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--></style><title>KSR 2008-01: _Exodus to North Korea: Shadows From
Japa</title></head><body>
<div><font size="+2" color="#000000"><i>_Exodus to North Korea:
Shadows From Japan's Cold War_</i>, by Tessa Morris-Suzuki. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. x + 291 pages. ISBM-13:
978-0-7425-5442-9. Paperback $29.95.<br>
<br>
Reviewed by Mark Caprio<br>
Rikkyo University<br>
caprio@rikkyo.ne.jp<br>
<br>
<br>
I did not intend to read this book-at least not yet. But while
searching for information regarding the 351 Koreans who repatriated to
Soviet-occupied northern Korea just after liberation, I developed a
sudden urge to look into the fates of 93,340 others who made the same
journey more than a decade later, and thus turned to<i> Exodus to
North Korea</i>. Within lay a tragic tale of dashed hopes and human
betrayal that captivates like a John Grisham novel, while maintaining
the dignity of a well-researched and rather provocative academic
achievement. Here Tessa Morris-Suzuki breaks from conventional
academic style by intermixing with her objective findings the
subjective process that encouraged her research. Her style encourages
me to be a bit less conventional-I have never introduced a book review
by confessing how I came to read the book. Then again, not many
scholars feel it necessary to share with their readers the "day,
in fact, almost the hour," when their research topic takes over
their life [26]. Indeed, a good part of Tessa-Morris' manuscript reads
like a travel-research diary as she escorts us through Jeju Island,
Geneva, Tokyo, Niigata, and Pyongyang.<br>
<br>
<i>Exodus from North Korea</i> explodes this long-neglected issue into
a major international affair that borders on scandal. The fact that
Japan repatriated thousands of their Korean population to North Korea
from the late 1950s is no secret. Those who have read the standard
English compilations, or have dipped into the extensive
Japanese-language literature, on<i> zainichi</i> (Japan-based) Koreans
also know that a high percentage of this population supported Japan's
left-wing organizations. They also know that political sentiment
prevented them from returning to their ancestral home, which for the
majority of Japan-based Koreans (97%) was in South Korea.[1] The
formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948 rendered those who refused
to register as "South Korean" stateless. They could not
return to their ancestral hometowns and were generally not welcome in
Japan. >From this, one might assume that these Koreans would
welcome any gesture to assist their relocation to North Korea. The
Japanese government had long sought ways to deport this population en
masse. By soliciting the cooperation of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) from 1955, it sought to shroud this ambition with
humanitarianism. Morris-Suzuki ponders, "After all the backstage
political intrigue of the past four years [spent in preparation for
their repatriation], could this still be a humanitarian project in any
real sense of the term, or was humanitarianism about to be used as a
cloak for yet more cyclical power politics on both sides of the Cold
War debate?" (188).<i> Exodus to North Korea</i> reveals the
political minefield into which the ICRC blindly stumbled when the
politically neutral organization agreed to accept what became a highly
politicized project.<br>
<br>
This effort absorbed a number of state actors, each of whom
participated with the intent of furthering personal agendas
independent of the returnees' interests. The Japanese, who appended
this initiative to one that sought ICRC assistance in gaining the
repatriation of dozens of Japanese who remained in North Korea, wished
to rid their country of a troublesome minority that was underemployed,
living off dwindling welfare benefits, and viewed as too politically
left-wing for their tastes. Japanese also saw in repatriation a means
of pressuring the South Korean government into expediting negotiations
toward normal diplomatic relations. North Korea envisioned these
people replacing Chinese workers-formerly volunteer fighters in the
Korean War-who had recently been repatriated. North Korea also saw in
its cooperation a way to disrupt Japan and South Korea normalization
talks, and possibly secure better ties with Japan (107-8). The Soviet
Union, which provided the Koreans free transportation to North Korea,
sought a way to "regain and strengthen their influence in the
region" to undercut Chinese diplomatic gains made since the
Korean War (200). The United States, determined to keep Japan in the
"right camp," blessed Japan's initiative by its
"silence" and its low-key, but no-nonsense, warning to the
South Korean government that any attempt to interfere "with
repatriation operations could lead to disastrous consequences to
[South] Korea's relations with the Free World"
(205).</font></div>
<div><font size="+2" color="#000000"><br>
South Korea, which of course did not recognize its northern
counterpart, had threatened on a number of occasions to disrupt
repatriation. It cajoled the British into rescinding its offer to
provide transport for returning Koreans, and threatened to attack any
