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<div class=Section1>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>But Lin Biao was never in Korea – he refused
the command and Peng Dehuai went instead. Lin went to the Soviet Union for
medical treatment in September 1950.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>As for the quote from Mr Newton, it does
not sound as though Stalin was relying on information from Mclean etc in coming
to his decision.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I also wonder just how much military
information, as distinct from political material, would have reached either Maclean
or Burgess – I suspect that it would have been very broad brush stuff, not the
detail that is being implied here.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Jim Hoare<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><font size=3
face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>
<hr size=2 width="100%" align=center tabindex=-1>
</span></font></div>
<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font size=2
face=Tahoma><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
koreanstudies-bounces@koreaweb.ws [mailto:koreanstudies-bounces@koreaweb.ws] <b><span
style='font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Kwang On Yoo<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> 03 July 2010 04:50<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Korean Studies Discussion List<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> Re: [KS] The Korean War
and The Three Cambridge Spies</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>Dear
Mr. SzalontaI,<br>
<br>
Thank you for the mail.<br>
<br>
*Ex U.S. State Dept. official Mr. Verne Newton, mainly quoting Khrushvhev's
memoirs states how, when and why Stalin decided to support Kim Il Sung's
invasion plan;<br>
' Kim Il Sung and his delegate arrived in Moscow in late December 1949, just
six months after the last U.S. troops were pulled out of South Korea. Kim
informed his host that he wanted "to prod the South Koreans with the point
of a bayonet," and later returned to Moscow with a concrete plan,
including an assurance that a popular uprising would greet the North Korean
Army. Still, Khrushchev reports, "Stalin had his doubts. He was worried
that the Americans would jump in. " He decided to consult with Mao, who
had been in Moscow during the time Kim Il Sung's plans were being reviewed. The
Chinese leader was all for the action and Stalin then gave his final
approval." <br>
<br>
*p300-301, The Cambridge Spies;<br>
The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess in America<br>
Verne W. Newton<br>
<br>
Then Stalin reportedly asked Kim, " Don't blame me when you have bloody
nose."<br>
<br>
**In his <b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Reminiscences </span></b>MacArthur
observes that after the war an official leaflet by Lin Piao published in China
reads; " I would never have made the attack and risked my men and military
reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General
MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my line of supply
and communication"<br>
<br>
** Reminiscences<br>
Douglas MacArthur<br>
<br>
It was definitely Lin Piao = Lin Biao = <a
href="http://www.mdbg.net/chindict/chindict.php?cdqchi=%E6%9E%97%E5%BD%AA"
target="_blank" style='background-attachment:scroll;background-position-x:0%;
background-position-y:0%'><span lang=KO style='border:solid #8080FF 1.5pt;
padding:0cm;background:#E0E0FF'>×ùøó</span></a> = <span lang=KO>ÀÓÇ¥</span> not
Peng Dehuai = <a
href="http://www.mdbg.net/chindict/chindict.php?cdqchi=%E5%BD%AD%E5%BE%B7%E6%87%B7"
target="_blank"><span lang=KO>ø°Óìüã</span></a> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>= <span
lang=KO>ÆØ´öȸ</span> who made the above statement. (Sorry, I misspelled Piao as
Pioa.)<br>
<br>
Thank you.<br>
<br>
Kwang-On Yoo<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span lang=KO style='font-size:12.0pt'>À¯
±¤¾ð</span><o:p></o:p></font></p>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>On
Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Balazs Szalontai <<a
href="mailto:aoverl@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">aoverl@yahoo.co.uk</a>>
wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0>
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<td valign=top style='padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>Dear
All,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>I
wonder what is the latest opinion about the extent to which the information
supplied by the Cambridge spies might have influenced Stalin's decision
to give his consent to Kim Il Sung's invasion plan, first in late
January and then in March-April. Of the authors who covered this
subject, several scholars (e.g., Kathryn Weathersby) expressed the opinion
that the confidential information thus obtained probably encouraged Stalin
who concluded that U.S. military retaliation was unlikely. In contrast,
some other historians (e.g., Bruce Cumings) concluded that if Stalin, thanks
to the British spies, was indeed privy to the confidential plans of
the Truman administration, he might have easily concluded that the U.S. would
<i><span style='font-style:italic'>not </span></i>let the ROK be
attacked by the North without retaliation (and thus he may have actually
wanted to provoke U.S. involvement in this local conflict of secondary
strategic importance). Since one of my ongoing research projects is
focused on Stalin's role in the Korean War, I am greatly interested in
your views on this issue.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>PS:
I wonder if the statement cited in the article below ("I would never
have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not
been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking
adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and
communication.") was indeed made by Lin Biao (or Lin Piao, but
definitely not Lin Pioa:)), or mistakenly attributed to him, rather than to
Peng Dehuai (whose actual military role in the PLA offensive in question was
greater). <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>With
best regards,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>Dr.
