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One more point with regard to "Brian Hwang's Discussion Question" is
to consider the UN coalition that fought in Korea. With the
exception of American and British forces, all other units were mad
of volunteers. Their reasons for volunteering were similar to why
Koreans volunteered for Vietnam: economic (Europeans in particular
were still suffering from the impact of WWII), adventure (more
common then you think), anti-communism, idealism (belief in the UN),
and patriotism and sense of duty (support for their government).
Should we call them "mercenaries?" This is based on recent research
on what I call the "Uncommon Coalition."<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/16/2012 2:02 AM, Kent Davy wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAM_DL1Lf2+TwjhY1_ZZrLS=rmviyy=pnONw+HoroZ=PrM+niAA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">It's certainly not necessarily dispositive, especially
considering that various countries, including the US have not
subscribed to it; but a good starting place for any consideration
of the issue whether the ROK Forces in Vietnam were "mercenaries"
is the Geneva Convention. <span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:19px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">The </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:19px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:19px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">,
(Protocol 1)</span><span
style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13px;line-height:19px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">,
8 June 1977, stipulates in pertinent part as follows:</span>
<div>
<font face="sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div>
<p
style="margin-top:0.4em;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0.5em;margin-left:0px;line-height:1.5em;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12px">Art
47. Mercenaries</p>
<dl
style="margin-top:0.2em;margin-bottom:0.5em;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12px;line-height:19px">
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">...</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">2.
A mercenary is any person who:
<dl style="margin-top:0.2em;margin-bottom:0.5em">
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(a) is
especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight
in an armed conflict;</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(b) does,
in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(c) is
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by
the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised,
by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(d) is
neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the
conflict;</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(e) is
not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px">(f) has
not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed
forces.</dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px"><span
style="line-height:1.5em"><br>
</span></dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px"><span
style="line-height:1.5em">For what it's worth, its
quite clear, especially if one parses the various
components of this protocol, that the ROK soldiers in
Vietnam were not mercenaries under this international
law definition.</span></dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px"><span
style="line-height:1.5em"><br>
</span></dd>
<dd
style="line-height:1.5em;margin-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.1em;margin-right:0px"><span
style="line-height:1.5em">____________________________________________________________</span></dd>
</dl>
</dd>
</dl>
"The purpose of today's training is to defeat
yesterday's understanding."
<div><br>
</div>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 1:26 AM,
KimcheeGI <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kimcheegi@gmail.com">kimcheegi@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>George, Don, Kevin and Brian:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Let's also take a look at what the US Army says about
the matter of "Mercenary Payments" and economic benefits
(From Chapter 4 of <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch06.htm#b1"
target="_blank">Allied Participation in Vietnam</a> by
Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier
General James Lawton Collins, Jr. 1985):</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote style="BORDER-LEFT:#ccc 1px solid;MARGIN:0px 0px
0px 0.8ex;PADDING-LEFT:1ex" class="gmail_quote">
<div>On 23 June 1965 Defense Minister Kim again met with
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, this time in
the tatter's capacity as Commander, US Forces, Korea, to
discuss the problems connected with the deployment of
the Korean division to Vietnam. Before concrete plans
could be drawn up, however, the Korean Army needed to
obtain the approval of the National Assembly. Although
approval was not necessarily automatic, the minister
expected early approval and tentatively established the
date of deployment as either late July or early August
1965.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>The minister desired US agreement to and support of
the following items before submitting the deployment
proposal to the National Assembly:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>1. Maintenance of current US and Korean force
ceilings in Korea.</div>
<div>2. Equipment of the three combat-ready reserve
divisions to 100 percent of the table of equipment
allowance and the seventeen regular divisions, including
the Marine division, with major items affecting
firepower, maneuver, and signal capabilities to avoid
weakening the Korean defense posture.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>[124]</div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>3. Maintenance of the same level of Military
Assistance Program funding for Korea as before the
deployment of the division.</div>
<div>4. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac area,
command channels, and logistical support for Korean
combat units destined for service in Vietnam.</div>
<div>5. Establishment of a small planning group to
determine the organization of the Korean division.</div>
<div>6. Provision of signal equipment for a direct and
exclusive communication net between Korea and Korean
forces headquarters in Vietnam.</div>
<div>7. Provision of transportation for the movement of
the Korean division and for subsequent requirements such
as rotation and replacement of personnel and supplies.</div>
<div>8. Provision of financial support to Korean units and
individuals in Vietnam, including combat duty pay at the
same rate as paid to US personnel, gratuities and
compensations for line-of-duty deaths or disability, and
salaries of Vietnamese indigenous personnel hired by
Korean units.</div>
<div>9. Provision of four C-123 aircraft for medical
evacuation and liaison between Korea and Vietnam.</div>
<div>10. Provision of a field broadcasting installation to
enable the Korean division to conduct anti-Communist
broadcasts, psychological warfare, and jamming
operations and to provide Korean home news, war news,
and entertainment programs.</div>
<div> </div>
<div> Some years later, in January 1971, General Dwight E.