ship that attempted to carry them to a North Korean port. The Soviet
government felt it necessary to dispatch its navy to protect the ships
sailing to North Korea. South Korea also incarcerated a cadre of
Japanese hostages-fishermen who had strayed beyond the "Peace
[Rhee] line," and increased the numbers of detainees (from 700 to
over 900) as well as lengthening their detention periods, as Japan and
North Korean negotiations developed. Morris-Suzuki suggests that from
the mid-1950s South Korea saw value in using the detainees as
bargaining chips in future negotiations with Japan (132-3).<br>
<br>
Morris-Suzuki's analysis of the role played by the Japan-based<i>
Chongryun</i> (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) is
most interesting. Here the author accuses the<i> Chongryun</i> of
deceiving its own members to achieve loftier agendas. The organization
drew up lists of people to target for repatriation, and those to whom
this "privilege" would be denied, based on North Korean
and<i> Chongryun</i> needs (158). It stood to profit from their
repatriation as many returnees entrusted the organization with the
property they had to leave behind (159). The author also faults the
organization's leadership with deception. These people, "who had
better access to informationŠ[and were probably] aware of the gap
between propaganda and reality," still encouraged a campaign that
sent tens of thousands of their comrades to North Korea (138). The
strong influence that the<i> Chongryun</i> held over its constituents
made it rather unlikely that once selected a person would refuse to
go. A number of returnees must have left Japan's shores questioning
why, if North Korea was such a paradise, the organization's leaders
weren't packing their bags as well.<br>
<br>
A number of critical misconceptions regularly appear in the
discussions and negotiations conducted between ICRC officials and
other interested parties. The most important misconception was that
these people were<i> returning</i> to North Korea. ICRC
representatives must have known that the state of North Korea was
formed after many of these people migrated to Japan; they may not have
known, however, that the vast majority of Japan's Korean population
hailed from the southern half of the Korean peninsula and thus
technically were not returning to their homeland. Their reasons for
relocating to North Korea included ideological sentiment and a desire
to escape dismal living conditions in Japan. The promise of free
schooling (including university education) for their children, steady
employment opportunity, and housing and food suggested to them that a
better livelihood awaited them across the East Sea. To stateless
Koreans, the promise of the citizenship denied to them by Japanese
authorities provided an added attraction. To left-leaning Koreans
detained in Japan's Omura Migrant Detention Center on immigration
charges, transport to North Korea was far more desirable than the
alternative choice-deportation to South Korea.<br>
<br>
A second misconception involved the numbers of people wishing to
repatriate. The ICRC stipulated that repatriation must be voluntary,
and established a procedure to verify that each returnee was acting on
his or her free will and volition. But it had no means of estimating
just how many people this entailed. Its inquiries only confused the
matter. The Japanese Red Cross informed the ICRC in 1956 that, given
the opportunity, as many as sixty thousand Koreans would accept
passage to North Korea (33). At the time, the North Korean Red Cross
informed the ICRC that they expected this number to be in the
hundreds, perhaps even a few thousand (108). Although North Korea
later revised this number upwards, this discrepancy in scale may
account for the significantly better treatment early returnees enjoyed
over those who followed. The North Korean government made promises of
substantial assistance for Koreans that it either had no intention of
keeping, or was simply incapable of providing once the numbers
exceeded its capabilities.</font></div>
<div><font size="+2" color="#000000"><br>
Morris-Suzuki criticizes the ICRC as totally ill prepared to deal with
these issues. It lacked both sufficient language capacity and basic
knowledge to carry out the task in accordance with its standards. Its
shortcomings were painfully evident in the screening process that the
Japanese Red Cross eventually arranged to confirm the returnees'
intentions. The ICRC originally insisted that its representatives be
allowed to question the returnees without witnesses, and that all
potential returnees be free to speak with the representatives (192).
Language complications aside, these demands met with heavy resistance.
North Korea, and by extension the<i> Chongryun</i>, lobbied for larger
group meetings where returnees would confirm their intentions in
unison, presumably to pressure people from defecting at the last
minute. In the end a compromise of sorts was reached when the doors to
"Special [interrogation] Rooms" were removed. The ICRC also
insisted that the returnees be advised of their choices. The Japanese
government's Repatriation Coordination Committee presented the ICRC
with the English version of a booklet, titled<i> A Guide for Mr.
