<div><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">Hello
Everyone,<br><br>As this year marks the 60th
anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War
(1950-2010), it is good opportunity to examine the role that three out
of the five Cambridge Spies played in the war. It is not widely known
that these three particular individuals (Donald Maclean, Guy
Burgess and Kim Philby) were deeply involved in Korean War. Their
involvement inflicted colossal damage upon the Korean and U.N. forces
during the first 10 months (June 1950-April 1951) of the war. <br>
<br>
General MacArthur asserted that "Philby, as well as Burgess and
Maclean had betrayed the plans and the order of battle of the U.S. 8th
Army in Korea to the communist intelligence services, and that thirty
thousand men had been killed, wounded or captured through that
betrayal." If
we consider that the total U.S. casualties during 3 years of the Korean
war was 33,870 dead and 142,000 wounded, the casualties attributed to
these three Cambridge spies was almost 6% in less than 10 months
out of all 37 months of the war (June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953). It should
be noted that in the week preceding Maclean's appointment on September
1, 1950, as the Head of the American Department of the British Foreign
Office, the U.N. had suffered its fewest casualties in seven weeks. <br>
<br>
At the time, all three spies were in prime positions where their
treasonous
activities would have maximum impact and as the saying goes, truly,
they were cats at the fish stall.<br><br></font><div> Name
Post(06/50-04/51) In U.S.
Bolted to USSR <br>
Donald Maclean Head, American Dept, British Foreign Office
04/44-09/48 May,1951<br>Guy Burgess 2nd Secretary, British
Embassy, D.C. 08/50-04/51 May,1951<br>
transferred
to U.S. from Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office<br>
Kim Philby SIS(M16) liaison to U.S. CIA & FBI
10/49-06/51 Jan., 1963</div><br><br>
<p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">While the three were in London
and Washington, D.C. they did everything in their power to see that
the Soviet Union prevailed by providing highly secret policy and
military
information originating from the British mission in Peking, the British
cabinet, the White House, CIA, State Department, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General MacArthur and General Walker, the U.S. 8th Army Commander
in Korea. <br>
<br>
The presence of the Commonwealth Brigade ( Britain , Canada , Australia
and New Zealand ) in Korea helped to preserve the idea that the U.S.
was not acting unilaterally in Korea , but as an agent of the U.N. Thus,
from the first day of the war, the Pentagon leaders went out of their
way to provide British military and diplomatic representatives with
special treatment and access. MacArthur did same to Britain 's ranking
political adviser in Japan who was able to provide London with
information
on proposed operations, bombing targets, and tactical decisions. Those
reports originating in Tokyo and in Peking went directly to the Far
Eastern Department, which were then copied to Maclean at the American
Department. Because of this routing, Maclean was able to get all reports
from Washington , Tokyo as well as from Peking . <br>
</font> <font face="Times New Roman" size="3"><br>
Yuri Modin, the Cambridge Spies’ KGB London Controller noted, "On
Sunday 25 June, the day the North invaded the South, Burgess and his
friend Maclean (on medical leave until Sept. 1st.) were more active than
ever. Burgess
gave me what he could: usually he annotated the documents in his own
hand with comments about the attitude of the British Government and
the possibility of an escalation of the war. Maclean, too supplied his
own comments." For these Soviet spies, there were no Sundays, nor
medical leave, only Stalin. Modin also noted that the information
provided
by the London agents (Maclean and Burgess) was so valuable and important
that these were forwarded to "three addresses" only, Joseph Stalin,
Foreign
Commissar Molotov and KGB chief Beria. <br>
<br>
Not only was top secret, day-to-day military information, including
the daily order of battle, compromised, but Washington’s war policy
decisions and the following directives to MacArthur were also
compromised: <br>
<br>
1. MacArthur was specially ordered to prevent any Nationalist (Formosa)
attacks on mainland Communist China. Thus, the Red Chinese moved two
of their best field armies from their coastal defenses opposite Formosa
to the staging areas north of the Yalu. When the Red Chinese decided
to intervene in Korea , these two armies under Lin Pioa (Lin Biao)
spearheaded
the attack. <br>
<br>
2. The restriction upon air reconnaissance of Manchuria ordered by
Washington
. It’s scope was confined entirely to Korea itself and nothing beyond. <br>
<br>
3. Washington's order "not to interfere with the operations of
the Supung (</font><font face="Arial Unicode MS" size="3">수풍</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">) Hydroelectric Power Plant near
Sinuiju
(</font><font face="Arial Unicode MS" size="3">신의주</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">) in North Korea". This installation
on the south bank of the Yalu supplied power not only to North Korea
but also to industrial and munitions plants in Manchuria and Siberia
. Later, Washington also ordered MacArthur make no moves against Chinese
units which were entering North Korea to take up position around the
power plant. They knew that MacArthur was forbidden to bomb the power
plant. <br>
<br>
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's refusal to bomb the Najin (</font><font face="Arial Unicode MS" size="3">나진</font><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">)
depot on the east coast, to which the Soviet Union forwarded supplies
from Vladivostok for the North Korean Army. <br>
<br>
5. The Defense Secretary Marshall's order to MacArthur "to postpone
all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border."
