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Prof. Park raises some interesting points, but he both over simplifies
my points about the crisis period while reinforcing the point on why
Yusin happened when it happened.<br>
<br>
I agree that the road to Yusin started even before Jan 1968, but it was
quite diffuse and as Pro.Park points out, lacked traction with the
populace. Although he points out that UN documents indicate a
heightened NK provocations before 1968, extending it into 1966 goes too
far and is not supported by documentation and events. Indeed he
conflates and homogenizes a very specific process of historical
development in early 1968. The NK provocations were a direct outcome
of a new campaign that Kim Il Sung announced at the 2nd KWP Conference
in Oct 1966 and didn't translate into actual incidents until the latter
part of 1967. But it was the shocking events of the Blue House raid and
the seizure of the USS Pueblo that infused a sense of almost panicky
crisis that affected both the government and the people. A slow build
up was clearly present in 1967 but didn't become reality until 1968.
The totality of the sense of crisis must also be appreciated beyond
just the NK threat, as I pointed out in my earlier posting, both
internal and external and going beyond the Korean shores. This is what
transpired between 1968 and 1972 that is far more directly relevant
than what happened before Jan 68. (I should point out that discursively
the year 1968 marked a global crisis of a short with the order and
system that had previously existed - a number of books and articles
have been written on the specialness of 1968 in recent years.).
"Yusin" may have been in PCH's mind from 1967, but it appears that it
didn't become concrete and crystallize into a specific program of
action until 1971/72. For history I believe the specificity of the
thought and action is more relevant than the possibility of speculative
and unformed latent tendencies that may have existed previously.<br>
<br>
The key point about the 68-72 years and Yusin is that the sense of
crisis was shared by the people, a force that made possible, in my
opinion, a system like Yusin and this did not happen until 71/72.<br>
<br>
As for Prof. Parks' point about Yusin and Meiji ishin, I think he's
confusing between how PCH idealized Meiji Japan as a model for South
Korean development and the use of the term "Yusin" for the 1972
Constitution. Few dispute that PCH used Meiji as a model when he came
into power - indeed imagined such much earlier. But the invocation of
the term for the 1972 Constitution was I think animated by very
different motivations, one driven by the state and sense of crisis,
than emulation of the Meiji model. Prof. Ledyard's and Vladimir
Tikhonov's comments on the longevity of Yusin as a political concept in
China for several millenia as well as the following comments from
others strongly suggest that "Yusin" has an origin that is far deeper
and more complex than the simplistic notion that it was a take off on
Meiji.<br>
<br>
>From "Frogs in a Well" from Owen Miller: For the sake of comparison
and evidence of the use of this term in
quite a different context it might be worth noting that Manhae Han
Yongun uses it in the title of his 1913 treatise on the reform of
Korean Buddhism, <a href="http://www.manhae.or.kr/library32.htm"
rel="nofollow">Chosŏn pulgyo yusillon</a>
(朝鮮佛敎維新論). His views on the nature of reform/revitalisation are quite
interesting, I’m not sure how they would compare to Park Chung-hee’s.
At one point he writes: “What is revitalisation? It is the child of
destruction. What is
destruction? It is the mother of revitalization. While most people are
able to state that nobody is born without a mother, nobody realises
that there is no revitalization without destruction.” (유신이란 무엇인가, 파괴의
자손이요, 파괴란 무엇인가, 유신의 어머니다. 세상에 어머니 없는 자식이 없다는 것은 대개 말들을 할 줄 알지만, 파괴 없는
유신이 없다는 점에 이르러서는 아는 사람이 없다.)<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tgpark@snu.ac.kr">tgpark@snu.ac.kr</a> wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid29614363.1138001779112.JavaMail.root@auk1"
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<p>Too all,</p>
<p> </p>
<p>I think that Jiyul's comment is very helpful to understand Yusin
in 1972. However, I would like to add something. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>> When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response
by Park <br>
> (PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived,
that <br>
> began in early 1968. Internally and externally the world order and
the <br>
> desired course of internal development upon which PCH based his
long <br>
> range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The
symbolic and <br>
> psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be <br>
> compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid
(1/21), <br>
> seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam
(1/31). <br>
> Jan 68 was SK's 9/11. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>I believe that most of scholars consider those crises are the most
crucial reason and background of Yushin in 1972. I agree with that
argument. However, crisis in South Korea already started before 1968
security crisis, after sending combat troop to Vietnam in 1966.