Beach, who had succeeded General Howze as Commander in
Chief, United Nations Command, on 1 July 1965, commented
on the list.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>
<blockquote style="BORDER-LEFT:#ccc 1px solid;MARGIN:0px
0px 0px 0.8ex;PADDING-LEFT:1ex" class="gmail_quote">
<div>The initial Korean bill (wish-list) was
fantastic. Basically, the ROK wanted their troops to
receive the same pay as the Americans, all new US
equipment for deploying troops and modernization of
the entire ROK Army, Navy and Air Force. I told them
with the Ambassador's concurrence that their bill
was completely unreasonable and there was no chance
whatever of the US agreeing to it. The final
compromise included a very substantial increase in
pay for the troops deployed, as much good equipment
as we could then furnish and a US commitment that no
US troops would be withdrawn from Korea without
prior consultation with the ROK. The latter, to the
Koreans, meant that no US troops would be withdrawn
without ROK approval. Obviously, the latter was not
the case as is now evident with the withdrawal of
the 7th US Division from Korea.</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote style="BORDER-LEFT:#ccc 1px solid;MARGIN:0px 0px
0px 0.8ex;PADDING-LEFT:1ex" class="gmail_quote">The US
Department of State and Department of Defense ultimately
resolved the matter of the Korean requirements.</blockquote>
<div> </div>
<div>So as Don mentioned, a form of Overseas Pay was given,
but nowhere near what the Korean Government requested or
what is whispered in conspiracy theories and in Internet
chat rooms as a secret fund:</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote style="BORDER-LEFT:#ccc 1px solid;MARGIN:0px 0px
0px 0.8ex;PADDING-LEFT:1ex" class="gmail_quote">
<div>The request for financial support to Korean units and
individuals in Vietnam met with disapproval. The US
commander in Korea did not favor combat duty
pay--especially at the same rate paid to US troops-but
was in agreement with the payment of an overseas
allowance. If the United States had to pay death
benefits or make disability payments, the rates should
be those presently established under Korean law on a
one-time basis only. The United States would not pay
directly for the employment of Vietnamese nationals by
Korean forces but was in favor of including such
expenses in the agreements between the Republic of Korea
and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the request for four
C-123 aircraft appeared to overlap a previous
transportation request, the commander felt that the
United States should provide only scheduled flights to
Korea or reserve spaces on other US scheduled flights
for Korean use.</div>
</blockquote>
<div> </div>
<div>And for the total cost savings to the Korean Government
we can go on:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>
<blockquote style="BORDER-LEFT:#ccc 1px solid;MARGIN:0px
0px 0px 0.8ex;PADDING-LEFT:1ex" class="gmail_quote">
<div>The United States agreed to suspend the Military
Assistance Program transfer project for as long as the
Korean government maintained substantial forces in
Vietnam. The United States also agreed to offshore
procurement from Korea for transfer items such as
petroleum, oil, lubricants, and construction materials
listed in the fiscal year 1966 Military Assistance
Program. Subsequently, and during the period of the
transfer program, the United States would determine
offshore procurement from Korea on the basis of
individual items and under normal offshore procurement
procedures.
<p>These concessions to the Korean government were
made, however, with the understanding that the <strong><em>budgetary
savings accruing to Korea from the actions taken
would contribute to a substantial military and
civil service pay-raise for Koreans</em></strong>.