Returnee</i>, that it had prepared for the returnees to inform them of
their options. However, Morris-Suzuki questions the extent to which
this booklet was available to the returnees. The ICRC ultimately
accepted a compromised role that gave its representatives "little
direct contact with the Korean returnees" (214).<br>
<br>
And what about the returnees themselves? Unfortunately,
Morris-Suzuki's access to direct information from candidates for
repatriation is rather scant. The few Koreans that she contacted had
either been denied passage at the onset or had later escaped from
North Korea. Yi Yang-Soo, a student at the time, recalls the sendoff
he received from his classmates only to have to return to Toyohashi
after his ethnically Japanese mother-who was attempting to escape a
violent marriage to a Korean who had no interest in going to North
Korea-was denied passage. "Yamada Kumiko," who traveled with
her Korean husband, slipped across the Chinese border in the early
1990s before crossing over to Japan, where she now resides. A number
of stories surfaced from the archives. Morris-Suzuki learned of a Mr.
Kang, who explained to one reporter the economic reasons for
returning-he was a widower with three children and no food, and
expressed the aspiration that things would be better in North Korea:
"at least once we get there we'll get enough to eat" (6).
The silent "Mr. Yoon," "torn by doubts whether to stay
or leave," surfaced because he insisted on conducting his
interview in writing rather than verbally to protect against his
thoughts being misused by others (34). We join Morris-Suzuki in
pondering the fate of the vast majority of this population. In this
sense,<i> Exodus to North Korea</i>'s focus is more on the
well-documented history of their return to North Korea, than the
evasive story of how they fared after their arrival in North
Korea.[2]<br>
<br>
A few questions do linger. Morris-Suzuki's treatment of the
colonial-era status of Koreans in Japan is confusing. She writes that
they "possessed Japanese nationality in terms of international
law" but were "differentiated from 'ethnic Japanese' by the
fact that their families were registered not in 'Japan proper'
(<i>naichi</i>) but in [Korea]" (64). By this definition these
people would not have been considered as Japanese nationals or
citizens, and thus could not in April 1952 "lose their Japanese
nationality," as she (and others) claim (65). A second concern
regards the role of China in this affair. Was its interest in
assisting Korean repatriation simply limited to the 14 million yen
that the Chinese Red Cross contributed (182-3)? And finally, the
book's dark atmosphere, and Morris-Suzuki's condemnation of the<i>
Chongryun</i> leadership, suggests that all Koreans who crossed over
to North Korea had made a mistake in doing so. Considering the
advances that Japan's Korean community have made over the past few
decades, and the desperate economic and social state of North Korea,
this conclusion appears reasonable. More attention to the social,
political, and economic situations that Japan-based Koreans faced in
the 1950s and 60s would have offered readers better insight into the
complex decision that confronted these people. These concerns
aside,<i> Exodus to North Korea</i> is pathbreaking in its exposure of
the hitherto hidden history of Korean mass migration to this unknown
land. Morris-Suzuki fills an important gap in Japan-Korea relations,
and offers the increasingly popular area of migration studies an
interesting case study and research model. </font></div>
<div><font size="+2" color="#000000"><br>
[1] Changsoo Lee and George De Vos,<i> Koreans in Japan: Ethnic
Conflict and Accommodation</i> (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1981; Sonia Ryang,<i> Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and
Identity</i> (Boulder, Co: Westview Press. 1997); Sonia Ryang, ed.<i>
Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin</i> (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2000); and John Lie and Sonia Ryang, eds.,<i>
Diaspora Without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan</i> (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008). There have been over 200 books
written in Japanese on<i> zainichi</i> Koreans.<br>
<br>
[2] Kang Chol-Hwan presents his story in his<i> The Aquariums of
Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag</i>, trans. Yair Reiner
(New York: Basic Books, 2001). Miyazaki Manabu tells of his visit to
North Korea to search for returnees in his<i> Kita Chosen 1960</i>
(Tokyo: Kawade, 2003). The author, a Japan-based Korean who sat on
repatriation cooperative committees in Okayama, visited North Korea in
1960 to participate in the celebrations of the fifteenth anniversary
of Korean liberation. Since the publication of<i> Exodus to North
Koreas</i>, Han Soggyu's<i> Nihon kara "Kita" ni kaetta hito
no monogatari</i> [The story of returnees to the "North"
from Japan] (Tokyo: Shinkansha, 2007), a "novel based on actual
stories" of returnees (<i>jitsuwa shosetsu</i>), has also
appeared.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<x-tab> </x-tab> <br>
Citation:<br>
Caprio, Mark 2008<br>
Review of _Exodus to North Korea: Shadows From Japan's Cold War_, by
Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2007)<br>
_Korean Studies Review_ 2008, no. 1<br>
Electronic file: http://koreaweb.ws/ks/ksr/ksr08-01.htm</font></div>
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