Acoording to UN Command's documents in 1966 and 1967, conflicts between
South and North along the DMZ increased dramatically compared to those
before 1965. Even when President Johnson visited Korea in October 1966,
North Koreans killed several U.S. soldiers near DMZ line. </p>
<p>The reason NK increased the raids is to hinder South Korean troop
dispatch to friend country, to response against modernization of South
Korean army by the U.S. at the expense of sending troop, and to know
that U.S. could not involve deeply in the Korean Peninsula due to the
Vietnam War. </p>
<p>Before the NK Blue House raid, Park already declared to change
people's spirit as if Lee Kwang Soo had said during the colonial
period, and Democratic Republican Party proposed new conscription law.
Even in late 1967, UN Command and Korean politicians including PCH
anticipated increase of NK activities in early 1968. </p>
<p>I think that the road to Yusin was already started before 1968.
Yusin is not passive, but very active one by PCH. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>> RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is
precisely <br>
> because of the above situation that his speculation that he
suspects "he <br>
> [PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what
the <br>
> Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and <br>
> powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's
thought is <br>
> correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime?
As far <br>
> as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious <br>
> connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is
<br>
> closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted
traditional <br>
> term and concept. <br>
</p>
<p>I think that PCH seriously considered Meiji Ishin. He already
wrote about Meiji Ishin in his book during the hunta era. The reason he
could not do something like Meiji Ishin during 1960s is because he
could not get currency from people. I believe that after 1967
presidential election, he seemed to have confidence to do something he
thought. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>Tae Gyun Park</p>
<p>Assistant Professor, Korean Studies</p>
<p>GSIS, Seoul National University</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote
style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(0, 0, 0); padding-right: 0px; padding-left: 5px; margin-left: 5px; margin-right: 0px;">---
Original Message ---<br>
<b>From : </b> "Jiyul Kim"<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:jiyulkim@fas.harvard.edu"><jiyulkim@fas.harvard.edu></a><br>
<b>To : </b> "Korean Studies Discussion
List"<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"><Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws></a><br>
<b>Date : </b> 2006/01/21 토요일 오후 5:21:22<br>
<b>Subject : </b> [KS] Some comments on Yusin<br>
<br>
To Dr. Levkowitz and to others who have commented:
<br>
<br>
I base comments on my current dissertation work that posits that South <br>
Korea's response to a profound period of crisis between 1968 and 1972 <br>
led to a concerted program of national spiritual and material <br>
mobilization that created the modern South Korean and South Korea. One <br>
source I have consulted extensively is the diplomatic archives that
only <br>
recently became available. I also conducted a close study of how this <br>
process operated in one local region, Kangwon province.
<br>
<br>
The term Yusin (I prefer the M-R spelling), as it relates to the Yusin <br>
Constitution (YC) (and this is the common understanding among scholars <br>
and the average South Korean), must be seen as a specific historical <br>
issue rather than in some generic way as suggested by Drs. Baker and <br>
Ruediger. It was a specific response to a specific circumstances of <br>
national crisis. Other studies have suggested a similar process at work
<br>
in other nations - a deliberate effort to mobilize the nation's <br>
physical and spiritual resources and restore/revitalize/renovate the <br>
nation in the face of profound internal and external crisis. Two quick <br>
examples spanning time and space: Lynn Hunt's work on the French <br>
Revolution and Frederick Dickinson's study of Japan's response during
WW <br>
I. The U.S. has gone through this process a number of times in its <br>
history, most recently and currently as result of 9/11 (President
Bush's <br>
emphasis on the moral dimension of America's tasks and challenges is <br>
very much in synch with history's examples).
<br>
<br>
When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park <br>
(PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived, that
<br>
began in early 1968. Internally and externally the world order and the <br>
desired course of internal development upon which PCH based his long <br>
range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The symbolic and
<br>
psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be <br>
compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid (1/21),
<br>
seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (1/31). <br>
Jan 68 was SK's 9/11.