Actually, the Korean government would not incur any
additional costs in deploying the division to
Vietnam but would secure a number of economic
benefits. On the other hand, the cost to the United
States for Koreans already in Vietnam approximated
$2,000,000 annually, and first year costs for the
operation of the Korean division in Vietnam were
estimated at $43,000,000.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div> Brian: </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Also if you can't get to Korea but you can read Korean
a good place to start is <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.vietvet.co.kr/" target="_blank">http://www.vietvet.co.kr/</a> The
Vietnam War and Korea Website. There are many Korean
first hand narratives and some are also in English if you
follow the links. But as Don mentioned, the Vietnam War
Vets from Korea are a proud bunch, so ask accordingly. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Good luck and best wishes in your research endeavors.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Charlie,</div>
<div>the KimcheeGI</div>
<div class="im HOEnZb">
<div> </div>
<div>On Sun, Apr 15, 2012 at 11:15 PM, Katsiaficas, George
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:katsiaficasg@wit.edu" target="_blank">katsiaficasg@wit.edu</a>>
wrote:</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> The larger context has bearing on your question.
The government of South Korea received tremendous
economic benefits from the Vietnam War. Park Chung-hee's
grandiose scheme to build heavy industry required
enormous amounts of money, but he had only limited
domestic sources. As much as he squeezed workers and
devalued the currency to stimulate exports, he still
needed farmore capital. Between 1953 and 1962, US aid
funded 70% of Korea’s imports and 80% of its fixed
capital investments—about 8% of its GNP.Once the US
needed its monies to fight the war in Vietnam, however,
it began to cut back. In order to find new international
sources of money, Park endorsed a key US proposal:
closer ROK ties with Japan. Staunch domestic opposition
to normalization prevented a treaty from simply being
finalized. On June 3, 1964, Park declared martial law in
Seoul and dismissed dozens of professors and students.
The US Combined Forces Commander approved the release of
two combat divisions to suppress the protests. Despite
thousands of students threatening to storm the Blue
House (the presidentialresidence), Park rammed the
treaty through the rubber stamp legislature of the Third
Republic. When the opposition went on a hunger strike to
protest the treaty, the ruling party took one minute to
ratify it, and at the same time, it also approved
sending 20,000 troops to Vietnam to fight on the side of
the US. In exchange for normalization of relations,
Japan paid $300 million in grants (for which Park
indemnified Japan for all its previous actions) and made
available another half-a-billion dollars in loans.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Sensing an opportunity to channel public
sentiment against the communist enemy as well as a
second avenue to raise capital, Park immediately offered
thousands more troops for deployment to Vietnam. Despite
scattered student protests, war with Vietnam proved less
controversial than his settling of accounts with Japan.
Park’s movement of troops was so fast, that according to
figures released by the US State Department, there were
more South Korean soldiers fighting in southern Vietnam
in 1965 than North Vietnamese.[1] South Koreans soldiers
were widely reported to be even more brutal than their
US counterparts. At the end of 1969, some 48,000 ROK
military personnel were stationed in Vietnam, and by the
time they completed their withdrawal in 1973, some
300,000 veterans had fought there. ROK casualties
included 4,960 dead and 10,962 wounded. Wars provide
experiences for military officers who go on to inflict
future casualties. Lieutenant No Ri-Bang served in Jeju
in 1948 and went to Vietnam. Future dictators Chun Doo
Hwan and Roh Tae-woo served together in Vietnam, before
brutally ruling South Korea after Park’s assassination
in 1979.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> </div>
<div>></div>
<div>> The economic benefits of military intervention
in Vietnam were extraordinary. From 1965-1970, the South
Korean government received $1.1 billion in
payments—about 7% of GDP and 19% of foreign earnings.[3]
More than 80 Korean companies did lucrative business in
Vietnam—from transportation to supply, construction to
entertainment—from which the country accrued another $1
billion for exports to and services in Vietnam. Secret
US bonuses paid to Park’s government for Korean soldiers
who fought in Vietnam totaled $185 million from
1965-1973. When we add all these funds to the $1.1
billion in direct payments, the total US allocations to
Park’s regime amounted to about 30% of the ROK’s foreign
exchange earnings from 1966-1969.[4] Altogether US aid
to South Korea totaled $11 billion by 1973—more than to
any other country except South Vietnam—some 8% of
worldwide US military and foreign monies.[5] Regimes
friendly to the US in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines,
and Thailand also benefited greatly from the tidal wave
of dollars that flooded the region during the Vietnam
War.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Excerpted from my book, Asia's Unknown
Uprisings: Vol. 1 South Korean Social Movements in the
20th Century</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> George Katsiaficas</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> ________________________________</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> [1] See the discussion in the volume I edited,
Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the
War (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 63.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> [2] Chae-Jin Lee, pp. 55, 70.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> [3] Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 321.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> [4] Martin Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> [5] Han Sung-joo, “Korean Politics in an
