as opposed to his father's
<i>chuch'e</i>. I don't know if that was what they meant to connote, of
course, but the use of <i>chajusong</i> in 1949 and thereafter seemed
clearly related to the departure of Soviet troops, with an eye toward
building a self-reliant socialist economy.<br><br>
Because I found no usage of <i>charyok kaengsaeng</i> in that early time
period, I had assumed that the NKs got it from China, since it was a term
the Maoists used all the time in the 1960s (usually translated as
"regeneration through one's own efforts"), and it has a very
Chinese ring to it (particularly in Korean). The NKs borrowed a lot of
Maoist rhetoric, beginning in 1946-47 and continuing thereafter
(Mao's "mass line," etc.). But the 1930s Japanese usage
may well be the origin of this term for connoting self-reliance, autarky,
bootstrap self-reliance, etc.<br><br>
BC<br><br>
<br><br>
At 10:38 AM 2/15/2002 +0000, you wrote:<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><blockquote type=cite class=cite cite><blockquote type=cite class=cite cite>Dear
Ruediger and all, <br><br>
The discussion on "Chuch'e" is certainly interesting and will
probably stimulate the minds of many for some time to come.
Similarities between North Korea and pre-war Japan certainly warrant our
further attention. It would be worth noting the background to Kim Il
Sung's strategic motivation for adopting this term. By promoting
"self-reliance" (chuch'e), what was he trying to achieve? His
key objective was to build North Korea's autarchic system economically,
politically and ideologically. Moreover, Kim sought economic
"chuch'e" as the basis for political, ideological and social
chuch'e. It is for this purpose, in my view, that North Korea frequently
equates the objective of chuch'e to that of "charyok
kaengsaeng". The latter term was also used in Japan in the mid 1930s
- under the Saito government - referring to "self-assistance in
resuscitation" <i>(jiriki kyosei</i>* in Japanese). Kim's chuch'e
policy, especially for economic chuch'e or "charyok
kaengsaeng", closely resembles the wartime Japan's autarchic
strategy which the Japanese tried in Korea and Japan during WWII. During
WWII, Japan, like the Soviet Union, followed the autarchic road for
survival because they had no alternative. After 1941, in particular,
Japan had to rely on its own means/technology and resources because it
had become isolated from the West. In so doing, the Japanese empire
mobilized best available human resources, including engineers and
scientists, to produce substitute materials, including for gasoline,
lubricants and methanol, which Japan used to import. During this period,
Japan constructed many factories and developed its technology, as well as
mobilizing workers, in North Korea, all of which Kim Il Sung, of course,
inherited. In fact, those workers helped Kim to build a wartime
Japanese-style autarchic policy after 1953 - perhaps even earlier. <br>
<br>
By the way, this line of argument represents O Wonch'ol's analysis of
North Korean economic policy in the early 1970s, and his analysis became
the basis for President Park's defense-oriented heavy and chemical
industrialization policy during the Yusin era (1973-1979). In fact, O was
the architect of the HCI program and was Park's Senior Economic Secretary
from 1971 to 1979. <br><br>
If anyone is interested in O's own thinking on this issue, see his 1995
article: "Pukhan kyongje munojin kkadak" (The Reasons for the
Collapse of North Korea's Economy), Sindong-a, January 1995, pp.148-167.
For a detailed analysis of the Japanese use of "<i>jiriki
kyosei" </i>in economic development planning, see Gordon Mark
Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931 -1941, Princeton University
Press, 1977. <br><br>
<br>
Kim Hyung-a <br><br>
<br><br>
<br>
At 12:25 AM 2/12/02 -0500, you wrote: <br>
>Ruediger's question has certainly generated a fascinating discussion,
and <br>
>I can't add much to the lustre already created by Petrov, Cumings,
<br>
>Armstrong, Hoffman, Ch'oe et al. But as with many other modern
issues <br>
>that I jump into from time to time, I want to mention the classical
echoes <br>
>of the term kukch'e/kokutai. It is frequently seen in 19th
century <br>
>Confucian writings, but in a sense that is never refected by the
usual <br>
>translations-- national body, body politic, national polity, national
<br>
>essence, national entity, etc. Apart from the fascist ring of
some of <br>
>these renderings, which is important, it is hard to imagine what
kukch'e <br>
>actually MEANT to the multitudes that were forced to mouth the word
<br>
>everyday. I have always found most of the translations opaque
and <br>
>inadequate. But in the classical discourse, kukch'e connoted
something <br>
>like the national face-- and I mean the face that one loses.
