<span>Hello All, <br><br>In the winter of 1950, shortly after their entry into The Korean War, Chinese</span> <span>leadership</span>
sent following cables to Joseph Stalin. These cables, that can be found
at archive of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.,
shed light on how dire the <span>Chinese</span> situation was at the time.
<div style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </div>
<div style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;">In
the first cable, dated November 8th, 1950, Mao Zedong asks Stalin for a
supply of small arms and ammunition, needed by the upcoming February,
to replace the "trophies" captured from Japanese and the Nationalist <span>Chinese</span> which The People's Liberation Army were using at the time in Korea.<br><br><font style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">In the second cable, dated November 17th, 1950, the <span>Chinese</span> Premier, <span style="background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% yellow;">Zhou</span> <span style="background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% yellow;">Enlai, </span>urgently requests 500 automobiles that the Russians had in the <span style="background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% yellow;">Liaodong</span> peninsular to relieve hardships the <var></var><span>Chinese</span> Army were facing in Korea. The next day Stalin agreed.</font></div>
<div style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><b></b> </div>
<div style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;">President
Truman used to say that the Chinese were "sick of the whole thing and
wished they had never gotten into Korea." It seems as this statement was
not that far off the mark as barely three months after entry into the
war, even Mao was already considering negotiated peace. In a dispatch
sent to Stalin, he stated, "conducting negotiation will be advantageous
for China and (North) Korea." </div>
<br>As increasingly more Chinese documents in relation to the Korean War are made public, it <var></var>seems that Truman's statement may have been correct.<br><br>Regards,<br><br>Kwang-On Yoo<br><br><br><br><br><table border="0" cellpadding="5" width="100%">
<tbody><tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top"><td colspan="2"><b>Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin)</b></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td><b>Date:</b><br>
8 November 1950</td>
<td><b>Source:</b><br>
<i>APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 80-81</i></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td colspan="2"><b>Description:</b><br>
Request from Mao to Stalin for infantry arms, detailing specifically types and amounts of requested munitions. </td>
</tr>
</tbody></table><br>
<br>
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY<br><br>CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637<br>Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,<br>Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko<br>
<br>From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 minutes<br>8.11.1950<br><br>TOP PRIORITY <br><br>To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]<br><br>In view of the fact that the infantry arms<br>of the People’s Liberation Army are mainly<br>trophies captured from the enemy, there is a<br>
great variety in the calibers of the rifles.<br><br>Such a situation creates great difficulty<br>for the manufacture of ammunition, and in<br>particular for the production of rifle and<br>machine gun cartridges, especially as our<br>
factories can produce only very small quantities of these cartridges.<br><br>At present the troops of the volunteer army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divisions<br>of
the twelve armies, which are taking part in military operations in
KOREA, have only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun cartridges. In
the future, in connection with<br>the development of military operations, we<br>will have a very great need to supply the<br>army with ammunition. If there is no change<br>in military production, then the rearmament<br>can be begun in the second half of 1951.<br>
<br>For overcoming the difficulties of the present time I ask you to review the question<br>of the possibility of the delivery of small<br>arms
for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course of January and February
1951, according to the following list (name, quantity in pieces):<br><br>1. Soviet rifles 140,000.<br><br>2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000.<br><br>3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000.<br><br>4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns 80,000,000.<br>
<br>5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000.<br><br>6. Cartridges for light machine guns 37,000,000.<br><br>7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000.<br><br>8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns 20,000,000.<br><br>9. Pilots’ handguns 1,000.<br>
<br>10. Cartridges for pilots’ handguns 100,000.<br><br>11. TNT 1,000 tons.<br><br>I ask you to communicate to me the results of your review of my request.<br><br>I wish you health.<br><br>MAO ZEDONG<br><br>No. 2784<br>7.11.50
<br><br><br><br><br><br><table border="0" cellpadding="5" width="100%"><tbody><tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top"><td colspan="2"><b>Ciphered telegram, Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin)</b></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td><b>Date:</b><br>
17 November 1950</td>
<td><b>Source:</b><br>
<i>APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 122-123</i></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td colspan="2"><b>Description:</b><br>
Request from Zhou Enlai to Stalin for the rapid transfer of automobiles
from Soviet forces on the Liaodong Peninsula rather than the Chinese
rear, on account of enemy attacks on autotransport and the onset of
winter. These automobiles are to be credited from the 3000 originally
allocated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table><br>
<br>
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY<br><br>CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998<br>Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,<br>Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev<br>From Beijing Received 20 hours 45 minutes<br>
17.11.1950<br><br>EXTREMELY URGENT T<br><br>To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]<br><br>According
to a report from Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient
number of automobiles engaged in transport to the rear, enemy planes are
inflicting losses on autotransport, and also it is not possible to
ensure the supply of local human and material resources, food supply
and winter clothing cannot be secured in time and the troops are
experiencing hunger and cold.<br><br>A new operation will begin soon. Railroad bridges across the Yalu are subjected to bombardment by enemy planes every day.<br><br>The
river is beginning to freeze, and it is not possible to build submerged
bridges and pontoons. Therefore until such time as the river is frozen,
so that automobiles can cross the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days
transport at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and
ammunition. If we do not, it will have an influence on the next stage of
the fulfillment of the operation.<br><br>In view of this, besides the
mobilization of all automobiles in Manchuria that could be mobilized on
the front, we can mobilize a maximum of 200 automobiles from Northern
China and immediately send them to the front to relieve the difficult
situation.<br><br>I earnestly ask you to give a command to the commander
of the Soviet Army on the Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500
automobiles for our army. These 500 automobiles will be reimbursed on
the account of the portion which you promised to send from 25.11 to
25.12, numbering 3,000 automobiles.<br><br>Can you satisfy my request? I await your swift reply.<br><br>With bolshevik greetings.<br><br>ZHOU ENLAI<br>No. 2933<br>17.11 10:00
<img src="http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/images/spacer.gif" height="1" width="1"><br><br><table border="0" cellpadding="5" width="100%"><tbody><tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top"><td colspan="2"><b>Ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via Zakharov</b></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td><b>Date:</b><br>
17 November 1950</td>
<td><b>Source:</b><br>
<i>APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, List 124</i></td>
</tr>
<tr bgcolor="#e0f0ff" valign="top">
<td colspan="2"><b>Description:</b><br>
Stalin's affirmative response to Zhou Enlai's request of 16 November for automobiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table><br>
<br>
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5708<br>BEIJING<br><br>To Comrade Zakharov<br><br>For Comrade Zhou Enlai<br><br>I
received the telegram with the request for urgent delivery of 500
automobiles. Your request will be satisfied by us. In order to speed up
the transfer of the automobiles to you, having in mind to give you new
automobiles, orders have been given to our military command not to give
you old automobiles from Port Arthur, but to send new automobiles to the
Manchuria [railway] station and to transfer 140 automobiles to Chinese
representatives on 20 November and 355 automobiles on 25-26 November.<br><br>We
will speed up the shipment of the remaining automobiles and another
1,000 automobiles will arrive at the Manchurian station before 5
December.<br><br>FILIPPOV [Stalin]<br>17 November 1950
<br>