International Context,” in Korean National Commission
for UNESCO (editor) Korean Politics: Striving for
Democracy and Unification (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002)
p. 620.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> From: don kirk <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kirkdon@yahoo.com" target="_blank">kirkdon@yahoo.com</a>></div>
<div>> Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>></div>
<div>> Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 15:04:41 -0700</div>
<div>> To: Kevin Shepard <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com" target="_blank">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>>,
Korean Studies Discussion List <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>></div>
<div>></div>
</div>
<div class="HOEnZb">
<div class="h5">
<div>> Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion
Question</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> The question is whether or not they got
bonuses in order to "volunteer" for Vietnam. If they
got no bonuses, then obviously they wouldn't be
"mercenaries." Even if they got bonuses, it would be
difficult to pin the mercenary label since soldiers in
any army generally get combat pay when fighting
overseas. Also, I'm not sure ordinary draftees had any
say in where they were sent.</div>
<div>> All told, 300,000 Koreans served in Vietnam
over nearly a ten-year period. Five thousand of them
were KIA, many more WIA. The White Horse and Tiger
divisions were the principal units. Korean special
forces were also in Vietnam. Those whom I have met are
proud to have served there. Many of them, grizzled old
veterans, turn up at demonstrations in Seoul
protesting leftist demos, NKorean human rights
violations, North Korean dynastic rule etc. They love
to wear their old uniforms with ribbons awarded for
Vietnam service, including acts of individual heroism.</div>
<div>> Some of them also talk quite openly about what
they did in Vietnam -- and could provide material
supporting your thesis re "the type of warfare that
they had to fight in Vietnam,</div>
<div>> including guerrilla warfare and civilian
warfare." Strongly suggest you come here and interview
some while they're still around. They'd tell you a
lot, good and bad. Sorry to say, one of them once
boasted to me of a personal "body count" of 300
victims -- would doubt if all of them were "enemy." On
the other hand, they were also known for high levels
of efficiency and success in their AO's.</div>
<div>> Good luck on the project.</div>
<div>> Don Kirk</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> --- On Sat, 4/14/12, Kevin Shepard <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com"
target="_blank">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> From: Kevin Shepard <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com"
target="_blank">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>></div>
<div>> Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion
Question</div>
<div>> To: "<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>></div>
<div>> Date: Saturday, April 14, 2012, 1:40 PM</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> I think you will be hard-pressed to justify
calling individual soldiers mercenaries - the Korean
government may have received funds from the US, but
ROK soldiers were drafted into mandatory service. If
you come across documentation that individuals
volunteered for Vietnam in order to receive funds from
the US, please send such documents to me.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Kevin Shepard, Ph.D.</div>
<div>> Strategist</div>
<div>> UNC/CFC/USFK</div>
<div>> UCJ 5 Strategy Div.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> ________________________________</div>
<div>> From: "<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws</a>"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws</a>></div>
<div>> To: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a></div>
<div>> Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 1:00 AM</div>
<div>> Subject: Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue
9</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Today's Topics:</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> 1. Discussion Question (<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brianhwang@berkeley.edu"
target="_blank">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a>)</div>
<div>> 2. March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East
Asian History and</div>
<div>> Culture Review" Available Online (Center
for Korean Studies)</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>>
----------------------------------------------------------------------</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Message: 1</div>
<div>> Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:15:24 -0700</div>
<div>> From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:brianhwang@berkeley.edu"
target="_blank">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a></div>
<div>> To: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a></div>
<div>> Subject: [KS] Discussion Question</div>
<div>> Message-ID:</div>
<div>> <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel@calmail.berkeley.edu"
target="_blank">7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel@calmail.berkeley.edu</a>></div>
<div>> Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Hello all:</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> I am a history student at University of
California, Berkeley. Currently I</div>
<div>> am working on a paper regarding Korean
involvement in the Vietnam War. My</div>
<div>> argument is that although Korean soldiers were
1) mercenaries (because</div>
<div>> they were paid predominantly by US dollars to
go) and 2) anti communists</div>
<div>> (because of past history), the atrocities that
they are accused of</div>
<div>> committing are not primarily due to the
aforementioned reasons, but</div>
<div>> because of the type of warfare that they had
to fight in Vietnam,</div>
<div>> including guerrilla warfare and civilian
warfare.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Do you all think this is a valid argument? Are