Balazs Szalontai<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>Mongolia
International University <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><br>
<br>
--- On <b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Thu, 1/7/10, Kwang On Yoo <i><span
style='font-style:italic'><<a href="mailto:lovehankook@gmail.com"
target="_blank">lovehankook@gmail.com</a>></span></i></span></b> wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #1010FF 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 4.0pt;
margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3 face=Gulim><span
style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>Hello
Everyone,<br>
<br>
As this year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War
(1950-2010), it is good opportunity to examine the role that three out of the
five Cambridge Spies played in the war. It is not widely known that these
three particular individuals (Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess and Kim Philby)
were deeply involved in Korean War. Their involvement inflicted colossal
damage upon the Korean and U.N. forces during the first 10 months (June
1950-April 1951) of the war. <br>
<br>
General MacArthur asserted that "Philby, as well as Burgess and Maclean
had betrayed the plans and the order of battle of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea
to the communist intelligence services, and that thirty thousand men had been
killed, wounded or captured through that betrayal." If we consider
that the total U.S. casualties during 3 years of the Korean war was
33,870 dead and 142,000 wounded, the casualties attributed to these three
Cambridge spies was almost 6% in less than 10 months out of all 37 months of the
war (June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953). It should be noted that in the week
preceding Maclean's appointment on September 1, 1950, as the Head of the
American Department of the British Foreign Office, the U.N. had suffered its
fewest casualties in seven weeks. <br>
<br>
At the time, all three spies were in prime positions where their treasonous
activities would have maximum impact and as the saying goes, truly, they were
cats at the fish stall.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>Name
Post(06/50-04/51)
In U.S. Bolted to USSR
<br>
Donald Maclean Head, American Dept, British Foreign Office
04/44-09/48 May,1951<br>
Guy Burgess 2nd Secretary,
British Embassy,
D.C.
08/50-04/51 May,1951<br>
transferred to U.S. from Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office<br>
Kim
Philby
SIS(M16) liaison to U.S. CIA & FBI
10/49-06/51 Jan., 1963<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3 face=Gulim><span
style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><font size=3
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>While
the three were in London and Washington, D.C. they did everything in their
power to see that the Soviet Union prevailed by providing highly secret
policy and military information originating from the British mission in
Peking, the British cabinet, the White House, CIA, State Department, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur and General Walker, the U.S. 8th
Army Commander in Korea. <br>
<br>
The presence of the Commonwealth Brigade ( Britain , Canada , Australia and
New Zealand ) in Korea helped to preserve the idea that the U.S. was not
acting unilaterally in Korea , but as an agent of the U.N. Thus, from the
first day of the war, the Pentagon leaders went out of their way to provide
British military and diplomatic representatives with special treatment and
access. MacArthur did same to Britain 's ranking political adviser in Japan
who was able to provide London with information on proposed operations,
bombing targets, and tactical decisions. Those reports originating in Tokyo
and in Peking went directly to the Far Eastern Department, which were then
copied to Maclean at the American Department. Because of this routing,
Maclean was able to get all reports from Washington , Tokyo as well as from
Peking . <br>
</span></font>
<font face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'><br>
Yuri Modin, the Cambridge Spies</span></font><span lang=KO>¡¯</span><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'> KGB
London Controller noted, "On Sunday 25 June, the day the North invaded
the South, Burgess and his friend Maclean (on medical leave until Sept. 1st.)
were more active than ever. Burgess gave me what he could: usually he
annotated the documents in his own hand with comments about the attitude of
the British Government and the possibility of an escalation of the war.