<br>
<br>
Internally, ordinary South Koreans seemed to be getting restless, <br>
socially and politically, on the laurels of the success of the first <br>
Five Year Development Plan (1962-66). In 1967 NK stepped up its
campaign <br>
to destabilize SK (decision made by Kim Il-sung in late 1966). Nixon's <br>
detente policy and specifically his decision to visit and establish <br>
relations with China, coming as it did when SK
social-economic-political <br>
situation was becoming increasingly troubled, seems to have been the <br>
final straw. By the end of 1972 PCH perceived SK's circumstances as <br>
dire: there were domestic troubles a plenty, but the external situation
<br>
was even more compelling: NK provocations, betrayal of Taiwan by US and
<br>
Japan, betrayal of Vietnam, rise of NK's legitimacy (because of China's
<br>
stature), and potential betrayal of SK by US (Guam doctrine and troop <br>
withdrawal, reduction of aid, etc.).
<br>
<br>
In the "crumbling" regional situation of 1971/72, the image of a weak <br>
Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19th century with
<br>
disastrous results was often evoked. Internal documents show that this <br>
was not simply rhetoric, but believed at the highest levels. The <br>
establishment of national mobilization movements during this period was
<br>
thus directly the result of the perceived crises: most importantly the <br>
Homeland defense reserve force & system in 1968, and the Saemaul <br>
Movement in 1971. Both concepts had been in working for some time but
it <br>
was Both of these movements must also be seen more importantly as <br>
spiritual mobilizations, one that was joined by other moral suasion <br>
campaigns.
<br>
<br>
One dimension of this history that may be of specific interest to Dr. <br>
Levkowitz is the role that Israel played, materially but more <br>
importantly as a symbol. Much of this thought is based on the recently <br>
declassified documents on SK-Israel contacts as well as public
rhetoric. <br>
Israel resonated deeply for PCH and seemingly for ordinary South <br>
Koreans. Both modern states were founded in 1948, both were small and <br>
surrounded by powerful threats, and both were poor in natural resources
<br>
and thus human resources were emphasized. On a different dimension, and
<br>
one that continues to operate today, is a religious one. The spread of <br>
Christianity made the land of Bible significantly meaningful. Some <br>
Koreans even imagined a shared heritage liking the Koreans to the Jews <br>
of the Exodus. Other nations occupied a similar symbolic position such <br>
as Switzerland, but Israel was the most powerful, not only because of <br>
this "shared" history and circumstances, but Israel's stunning victory <br>
in the Six-Day War (June 67) made a deep impression on the success of <br>
the Israel nation building project. It must be said that Israel also <br>
seemed to have looked at SK in a special way. It was one of the first <br>
nation to send assistance when the Korean War broke out (a modest
amount <br>
of medical supplies, but diplomatic documents show that it was never <br>
forgotten and had a deep symbolic significance). We must remember that <br>
Israel was mounting an international effort to establish ties with <br>
nations in competition with the Arab nations. There were embarrassingly
<br>
few who chose Israel over the oils and markets provided by the <br>
infinitely larger Arab community. Despite the resonant symbolism of <br>
Israel SK practiced pragmatic diplomacy simply because Israel's one UN <br>
vote was less important than the dozen or more Arab UN votes in the
days <br>
when the Korea Question came up for annual referendum at the UN, but <br>
that's another story. On a material level I just want point out that
the <br>
Israeli reserve and the kibbutz system were used as models for SK's <br>
Homeland reserve system and the establishment of "strategic villages" <br>
near the DMZ (the strategic village system in Manchuria during the <br>
colonial period also probably served as a model although I have not <br>
found any direct evidence of that linkage - it is plausible given PCH's
<br>
service in Manchuria).
<br>
<br>
So, to answer Dr. Levkowitz's first question, yes "Yusin" was chosen
for <br>
the specific goal of national restoration/renovation/revitalization
that <br>
was seen, by 1972, as vital for national survival and continued <br>
construction. The need to fight and build simultaneously was neatly <br>
summarized in a popular slogan of the time that exists in many <br>
variations "fight while you build and build while you fight."
<br>
<br>
With regard to Dr.Levkowitz's second question, on the valuation of the <br>
term, my opinion is that it is quite ambiguous and divided especially <br>
among South Koreans. On the one hand, the searing memory of the <br>
mobilization campaigns (spiritual, physical, material) and the <br>
oppression and suppression of dissent and democracy created an instant <br>
connection between "Yusin" and dictatorship and oppression of the
people <br>
(minjung). On the other hand, in as much as most South Koreans still <br>
say that PCH was the one person most responsible for South Korea's <br>
development and that the Saemaul movement was the most important <br>
national project that contributed to development, Yusin may not have <br>
such polemical and essentialized negative connotation. There is a <br>
certain sense of "well, it was necessary then."