Later MacArthur commented on this order, "It seemed to me incredible
that protection should be extended to the enemy, not only of the bridges
(over the Yalu, between North Korea and China) which were the only means
the Chinese had for moving their men and supplies across that wide
natural
river barrier into North Korea, but also for a 5 mile deep area on this
side of the Yalu in which to establish a bridgehead." <br>
<br>
6. Washington 's prohibition of hot pursuit of Soviet MIG-15s that had
attacked U.S. planes, conducting hit-and-run sorties back to their
Manchurian
sanctuary. The doctrine of hot pursuit was not applicable in Korea
because
it carried with it the "great danger of provoking the Soviets".
Later Dean Rusk(Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
during the Korean War) commented, "in retrospect, we made one mistake
that I came to regret. I feel now that we should have allowed hot
pursuit
across the Yalu. Not permitting this was asking too much of our men." <br>
<br>
7. The British proposal to appease the Chinese Communists by giving
them a strip of Northern Korea as a "buffer area", which was
an ingenious solution to the problem of combating Red Chinese
intervention. <br></font><br></p>
<p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">In addition to the above, the
following agreements were made between Truman and British Prime Minister
Atlee in December, 1950. Within hours of their meetings, a highly
classified
transcript of their talks was sent directly to Maclean at the Foreign
Office to include: <br>
<br>
1. No naval blockade off the coast of China , in view of the extent
of British trade with China through Hong Kong . <br>
<br>
2. The U.S. would not use an Atomic Bomb without prior consultation
with the British. <br>
<br>
Regarding these agreements, Cecil Robert, Maclean's deputy at the time,
likened the Korean War to a game of high stakes poker. He commented
"He (Maclean) enabled Stalin and Mao to know not only which cards
Truman and Atlee held, but how many chips Peking and Moscow would have
to push into the center of the table to get London to insist that the
West should fold it hands." <br>
<br>
The first commander who raised the question of a possible intelligence
leakage was General Walker, though later, other high ranking military
commanders followed. On several occasions Walker complained
bitterly
to MacArthur that his operational plans, which were always telegraphed
to Washington under the highest secrecy classification, were being
leaked
to the enemy, thereby giving the latter constant awareness regarding
his battlefield strategy. General Van Fleet, The 8th Army Commander
after
Walker was killed in automobile accident, later testified before the
Senate that "the enemy would not have entered Korea if he did not
feel safe from attack in North China and Manchuria . My own conviction
is there must have been information to the enemy that we would not
attack
his home bases." General Edward Almond, the X Corps Commander,
also testified before the same Senate committee, that "the things
as they happened looked very strange insofar as the assurance upon which
the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been a very
hazardous
thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant numbers in
which they did, if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition
or any other base would be subject to attack." Admiral Turner Joy, the
U.N. Naval Commander in Korea expressed the same sentiments. <br>
<br>
Most formidably, General James Gavin, a hero at the Normandy landing
and later Kennedy's ambassador to France , recalls that during his
service
in the last critical months of 1950, the enemy repeatedly displayed
an uncanny knowledge of U.N. troop deployment. He said " I have
no doubt whatsoever that the Chinese moved confidently and skillfully
in to North Korea, and, in fact, I believe that they were able to do
this because they were well-informed not only of the moves Walker would
make but of the limitations on what he might not do. At the time, it
was difficult to account for this but I am quite sure now that all of
MacArthur's plans flowed into the hands of the Communists through the
British Foreign Office." <br>
</font><br></p>
<p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">Dean Rusk, who knew Maclean
from Washington and was the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs during the Korean War, later told William Manchester, "It
can be assumed, first, anything we in our government knew about Korea
would have been known at the British Embassy and second, that officers
in the Embassy of the rank of these three would have known what the
British Embassy knew." <br>
<br>
But the mother of all acknowledgments came from none other than General
Lin Pioa (Lin Biao). The Chinese Commander in Korea himself tacitly
admitted that he had known all of the limitations placed on the U.N.