Maclean, too supplied his own comments." For these Soviet spies, there
were no Sundays, nor medical leave, only Stalin. Modin also noted that the
information provided by the London agents (Maclean and Burgess) was so
valuable and important that these were forwarded to "three
addresses" only, Joseph Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov and KGB chief
Beria. <br>
<br>
Not only was top secret, day-to-day military information, including the daily
order of battle, compromised, but Washington</span></font><span lang=KO>¡¯</span><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>s war
policy decisions and the following directives to MacArthur were also
compromised: <br>
<br>
1. MacArthur was specially ordered to prevent any Nationalist (Formosa)
attacks on mainland Communist China. Thus, the Red Chinese moved two of their
best field armies from their coastal defenses opposite Formosa to the staging
areas north of the Yalu. When the Red Chinese decided to intervene in Korea ,
these two armies under Lin Pioa (Lin Biao) spearheaded the attack. <br>
<br>
2. The restriction upon air reconnaissance of Manchuria ordered by Washington
. It</span></font><span lang=KO>¡¯</span><font face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>s scope was confined entirely to Korea
itself and nothing beyond. <br>
<br>
3. Washington's order "not to interfere with the operations of the
Supung (</span></font><font face="Arial Unicode MS"><span lang=KO
style='font-family:"Arial Unicode MS"'>¼ödz</span></font><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>)
Hydroelectric Power Plant near Sinuiju (</span></font><font
face="Arial Unicode MS"><span lang=KO style='font-family:"Arial Unicode MS"'>½ÅÀÇÁÖ</span></font><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>) in North
Korea". This installation on the south bank of the Yalu supplied power
not only to North Korea but also to industrial and munitions plants in
Manchuria and Siberia . Later, Washington also ordered MacArthur make no
moves against Chinese units which were entering North Korea to take up
position around the power plant. They knew that MacArthur was forbidden to
bomb the power plant. <br>
<br>
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's refusal to bomb the Najin (</span></font><font
face="Arial Unicode MS"><span lang=KO style='font-family:"Arial Unicode MS"'>³ªÁø</span></font><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>) depot on
the east coast, to which the Soviet Union forwarded supplies from Vladivostok
for the North Korean Army. <br>
<br>
5. The Defense Secretary Marshall's order to MacArthur "to postpone all
bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border." Later
MacArthur commented on this order, "It seemed to me incredible that
protection should be extended to the enemy, not only of the bridges (over the
Yalu, between North Korea and China) which were the only means the Chinese
had for moving their men and supplies across that wide natural river barrier
into North Korea, but also for a 5 mile deep area on this side of the Yalu in
which to establish a bridgehead." <br>
<br>
6. Washington 's prohibition of hot pursuit of Soviet MIG-15s that had
attacked U.S. planes, conducting hit-and-run sorties back to their Manchurian
sanctuary. The doctrine of hot pursuit was not applicable in Korea because it
carried with it the "great danger of provoking the Soviets". Later
Dean Rusk(Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the
Korean War) commented, "in retrospect, we made one mistake that I came
to regret. I feel now that we should have allowed hot pursuit across the
Yalu. Not permitting this was asking too much of our men." <br>
<br>
7. The British proposal to appease the Chinese Communists by giving them a
strip of Northern Korea as a "buffer area", which was an ingenious
solution to the problem of combating Red Chinese intervention. </span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>In addition to the
above, the following agreements were made between Truman and British Prime
Minister Atlee in December, 1950. Within hours of their meetings, a highly
classified transcript of their talks was sent directly to Maclean at the
Foreign Office to include: <br>
<br>
1. No naval blockade off the coast of China , in view of the extent of
British trade with China through Hong Kong . <br>
<br>
2. The U.S. would not use an Atomic Bomb without prior consultation with the
British. <br>
<br>
Regarding these agreements, Cecil Robert, Maclean's deputy at the time,
likened the Korean War to a game of high stakes poker. He commented "He
(Maclean) enabled Stalin and Mao to know not only which cards Truman and
Atlee held, but how many chips Peking and Moscow would have to push into the
center of the table to get London to insist that the West should fold it
hands." <br>
<br>
The first commander who raised the question of a possible intelligence
leakage was General Walker, though later, other high ranking military
commanders followed. On several
occasions Walker complained bitterly to MacArthur that his operational plans,
which were always telegraphed to Washington under the highest secrecy
classification, were being leaked to the enemy, thereby giving the latter
constant awareness regarding his battlefield strategy. General Van
Fleet, The 8th Army Commander after Walker was killed in automobile accident,
later testified before the Senate that "the enemy would not have entered
Korea if he did not feel safe from attack in North China and Manchuria . My
own conviction is there must have been information to the enemy that we would
not attack his home bases." General Edward Almond, the X Corps
Commander, also testified before the same Senate committee, that "the
things as they happened looked very strange insofar as the assurance upon
which the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been a very
hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant numbers
in which they did, if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition or
any other base would be subject to attack." Admiral Turner Joy, the
U.N. Naval Commander in Korea expressed the same sentiments. <br>
<br>
Most formidably, General James Gavin, a hero at the Normandy landing and
later Kennedy's ambassador to France , recalls that during his service in the
last critical months of 1950, the enemy repeatedly displayed an uncanny
