<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Taking into consideration the considerable influence that the U.S. wielded<VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR> in the IMF, I think it is correct to say that external pressure for financial and commercial deregulation was already fairly intense in the 1970s, though it was not yet a kind of official American government doctrine, and South Korea was not yet as heavily affected by it as some Latin American countries (I studied this process on the case of Uruguay, where a pro-monetarist military regime was established a few months before Pinochet's 1973 coup). It was pure financial orthodoxy, since at that time, the decline of the Soviet bloc was by no means in sight. Since it is well known that the U.S. government and Park Chung Hee were often in disagreement over what and where and how
should be developed (as the case of POSCO clearly illustrated), I think it is not unreasonable to assume that after his assassination, his successors were given more or less explicit suggestions and hints by Gleysteen and other prominent Americans with regard to the economic policies they considered desirable; in all probability, the Americans would have done so even if Kwangju had never occurred. Still, the term "consolidation" is quite appropriate for Chun's policies, all the more so because some negative elements of Park's model, such as regional imbalances in favor of the Southeast, continued to persist.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">All the best,</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Balazs</SPAN></div>
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<DIV style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; MARGIN: 5px 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; HEIGHT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-TOP: 0px" class=hr contentEditable=false readonly="true"></DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:</SPAN></B> Ruediger Frank <ruediger.frank@univie.ac.at><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> <BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Monday, 28 November 2011, 21:00<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising<BR></FONT><WBR>
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<DIV><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Dear all,<BR>I think around 1979/1980, as far as I know, US pressure for liberalization and deregulation was still rather low, or at least not higher than usual. This changed after Reagan became president in 1981 (Reaganomics), and in particular after events in the Soviet Union (deaths of Breshnev 1982, Andropov 1984 and Tschernenko 1985 as well as the emergence of Gorbatchev), Poland (since 1980) and Hungary (since 1984) showed to the U.S. government that its main opponent, the socialist system, was getting weaker and actually crubmled. This reduced the political need for Washington to keep both eyes closely shut when it came to the behavior of its key allies in the Cold War - and South Korea was one of them. I have spoken to members of the South Korean negotiating team in trade talks with the US in the late 1980s, and they reported about an abruptly changed attitude, now demanding liberalization
or else. They were shocked, because the issues of state procurement or IPR had been handled much more cooperatively in the years before. In fact, South Korea was designated as a Priority Foreign Country in 1989 under Super 301, which is among the heaviest sanctions the US Trade Representative can initiate. <BR>In any case, I think the events above came too late to have any relevance for the fate of Korea's economy in late 1979 and May 1980. The failure, or better: the end of the Park Chung-hee model was much more of a long-term and systemic nature. To me, one of the strengths of the South Korean development approach was its ability to get rid of a set of policies that had outlived themselves, rather than to keep riding a dead horse. Park CH did it when he switched to indicative planning and from light industry to HCI, and those after him did it when they allowed more market and more competition. By 1980, South Korea's economy had become much more
complex than in 1961 or 1972; the old tools, once having been responsible for growth, now became an obstacle and consequentially were replaced. That is a step socialism was never able to take, and hence it collapsed despite initial success.<BR>As for the classification of the early Chun economic policy as a revision of the Park CH approach, I'd rather use the term "consolidation", which I believe Cho Soon has suggested or was it Tat Yan Kong (don't have the books at hand, must rely on memory here). "Soft landing" was another term applied to that period. The high growth rates were not sustainable, and one-sided industrial policy had created structural imbalances. Not to mention the state's bailout policy, and the moral hazard it meant for the chaebòl. So I'd actually suggest a linear Rostow-type model.<BR>Regarding the intensity of the South Korean opposition, I'd add the North Korea factor. The South Korean government at that time was enormously
nervous about its own citizens, some of who seemed to believe life was better on the Northern side of the fence.<BR>In conclusion, I think the position of South Korea as a major US ally and front state in the Cold War and the permanent military and ideological threat from the North make the case of South Korea's economic development from 1961-1993 a very particular case. When we observe changes in policies or outcomes, we should always also consider possible changes that occurred in these two key areas.<BR>Best,<BR>Rudiger Frank<BR><BR><BR><BR>on Sonntag, 27. November 2011 at 12:02 you wrote:<BR><BR></SPAN>
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<TD width=1383><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'times new roman'; FONT-SIZE: 12pt">Let me suggest a somewhat different model of explanation. Instead simply juxtaposing Chun's de-regulatory economic policies with the demands of the democratic movement, one might draw up a triangular model, with Park Chung Hee's state-directed authoritarian modernization policy (particularly his massive post-1972 HCI drive) as the third pole. Gleysteen's telegrams clearly indicate that Chun's economic policies constituted a partial revision of Park's growth-centered, state-controlled, inflation-prone development model. To be sure, Professor Katsiaficas' presentation correctly places Chun's measures (and neo-liberalism in general) into the context of stagflation, a situation that emerged in South Korea in 1979-80. What may be added is that certain specific features of Park's post-1972 development model that distinguished South Korea from other NICs, such as the relatively high
inflation rate and the state-controlled credit policy that favored the chaebols, seems to have played a significant role in that popular opposition in South Korea in 1978-80 became unusually intensive by NIC standards. In other words, it was not simply the dismantlement of the pre-1980 economic model that negatively affected the population and provoked opposition but also the previous model itself. <BR> <BR>All the best,<BR>Balazs Szalontai<BR><BR><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'arial'; FONT-SIZE: 7pt"><B>From:</B> "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg@wit.edu><BR><B>To:</B> Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws>; Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk> <BR><B>Cc:</B> "youngeunchae@yahoo.com" <youngeunchae@yahoo.com> <BR><B>Sent:</B> Saturday, 26 November 2011, 23:35<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising<BR><BR><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'times
new roman'; FONT-SIZE: 12pt">A Power Point precisely on topic, is available at:<BR><A href="http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf" rel=nofollow target=_blank>http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf</A><BR><BR>It takes time to open and can be saved to one's machine. A main argument, now fairly widely accepted in Korea, is that US insistence on the crushing of the Gwangju Uprising, like its support for the coup in Chile in 1973 and in Turkey later in 1980, was aimed at imposition of neoliberal economic policies. <BR><BR>The Korean version is at:<BR><A href="http://eroseffect.com/korean/US_Gwangju.pdf" rel=nofollow target=_blank>http://eroseffect.com/korean/US_Gwangju.pdf</A><BR><BR>In addition, there are a number of articles in both languages on this website.<BR><BR>George<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'calibri'"><B>From: </B>don kirk <<A href="mailto:kirkdon@yahoo.com" rel=nofollow
target=_blank ymailto="mailto:kirkdon@yahoo.com">kirkdon@yahoo.com</A>><BR><B>Reply-To: </B>Korean Studies Discussion List <<A href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws" rel=nofollow target=_blank ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</A>><BR><B>Date: </B>Thu, 24 Nov 2011 16:03:49 -0800<BR><B>To: </B>Balazs Szalontai <<A href="mailto:aoverl@yahoo.co.uk" rel=nofollow target=_blank ymailto="mailto:aoverl@yahoo.co.uk">aoverl@yahoo.co.uk</A>>, Korean Studies Discussion List <<A href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws" rel=nofollow target=_blank ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</A>><BR><B>Subject: </B>Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising<BR><BR><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: 'times new roman'; FONT-SIZE: 10pt"><<A href="http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=youngeunchae@yahoo.com" rel=nofollow
target=_blank>youngeunchae@yahoo.com</A>><BR></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE><WBR><WBR></DIV></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></SPAN></DIV><WBR><WBR></DIV></DIV></div></body></html>