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Dear Kwang On,<BR>
<BR>
Thanks for yet another intereting email. To understand the apprently arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th Parallel, one might also consider the division of Vietnam, for the four allies--the US, the UK, the USSR and China--each got half of Vietnam or Korea in 1945. At the same moment that the US and USSR divided Korea to accept the ceremonial swords of Japanese commanders, China and the UK divided Vietnam at the 16th Parallel so each of the Big Four would get something. This seemingly insignificant piece of information becomes important when we remember that after the 1954 defeat of France by the Viet Minh, Vietnam was subsequently divided at the 17th Parallel, no longer at the 16th, by the Geneva Agreement. Clearly the new line was drawn further to the north so that Hue, the country's third largest city and old imperial capital, would fall within the French/US zone of control.<BR>
<BR>
Again, US policymakers were surprised by communist "generosity," which might alternatively be interpreted as a desire to avoid further war and trust among former allies.<BR>
<BR>
George Katsiaficas<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----<BR>
Von: Kwang On Yoo [<A HREF="mailto:lovehankook@gmail.com">mailto:lovehankook@gmail.com</A>]<BR>
Gesendet: So 26.06.2011 09:28<BR>
An: afostercarter@aol.com<BR>
Betreff: How 38th Parallel became demarcation line between South and North Korea in 1945?<BR>
<BR>
Hello,<BR>
<BR>
*We had not selected the 38th parallel as a permanent boundary; we had<BR>
simply proposed it to facilitate the acceptance of the Japanese surrender,<BR>
American in South, Russian in North. It was designed to serve temporary<BR>
military expediency. Division along the parallel made no sense economically<BR>
or geographically as far as Korea itself was concerned.* - Dean Rusk<BR>
<BR>
Sixty-one years ago on Sunday, June 25th, 1950, North Korean Armed Forces<BR>
crossed over the 38th parallel, starting the bloody Korean war which lasted<BR>
for more than three years. In the course of the war, each side crossed this<BR>
artificial line no less than four times.<BR>
<BR>
This is how the infamous 38th parallel became the demarcation line between<BR>
South and North Korea in 1945; Korea's almost accidental, yet fateful,<BR>
partition. A temporary line of convenience to stop the Red Army from<BR>
occupying the whole peninsula.<BR>
<BR>
Adhering to the Postdam Declaration of July 28, 1945, only after Japanese<BR>
surrender was warranted and the tide of the war definitely turned towards<BR>
the Allied favor, the Soviet Union declared war upon Japan the first week of<BR>
1945 and joined the United States, the United Kingdom and China in support<BR>
of *"independence of Korea, in due course".*<BR>
<BR>
During the hectic days of early August, 1945, the necessity of a quick<BR>
decision on the division of responsibility for accepting the surrender of<BR>
Japanese forces in Korea became pressing. While the Japanese were<BR>
negotiating surrender with the United States, the Russian army prepared to<BR>
invade Korea. The situation called for a immediate action. Just three days<BR>
before Japan's August 15th surrender, Russian troops entered Korea. The<BR>
nearest American forces were in Okinawa, 1.500 km away and didn't arrive in<BR>
Incheon until September 8th!<BR>
<BR>
At the time, there were 117,000 Japanese troops in North Korea and 230,000<BR>
in South Korea .(Speculating that the U.S. Forces would invade Korea through<BR>
Jeju island Japanese amassed two army divisions in the island, three<BR>
divisions in the<BR>
southern provinces during the early 1945.)<BR>
<BR>
Dean Rusk, the chief architect responsible for drawing the line, revealed<BR>
his almost comedic decision in his 1990 memoir, "As I Saw It":<BR>
<BR>
*"One episode had greater significance than we realized at the time. Widely<BR>
scattered Japanese forces had to surrender, and the State and War Department<BR>
differed over where and when American forces should accept their surrender.<BR>
The State Department wanted us to accept the surrender as far north on the<BR>
mainland of China as possible, including key points in Manchuria. But the<BR>
U.S. Army, concerned about the future, did not want responsibility for areas<BR>
where it had no or few forces. In fact, the Army did not want to go onto the<BR>
mainland at all.<BR>
*<BR>
*We finally reached a compromise that would keep at least some U.S. forces<BR>
on the Asian mainland, a sort of toehold on the Korean peninsular for<BR>
symbolic purpose. During a SWINK (State/War/Navy) Coordinating Committee<BR>
meeting on August 14, 1945 (August 15, Korean Time) the same day of the<BR>
Japanese surrender, Colonel Charles Bonesteel (who later served in Korea<BR>
from 1966-1969 as Commanding General of the U.S. Forces in Korea) and I<BR>
(Dean Rusk was also a Army Colonel at the time) retired to adjacent room<BR>
late at night and studied intently a map of the Korean peninsular. Working<BR>
in haste and under great pressure, we had a formidable task: **to pick a<BR>