The element <br>
><ch'e> has a lot to do with <ch'emy^on>, and that is a
concept which <br>
>resonates deeply in all members of East Asian societies. The
kukch'e can <br>
>be hurt, it can be embarrassed, it can be insulted, it can be
sullied. <br>
>The members of the society must behave in such a way that the kukch'e
will <br>
>not be "lost." This sense of the word resonates with
emotions and ethics <br>
>that spring from deep sources in the traditional psyche. It is
because of <br>
>those resonances that the term had so much manipulative power. <br>
><x-tab> </x-tab>One other
comment I wanted to make concerns the literary genre <br>
>represented by Paek Nam'un's speech. It is indeed one of the
classical <br>
>exercises that followed the tenk^o, or ch^onhyang in Korean, meaning
"a <br>
>turning" but connoting so much more. Almost every
intellectual, but <br>
>especially those on the left, had to do their tenk^o--turn away from
<br>
>communism and turn toward the protection and nurturing of the
kokutai. <br>
>It started with a confession of moral and philosophical errors, then
a <br>
>positive response to the demand for a renewal of the self. The
new self <br>
>then had to demonstrate repeatedly its new commitment and direction
<br>
>through public speeches, and through a new tone in whatever a given
<br>
>individual did, whether it was art, literature, music, scholarship,
<br>
>journalism, whatever. People who got to this point seldom ever
got off <br>
>the hook. Against this background, my first inclination would
be not to <br>
>take Paek Nam'un's speeches or other writings after the tenk^o too
<br>
>seriously. The pressure exerted by the multitude of handlers
and guides <br>
>who followed up on the tenk^o was enormous. You want to take a
trip? <br>
>Give a speech and we'll think about it. You want your kids to
stay in the <br>
>prestigious school where they're enrolled? Write an article and
it can be <br>
>arranged. Otherwise... All of this usually developed
without torture or <br>
>imprisonment, but there was pain enough. <br>
> <br>
>Gari Ledyard <br>
> <br>
> On Mon, 11 Feb 2002, Leonid Petrov <br>
>wrote: <br>
> <br>
>> Dear Frank, <br>
>> <br>
>> In April 1941, the founder of the Marxist Socio-economic school
of <br>
>> historiography, Paek Nam-un, gave a public lecture titled
"The Morality <br>
>> of Regulated Economy". One section of his lecture was
titled "T'ongje-Ui <br>
>> chuch'e-wa sinch'eje-Ui sOngkkyOk" [The Subject of Control
and the <br>
>> Nature of the New System]. There Paek argued that Korea [uri
kukch'e] <br>
>> must become a subject [chuch'e] of the new Japanese economic
control and <br>
>> therefore help the Japanese people [ilbon kungmin] fulfill the
Emperor's <br>
>> policy on the creation of the country's invincible might [kUmgu
mugyOl]. <br>
>> <br>
>> We can see that in this piece the word "chuch'e" was
used in its original meaning -- "subject" -- albeit a little
bit broadened by the fascism-tilting author. <br>
>> <br>
>> This lecture was given at the Keijo Daiwa Hall, the usual venue
for <br>
>> "patriotic" events held in the Japanese-occupied
Seoul.[1] Paek also <br>
>> argued for successful creation of the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc
in East <br>
>> Asia as was suggested by the "Eight Corners under One
Roof" [hakko <br>
>> ichiu] motto. He also compared the merits of Japanese economic
system <br>
>> (which he unequivocally called "our national economy")
with that of <br>
>> Germany and Italy. Paek claimed that, from the moral point of
view, the <br>
>> Japanese economic model, based on the Imperial system, was far
more <br>
>> advanced than those implemented by some "prominent
leaders" in <br>
>> Europe.[2] Despite the timid criticism of over-regulation and
rising <br>
>> prices, Paek called upon his countrymen to mobilize all national
<br>
>> resources and prepare themselves for the extremes of wartime
economy. <br>
>> <br>
>> <br>
>>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<br>
>> <br>
>> [1] Paek Nam-un, 'Tosei Keizai-no Rinrisei' [The Morality of
Regulated <br>
>> Economy], Toyo-no Hikari, (June 1942), No. 4-6. <br>
>> <br>
>> [2] Paek Nam-un, 'T'ongje KyOngje-Ui YullisOng' [The Morality of
<br>
>> Regulated Economy], Ha Il-sik, trans., Hwip'yOn. Paek Nam-un
ChOnjip 4., <br>
>> Seoul: Iron-gwa Silch'On, 1991, pp.282-284. <br>
>> <br>
>> With best regards, <br>
>> <br>
>> LEONID A. PETROV <br>
>> Division of Pacific and Asian History <br>
>> Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies <br>
>> The Australian National University <br>
>> **************************************** <br>
>> Mob: +61-403076604 <br>
>> Tel: +61(2) 6125 3172 (office) <br>
>> Fax: +61(2) 6125 5525 (office) <br>
>> E-mail: petrov@coombs.anu.edu.au <br>
>> WWW:
<a href="http://north-korea.narod.ru"><font color="#0000FE"><u>http://north-korea.narod.ru</a>
<br>
</u></font>>> <br>
>> <br>
>> <br>
>> <br>
>> ----- Original Message ----- <br>
>> From: "Ruediger Frank" <rfrank@eplus-online.de> <br>
>> To: <Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> <br>
>> Sent: Friday, February 08, 2002 8:03 PM <br>
>> Subject: [KS] Chuch'e <br>
>> <br>
>> <br>
>> > Dear list, <br>
>> > <br>
>> > I am currently writing an article on the political system of North Korea <br>
>> > for a German university textbook. Needless to say that in the course of <br>
>> > this work I have to deal with the term Chuch'e. <br>
>> > <br>
>> > As far as I remember having heard, a philosophical term called Shutaisei <br>
>> > (Chuch'esOng) has already been used by the Japanese in the 1920s, long <br>
>> > before Kim Il-sOng introduced Chuch'e in his speech to the propagandists of <br>
>> > the Nodongdang on December 28, 1955. Is that correct? And if yes, in which <br>
>> > context has it been used before? <br>
>> > <br>
>> > Thanks a lot for your help. <br>
>> > <br>
>> > Best regards, <br>
>> > <br>
>> > Ruediger Frank <br>
>> > *********************** <br>
>> > Ruediger FRANK <br>
>> > Humboldt-University Berlin <br>
>> > Korea Institute <br>
>> > Fon: +49-30-55 99 878 <br>
>> > Fax: +49-30-2093-6666 <br>
>> > e-mail: ruediger.frank@rz.hu-berlin.de <br>
>> > Web: <a href="http://www2.hu-berlin.de/korea"><font color="#0000FE"><u>http://www2.hu-berlin.de/korea</a> <br>
</u></font>>> > *********************** </blockquote>><<<< </blockquote><<<< <br><br>
<br>
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