knowledge of U.N. troop deployment. He said " I have no doubt whatsoever
that the Chinese moved confidently and skillfully in to North Korea, and, in
fact, I believe that they were able to do this because they were
well-informed not only of the moves Walker would make but of the limitations
on what he might not do. At the time, it was difficult to account for this
but I am quite sure now that all of MacArthur's plans flowed into the
hands of the Communists through the British Foreign Office." <br>
</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>Dean Rusk, who knew
Maclean from Washington and was the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs during the Korean War, later told William Manchester,
"It can be assumed, first, anything we in our government knew about
Korea would have been known at the British Embassy and second, that officers
in the Embassy of the rank of these three would have known what the British
Embassy knew." <br>
<br>
But the mother of all acknowledgments came from none other than General Lin
Pioa (Lin Biao). The Chinese Commander in Korea himself tacitly admitted that
he had known all of the limitations placed on the U.N. forces. He obviously
knew everything, from no Nationalist Chinese attacks on Red China, no hot
pursuit, no bridges to connecting Manchuria to North Korea, no strikes
against dams or power plants, all targets in Manchuria and China off-limits,
the date and order of battle for the end of the war offensive, no economic
blockade and finally no risk of the atomic bomb. He specifically said "I
would never have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if
I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from
taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and
communication." Because of the information provided by the three spies,
Peking and Moscow knew that they were fighting almost a risk free war. <br>
<br>
Later in 1968, from the safety of Moscow, Philby had the audacity to say
about his friend Maclean, "After his departure, it was said blandly that
he was 'only' the head of the American Department of the Foreign Office, and
that had little access to high-grade information. But it is nonsense to
suppose that a resolute and experienced operator occupying a senior post in
the Foreign Office can have access only to papers that are placed on his desk
in the ordinary course of duty." Regarding his own involvement in Korean
War, he wrote to Manchester in 1978, </span></font><span lang=KO>¡°</span><font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'>Was there
a leak or wasn't there? I do not know, and, if I did I probably could not
tell you. The question is left hanging." <br>
<br>
Some smoking guns, to further implicate the three include:</span></font> <font
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-family:"Times New Roman"'> </span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>1. In Philby's own
words, "In my garage-cum-potting-shed, I slipped a trowel into my
briefcase and then went down to the basement. I wrapped a camera, tripod and
accessories into waterproof containers, and bundled them in after the trowel.
I had often rehearsed the necessary action in my mind's eye, and had lain the
basis for it. It had became my frequent habit to drive out to Great Falls to
spend a peaceful half-hour between bouts of CIA-FBI liaison, and on the way I
had marked down a spot suitable for the action that had now became necessary,
where the undergrowth was high and dense enough for concealment and got to
work with trowel. As far as inanimate objects were concerned, I was clean as
a whistle." <br>
<br>
2. Cecil Robert, one of Maclean's two deputies in the Department,
acknowledged that Donald had access to most of the important telegrams
passing between the Foreign Office and posts abroad, as well as large
selection of Cabinet papers, some of which Cecil found locked in Maclean's
cabinet after he fled to Russia. <br>
<br>
3. Inside Burgess' abandoned car, the FBI found graphs and charts on the
strength of American armed forces, defense expenditures for the U.S. from
1943 to1950, and maps of various defense installations. <br>
<br>
Fortunately(?) for South Korea, their espionage activities abruptly ended in
April of 1951when Maclean and Burgess escaped to Russia in May. Otherwise
Korea 's geopolitical situation would have been much different than it is
now, though one cannot help but wonder how the course or duration of the
Korean War may have differed, had it not been for the involvement of the
Cambridge Spies. <br>
<br>
<br>
<b><u><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sources </span></u></b></span></font> <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>1) <i><span
style='font-style:italic'>U.S. News & World Reports</span></i>, September
30, 1955 - <i><span style='font-style:italic'>"How Two Spies Cost The
U.S. A War" <br>
<br>
2) The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess in
America , </span></i>by Verne W. Newton <br>
<br>
3) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>An American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur:
1880 -1964</span></i>, by William Manchester <br>
<br>
4) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>Reminiscences</span></i>, by Douglas
MacArthur <br>
<br>
5) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History</span></i>,
by Major General Courtney Whitney <br>
<br>
6) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>Treason in the Blood</span></i>, by
Anthony Cave Brown <br>
<br>
7) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>As I Saw It</span></i>, by Dean Rusk,
as told to Richard Rusk <br>
<br>
8) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>My Silent War</span></i>, by Kim
Philby <br>
<br>
9) <i><span style='font-style:italic'>My 5 Cambridge Friends</span></i>, by
Yuri Modin</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>Thank you very much
for your time.</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"'>Kwang-On Yoo</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><img
border=0 width=32 height=32 id="_x0000_i1025" src="%20">Reply<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face=Gulim><span style='font-size:12.0pt'><img
border=0 width=32 height=32 id="_x0000_i1026" src="%20">Forward<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
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