forces. He obviously knew everything, from no Nationalist Chinese
attacks
on Red China, no hot pursuit, no bridges to connecting Manchuria to
North Korea, no strikes against dams or power plants, all targets in
Manchuria and China off-limits, the date and order of battle for the
end of the war offensive, no economic blockade and finally no risk of
the atomic bomb. He specifically said "I would never have made
the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been
assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking
adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and
communication."
Because of the information provided by the three spies, Peking and
Moscow
knew that they were fighting almost a risk free war. <br>
<br>
Later in 1968, from the safety of Moscow, Philby had the audacity to say
about his
friend Maclean, "After his departure, it was said blandly that
he was 'only' the head of the American Department of the Foreign Office,
and that had little access to high-grade information. But it is nonsense
to suppose that a resolute and experienced operator occupying a senior
post in the Foreign Office can have access only to papers that are
placed
on his desk in the ordinary course of duty." Regarding his own
involvement in Korean War, he wrote to Manchester in 1978, “Was there
a leak or wasn't there? I do not know, and, if I did I probably could
not tell you. The question is left hanging." <br>
<br>
Some smoking guns, to further implicate the three include:</font> <font face="Times New Roman" size="3"> <br>
</font></p><p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">1. In Philby's own
words, "In my garage-cum-potting-shed, I slipped
a trowel into my briefcase and then went down to the basement. I wrapped
a camera, tripod and accessories into waterproof containers, and bundled
them in after the trowel. I had often rehearsed the necessary action
in my mind's eye, and had lain the basis for it. It had became my
frequent
habit to drive out to Great Falls to spend a peaceful half-hour between
bouts of CIA-FBI liaison, and on the way I had marked down a spot
suitable
for the action that had now became necessary, where the undergrowth
was high and dense enough for concealment and got to work with trowel.
As far as inanimate objects were concerned, I was clean as a whistle." <br>
<br>
2. Cecil Robert, one of Maclean's two deputies in the Department,
acknowledged
that Donald had access to most of the important telegrams passing
between
the Foreign Office and posts abroad, as well as large selection of
Cabinet
papers, some of which Cecil found locked in Maclean's cabinet after
he fled to Russia. <br>
<br>
3. Inside Burgess' abandoned car, the FBI found graphs and charts on
the strength of American armed forces, defense expenditures for the
U.S. from 1943 to1950, and maps of various defense installations. <br>
<br>
Fortunately(?) for South Korea, their espionage activities abruptly
ended
in April of 1951when Maclean and Burgess escaped to Russia in May.
Otherwise Korea 's geopolitical situation would
have been much different than it is now, though one cannot help but
wonder how the course or duration of the Korean War may have differed,
had it not been for the involvement of the Cambridge Spies. <br>
<br><br>
<b><u>Sources </u></b></font> <br></p>
<p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">1) <i>U.S. News & World
Reports</i>, September 30, 1955 - <i>"How Two Spies Cost The U.S.
A War" <br>
<br>
2) The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess
in America , </i>by Verne W. Newton <br>
<br>
3) <i>An American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur: 1880 -1964</i>, by William
Manchester <br>
<br>
4) <i>Reminiscences</i>, by Douglas MacArthur <br>
<br>
5) <i>MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History</i>, by Major General
Courtney
Whitney <br>
<br>
6) <i>Treason in the Blood</i>, by Anthony Cave Brown <br>
<br>
7) <i>As I Saw It</i>, by Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk <br>
<br>
8) <i>My Silent War</i>, by Kim Philby <br>
<br>
9) <i>My 5 Cambridge Friends</i>, by Yuri Modin</font></p><p><br></p><p><font face="Times New Roman" size="3">Thank you very much for your time.<br></font></p><p><font size="3"><font face="Times New Roman">Kwang-On Yoo</font></font></p>
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