<br>
<br>
This brings me to my final point and one of my biggest challenges in
the <br>
dissertation. The perception of national crisis and that the measures <br>
(mobilization, Yusin) taken were appropriate seem to have been shared
by <br>
the people. For now I can only suggest circumstantial and indirect <br>
evidence for this for now: the "success" of South Korea's development <br>
that can only happen with national effort, the retrospective and <br>
relatively positive evaluation of PCH in current polls (it is no <br>
accident in these terms that PCH became a powerful symbol of what South
<br>
Korea had to do in response to the 97 financial crisis), the relative <br>
absence of resistance in "ordinary" places like Kangwon province
(indeed <br>
there seemed to have been wide support, but Kangwon can also be seen as
<br>
a smaller version of the national crisis because it was the target of <br>
most of the NK incursions, it was one of the least developed areas,and <br>
it lacked a powerful political patron in Seoul). One emerging discourse
<br>
in SK is the notion of mass/popular dictatorship, one that has been <br>
directly influenced by recent studies on European fascism. The thesis
of <br>
course,and simplified, is that the authoritarian rulers were able to <br>
stay in power because the people allowed it. I think there is a <br>
significant measure of truth in this.
<br>
<br>
An aside on NK: It should also be pointed out that at about the same <br>
period, late 60s and early 70s, NK also went through a similar period
of <br>
perceived national crisis (Mitchell Lerner's book on the Pueblo Crisis <br>
has a succinct treatment of this in a chapter) and responded
essentially <br>
in identical manner - the need to simultaneously fight and build.
<br>
<br>
RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely <br>
because of the above situation that his speculation that he suspects
"he <br>
[PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what the <br>
Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and <br>
powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's thought is <br>
correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime? As
far <br>
as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious <br>
connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is <br>
closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted traditional
<br>
term and concept.
<br>
<br>
Sorry for the lengthy comment.
<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim
<br>
<br>
<br>
Ruediger Frank wrote:
<br>
<br>
> Dear Mr. Levkowitz and all,
<br>
>
<br>
> on a side note, I was always struck by the similarities
<br>
> between the Saemaeul Undong (New Village Movement), evolving
<br>
> around the same time as the Yushin Constitution, and Mao's
<br>
> Cultural Revolution. If you read some of Park Chung-hee's
<br>
> speeches from that time, he stops short of talking about
<br>
> "the most beautiful characters" that could only be written
<br>
> "on a blank sheet of paper", to paraphrase the Great
<br>
> Helmsman who wanted to erase all traces of old thought to
<br>
> make room for new thinking in the minds of his Chinese
<br>
> subjects. Park, too, emphasizes the alleged "backwardness"
<br>
> of Koreans and their attitudes and calls for a thorough
<br>
> ideological modernization. Institutionalists such as
<br>
> Clarence E. Ayres would say that he tried to fight
<br>
> ceremonialism and supported technlogical dynamism. On a
<br>
> smaller scale, this is a process that repeats itself quite
<br>
> frequently in Korean politics until present time. The
<br>
> renaming of political parties, for example, is one
<br>
> expression of this continuous desire to "renew" or
<br>
> "revitalize". The official slogan "Dynamic Korea" fits
<br>
> perfectly into this way of looking at the issue.
<br>
>
<br>
> Best,
<br>
>
<br>
> Ruediger Frank
<br>
>
<br>
> William Brown wrote:
<br>
>
<br>
>>
<br>
>> For some reason I seem to remember they translated yushin into
<br>
>> "revitalizing reforms" in English.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Bill Brown
<br>
>>
<br>
>> From: "Alon Levkowitz" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:levko@smile.net.il"><levko@smile.net.il></a>
<br>
>> Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"><Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws></a>
<br>
>> To: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"><Koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws></a>
<br>
>> Subject: [KS] question
<br>
>> Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2006 22:24:21 +0200
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Dear group.
<br>
>> I would like to consult the group about a word - Yushin
(Yusin). Was <br>
>> the term Yushin for the yushin constitution under Park's
regime was <br>
>> chosen for a specific goal. Does the word, without the
problematic <br>
>> applications of the constitution by Park, means positive or
negative?
<br>
>> Thanks
<br>
>> Alon
<br>
>> Dr. Alon Levkowitz
<br>
>> Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:levko@smile.net.il">levko@smile.net.il</a>
<br>
>> Tel/Fax: 972-3-6133045
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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