Aloha all & especially Prof Park!<br><br>I just wanted to share a response re: ROK army hazing from an American friend who was drafted into the Korean army. Yes, he was put on the hojeok by his grandfather, only to learn after arriving in Korea that that made him eligible for the compulsory military service. No, he didn't speak any Korean at the time of his induction.<br>
<br>"Published documentary material? I don't know of any.<br><br>If you want my opinion, anything I share is already outdated since I finished my service over 6 years ago. There were still beatings going on while I was in the Army but at a much smaller scale than in the past. My drill sergeant in boot camp was nastier than the others and yet I only saw him lay hands on a recruit once. At the Second Army HQ in Daegu, where there was zero tolerance for physical abuse, I've only heard of beatings in my company and only saw one fight among members of a different company. In Afghanistan, I saw my company commander kick several members of my company for not trimming their hair. Of course, I've read reports of much worse at bases near the North Korean border. However, the vast majority of the abuse in the Army at the time was mental and emotional.<br>
<br>With regard to the Gwangju uprising, I don't think it's so much an issue of conscripts being abused into hurting civilians. The whole of boot camp strips away your rational mind and the identity you have when you put on a uniform allow people to commit atrocities. <br>
<br>My motivation for applying to the Afghanistan deployment was similar to the father-in-law applying to Vietnam. Well, at least part of it was. I was never beaten throughout my two years--I'd like to think it's because I was smart enough to know how to avoid it--but I couldn't stand the thought of spending the entire two years in the same company with people who seemed hell-bent on making my life miserable, mocking and humiliating and verbally abusing me constantly. <br>
<br>Don't know if this helps."<br><br>Annie Koh<br>SNU alum & current Ph.D. candidate at<br>Dept of Urban & Regional Planning<br>University of Hawaii at Manoa<br><br>Message: 3<br>
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 16:04:51 -0400<br>
From: Jim Thomas <<a href="mailto:jimpthomas@hotmail.com">jimpthomas@hotmail.com</a>><br>
To: Korean Studies Discussion List <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Subject: [KS] ROK military hazing<br>
Message-ID: <BLU165-<div id=":1ed">W41FE2AAE248AF4B9B943ECDD3F0@phx.gbl><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"<br>
<br>
<br>
(Following on Michael's point)<br>
Unfortunately, the hazing still goes on and remains unreported,
according to informants (among my students) who served in the ROK
military over the last decade or so. Any direction on published
documentary material about this would be most appreciated.<br>
<br>
Speaking of intimidation, one can only image what sorts of threats and
intimidation were used for troops who were deployed to Kwangju in May,
1980--not that that justified their actions.<br>
<br>
And I assume you have all heard the exprssion:<br>
"There are three kinds of Korean males (namja): Those who have done
their military service, those who are serving, and those who will serve
in the future..." Quite an indictment on mililitarized society, where
little can change as long as conscription remains.<br>
best,<br>
jim<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 01:33:10 -0700<br>
From: <a href="mailto:mjcgibb@yahoo.com">mjcgibb@yahoo.com</a><br>
To: <a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Dear all,<br>
I asked my father-in-law last night why he went to Vietnam as part of a
contingent of South Korean troops during his mandatory military service.
He volunteered to go, he said, because he was sick of the beatings he
was receiving courtesy of his South Korean army seniors. He thought life
in Vietnam could not possibly be worse than the horrendous conditions
(hazing) he was experiencing as a conscript in Korea. His mates who
volunteered at the same time did so for similar reasons, he said.