there any primary sources</div>
<div>> that would help me in my argument, including
ones that attribute Korean</div>
<div>> atrocities to their mercenary and
anticommunist nature?</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Thank you!</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> ------------------------------</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Message: 2</div>
<div>> Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 11:00:21 -0700</div>
<div>> From: "Center for Korean Studies" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cks@berkeley.edu" target="_blank">cks@berkeley.edu</a>></div>
<div>> To: <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>></div>
<div>> Subject: [KS] March 2012 Issue of
"Cross-Currents: East Asian History</div>
<div>> and Culture Review" Available Online</div>
<div>> Message-ID:
<037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://berkeley.edu"
target="_blank">berkeley.edu</a>></div>
<div>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East
Asian History and Culture Review" now online</div>
<div>> </div>
<div>> The second issue of IEAS's new, interactive
e-journal "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and
Culture Review" is now online. The theme of the March
2012 issue is "Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for
East Asian History: The Past and Future of the
Gaih?zu" (guest edited by K?ren Wigen, professor of
History at Stanford). Visit <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2"
target="_blank">http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2</a>
to read the articles, a review essay written by
Timothy Cheek (University of British Columbia) about
Ezra Vogel's new book on Deng Xiaoping, and abstracts
of important new scholarship in Chinese. The March
issue of the e-journal also features a photo essay by
Jianhua Gong documenting Shanghai's longtang
alleyways.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> A joint enterprise of the Research Institute
of Korean Studies at Korea University (RIKS) and the
Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of
California at Berkeley (IEAS), "Cross-Currents" offers
its readers up-to-date research findings, emerging
trends, and cutting-edge perspectives concerning East
Asian history and culture from scholars in both
English-speaking and Asian language-speaking academic
communities.</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> * * ** **</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>> March 2012 issue of "Cross-Currents" e-journal</div>
<div>> (See <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2"
target="_blank">http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2</a>)</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Co-Editors' Note*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Building an Online Community of East Asia
Scholars</div>
<div>> Sungtaek Cho, Research Institute of Korean
Studies (RIKS), Korea University</div>
<div>> Wen-hsin Yeh, Institute of East Asian Studies
(IEAS), University of California, Berkeley</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East
Asian History: The Past and Future of the Gaihozu*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Introduction to "Japanese Imperial Maps as
Sources for East Asian History: The Past and Future of
the Gaihozu"</div>
<div>> Guest editor K?ren Wigen, Stanford University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Japanese Mapping of Asia-Pacific Areas,
1873-1945: An Overview</div>
<div>> Shigeru Kobayashi, Osaka University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Imagining Manmo: Mapping the Russo-Japanese
Boundary Agreements in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia,
1907-1915</div>
<div>> Yoshihisa T. Matsusaka, Wellesley College</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Triangulating Chosen: Maps, Mapmaking, and the
Land Survey in Colonial Korea</div>
<div>> David Fedman, Stanford University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Mapping Economic Development: The South Seas
Government and Sugar Production in Japan's South
Pacific Mandate, 1919--1941</div>
<div>> Ti Ngo, University of California, Berkeley</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Forum*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Asian Studies/Global Studies: Transcending
Area Studies and Social Sciences</div>
<div>> John Lie, University of California, Berkeley/</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Defenders and Conquerors: The Rhetoric of
Royal Power in Korean Inscriptions from the Fifth to
Seventh Centuries</div>
<div>> Hung-gyu Kim, Korea University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Review Essays and Notes*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Of Leaders and Governance: How the Chinese
Dragon Got Its Scales</div>
<div>> Timothy Cheek, University of British Columbia</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> A Note on the 40th Anniversary of Nixon's
Visit to China</div>
<div>> William C. Kirby, Harvard University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Photo Essay*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> "Shanghai Alleyways" by photographer Jianhua
Gong</div>
<div>> Essay by Xiaoneng Yang, Stanford University</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> *Readings from Asia*</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Ge Zhaoguang , Dwelling in the Middle of the
Country: Reestablishing Histories of "China"
[????:????"??"???]</div>
<div>> Abstract by Wennan Liu, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences</div>
<div>></div>
<div>> Wang Qisheng, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution: Republican Politics in
Social-Cultural Scope [???????????????????]</div>
<div>> Abstract by Bin Ye, Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
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<div>> End of Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9</div>
<div>> *********************************************</div>
<div>></div>
<div>></div>
<div> </div>
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