zone for the American occupation. **Neither Tic (Bonesteel's nickname since<BR>
his West Point days) nor I was a Korean expert, but it seemed to us that<BR>
Seoul, the capital, should be in the American sector. We also know that the<BR>
U.S. Army opposed an extensive area of occupation. Using a **National<BR>
Geographic map**, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing<BR>
line but could not find a natural geographic line. We saw instead the 38th<BR>
parallel and decided to recommend that.*<BR>
<BR>
*SWANK accepted it without too much haggling, and surprisingly, so did the<BR>
Soviets. I had thought they might insist on a line farther south in view of<BR>
our respective military position. No one present at our meeting, two young<BR>
American colonels, was aware that at the turn of the century the Russian and<BR>
Japanese had discussed spheres of influence in Korea divided along **the<BR>
38th Parallel***. Had we known that, we almost surely would have chosen<BR>
another line of demarcation. Remembering those earlier discussions, the<BR>
Russians might have interpreted our action **as acknowledgment their sphere<BR>
of influence in Korea, divided along the 38th parallel. **Any future talk<BR>
about the agreed-upon reunification of Korea would be seen as mere show. But<BR>
we were ignorant of all this, and SWINK'S choice of the 38th parallel,<BR>
recommended by two tired colonels working late at night, proved fateful.*"<BR>
<BR>
Surprisingly such a venerable Encyclopædia Britannica has described the same<BR>
line we are discussing as follows,<BR>
"The line was chosen by U.S. military<BR>
planners<<A HREF="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/617357/history-of-United-States">http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/617357/history-of-United-States</A>>at<BR>
the Potsdam<BR>
Conference<<A HREF="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472799/Potsdam-Conference">http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472799/Potsdam-Conference</A>>(July<BR>
1945) near the end of World<BR>
War II <<A HREF="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/648813/World-War-II">http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/648813/World-War-II</A>>- -<BR>
-."<BR>
How wrong they are!<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
*By August 14, the SWINK recommendation had been approved by the U.S. Joint<BR>
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the State Department and, finally, by President<BR>
Truman. The next day Truman sent a cable of a draft for the General Order<BR>
No.1, proposing to Stalin that the 38th Parallel be accepted as the<BR>
demarcation line and to the amazement of SWINK, Stalin wired back the next<BR>
day. "I have nothing against the substance of the Order." Those at SWINK<BR>
were amazed because Stalin could have waited a day or two and told Truman<BR>
that* the Soviet forces were well on their way to disarm all Japanese forces<BR>
on the Korean peninsular and hence no need for the U.S. to be concern about<BR>
the Japanese in Korea any more. Washington would have been dismayed but<BR>
there was nothing Americans could have done, the nearest American forces was<BR>
in Okinawa!*<BR>
<BR>
*<BR>
On August 16th, orders were issued to General MacArthur containing detailed<BR>
instructions on procedures and arrangements for receiving the surrender.<BR>
Predictably, the U.S. and Soviet zones hardened into separate regimes and<BR>
proclaimed in 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) south of the 38th Parallel<BR>
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the north.<BR>
<BR>
Incredibly, the U.S. government never bothered to inform the Korean<BR>
Provisional Government, in exile in China, the partition before or after the<BR>
fact. Korea was respected that much.<BR>
<BR>
The fateful partition had remained until the North Korea invaded South Korea<BR>
across the line 61 years ago today.<BR>
<BR>
Map: <A HREF="http://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%ED%8C%8C%EC%9D%BC:Korean_dmz_map.png">http://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%ED%8C%8C%EC%9D%BC:Korean_dmz_map.png</A><BR>
<BR>
<BR>
*Note;*<BR>
* *Rusk was referring to following event but it was the 39th Parallel, not<BR>
the 38th*: *In 1903, Russia went on to propose among others that the<BR>
territory of Korea north of the 39th parallel be declared a neutral zone<BR>
into which neither country would be permitted to introduce troops. The<BR>
tortuous negotiations went on through several sessions but no ground for<BR>
compromise could be found. Having failed to achieve its purpose through<BR>
diplomatic mean, Japan carried out a surprise attack on the Russian<BR>
installations at Port Arthur. The rivalry between the two powers now was to<BR>
be resolved by war, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.*<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Regards,<BR>
<BR>
Kwang-On Yoo<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
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