Vietnam offered a way out of the hell of 1960s military service in
Korea, he said.<br>
<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<br>
Michael<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Balazs Szalontai <<a href="mailto:aoverl@yahoo.co.uk">aoverl@yahoo.co.uk</a>><br>
To: Michael Pettid <<a href="mailto:mjpettid2000@yahoo.com">mjpettid2000@yahoo.com</a>>; Korean Studies Discussion List <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Sent: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 9:12 AM<br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Dear George, Jiyul and all,<br>
<br>
I think that we need to pay close attentions to the stages of South
Korean military involvement in Vietnam if we are to specify which were
Park Chung Hee's primary and secondary motives for sending ROKA troops
to Vietnam. I do agree with the point that the economic benefits thus
gained were substantial, to put it mildly, and new combat experience for
the ROKA also must have mattered a lot. Still, these considerations do
not satisfactorily explain why Park, instead of trying to maximize these
benefits by fulfilling each American request for ROKA troops, put a
ceiling to the deployments in November 1966, and refused to send
additional troops in 1967-68, no matter how persistently the U.S. asked
for them. To be sure, the North Korean commando raids that started in
November 1966 probably influenced his decision, but since at first he
tended to downplay their importance, and later responded to them by
launching counter-raids, a fear of the North might not be a sufficient
explanation. Thus I consider it likely that his primary motives for the
troop deployment were to (1) secure a U.S. commitment to the defense of
the ROK, such as a pledge not to withdraw US troops from South Korea
without consultation, and (2) use the troop deployments as a bargaining
chip to conclude the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on terms more
favorable to Seoul. NB, Park's decision to halt deployments was made
right after the ratification of the SOFA by the ROK National Assembly in
October 1966. Once he achieved as much as he could in this field, he
probably calculated that it was no longer necessary to send additional
troops, since the US-ROK agreements signed in 1966 settled these issues.
If this was really so, he miscalculated, because Nixon withdrew
one-third of the US troops anyway.<br>
<br>
All the best,<br>
Balazs Szalontai<br>
Kwangwoon University<br>
<br>
--- On Tue, 17/4/12, Michael Pettid <<a href="mailto:mjpettid2000@yahoo.com">mjpettid2000@yahoo.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Mr. Kim,<br>
<br>
<br>
It is too easy to blame war and violence on some predisposed human
condition (and that is very convenient for militaristic governments and
individuals who hope to profit from such violence). And preparing for
war is surely the best way to prevent it and make the world safe. We
are certainly doing a fine job of that as I write.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I am a premodernist and I teach my students about the futility and
uselessness of war and how that damaged the lives of individuals and
society. It is not a human condition as you state, but rather resultant
from greed and the desire to take from others what one might not have.
I find it rather amazing that this is something I need to state in
academia, but clearly we have a ways to go.<br>
<br>
Michael J. Pettid<br>
Professor of Premodern Korean Studies<br>
Department of Asian and Asian American Studies<br>
Director, Translation, Research and Instruction Program<br>
Binghamton University<br>
<a href="tel:607.777.3862" value="+16077773862">607.777.3862</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Sheila Miyoshi Jager <<a href="mailto:sheila.jager@oberlin.edu">sheila.jager@oberlin.edu</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 8:22 AM<br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Unfortunately war is a necessary evil in the human condition. The better
you are prepared for it the better the chance of preventing it. No one
is more anti-war then the people who have to fight it if it occurs. You
can condemn war, and rightfully so, but you can't eliminate it.<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim.<br>
<br>
On 4/15/2012 7:50 PM, Michael Pettid wrote:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Mr. Kim<br>
<br>
<br>
I am happy that you were able to find a silver lining in a war that
killed tens of thousands of combatants and many, many more
non-combatants. The war experience that was able to "bolster the
competence and confidence" of the SK troops was surely worth such a
cost, right? Wars are the plague of humankind and nothing more than the
actions of various governments to achieve their goals. War must be
condemned in whatever fashion necessary.<br>
<br>
<br>
Michael J. Pettid<br>
Professor of Premodern Korean Studies<br>
Department of Asian and Asian American Studies<br>
Director, Translation, Research and Instruction Program<br>
Binghamton University<br>
<a href="tel:607.777.3862" value="+16077773862">607.777.3862</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Jiyul Kim <<a href="mailto:jiyulkim@gmail.com">jiyulkim@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 12:58 PM<br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
This is all good and fine from a macro view and I see nothing to
disagree with, but numbers and quantification and metrics do not make
history. What is left out is the psychology and emotions that Vietnam
generated in Park, the military, and the populace. No doubt there were
tremendous materiel benefits for SK and other Asian countries from the
war, but the war also had unmeasurable "benefits" that were recognized
then as well for example consolidating national pride and confidence and
providing the military with combat experience. Since 1953 the only
Korean forces, North and South, who have experienced real combat were
the Koreans in Vietnam including a handful of North Korean fighter
pilots. That experience did much to bolster the competence and
confidence of the South Korean Army. This is not to justify their
deployment or to somehow legitimate the Vietnam War. I for one believe
it was a tragic unjust war for the U.S. and its allies to have gotten
involved in, but we should not always paint everything about the war in
broad and condemning strokes.<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/15/2012 10:15 AM, Katsiaficas, George wrote:<br>
<br>
The larger context has bearing on your question. The government of South
Korea received tremendous economic benefits from the Vietnam War. Park
Chung-hee's grandiose scheme to build heavy industry required enormous
amounts of money, but he had only limited domestic sources. As much as
hesqueezed workers and devalued the currency to stimulate exports, he
still needed farmore capital. Between 1953 and 1962, US aid funded 70%
of Korea?s imports and 80% of its fixed capital investments?about 8% of
its GNP.Once the US needed its monies to fight the war in Vietnam,
however, it began to cut back. In order to find new international
sources of money, Park endorsed a key US proposal: closer ROK ties with
Japan. Staunch domestic opposition to normalization prevented a treaty
from simply being finalized. On June 3, 1964, Park declared martial law
in Seoul and dismissed dozens of professors and students. The US
Combined Forces Commander approved the release of two combat divisions
to suppress the protests. Despite thousands of students threatening to
storm the Blue House (the presidentialresidence), Park rammed the treaty
through the rubber stamp legislature of the Third Republic. When the
opposition went on a hunger strike to protest the treaty, the ruling
party took one minute to ratify it, and at the same time, it also
approved sending 20,000 troops to Vietnam to fight on the side of the
US. In exchange for normalization of relations, Japan paid $300 million
in grants (for which Park indemnified Japan for all its previous
actions) and made available another half-a-billion dollars in loans.<br>
<br>
<br>
Sensing an opportunity to channel public sentiment against the communist
enemy as well as a second avenue to raise capital, Park immediately
offered thousands more troops for deployment to Vietnam. Despite
scattered student protests, war with Vietnam proved less controversial
than his settling of accounts with Japan. Park?s movement of troops was
so fast, that according to figures released by the US State Department,
there were more South Korean soldiers fighting in southern Vietnam in
1965 than North Vietnamese.[1] South Koreans soldiers were widely
reported to be even more brutal than their US counterparts. At the end
of 1969, some 48,000 ROK military personnel were stationed in Vietnam,
and by the time they completed their withdrawal in 1973, some 300,000
veterans had fought there. ROK casualties included 4,960 dead and 10,962
wounded. Wars provide experiences for military officers who go on to
inflict future casualties. Lieutenant No Ri-Bang served in Jeju in 1948
and went to Vietnam. Future dictators Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo
served together in Vietnam, before brutally ruling South Korea after
Park?s assassination in 1979.<br>
<br>
The economic benefits of military intervention in Vietnam were
extraordinary. From 1965-1970, the South Korean government received $1.1
billion in payments?about 7% of GDP and 19% of foreign earnings.[3]
More than 80 Korean companies did lucrative business in Vietnam?from
transportation to supply, construction to entertainment?from which the
country accrued another $1 billion for exports to and services in
Vietnam. Secret US bonuses paid to Park?s government for Korean soldiers
who fought in Vietnam totaled $185 million from 1965-1973. When we add
all these funds to the $1.1 billion in direct payments, the total US
allocations to Park?s regime amounted to about 30% of the ROK?s foreign
exchange earnings from 1966-1969.[4] Altogether US aid to South Korea
totaled $11 billion by 1973?more than to any other country except South
Vietnam?some 8% of worldwide US military and foreign monies.[5] Regimes
friendly to the US in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand also
benefited greatly from the tidal wave of dollars that flooded the region
during the Vietnam War.<br>
<br>
<br>
Excerpted from my book, Asia's Unknown Uprisings: Vol. 1 South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century<br>
<br>
<br>
George Katsiaficas<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
[1] See the discussion in the volume I edited, Vietnam Documents:
American and Vietnamese Views of the War (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992)
p. 63.<br>
<br>
[2] Chae-Jin Lee, pp. 55, 70.<br>
<br>
[3] Cumings, Korea?s Place in the Sun, p. 321.<br>
<br>
[4] Martin Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.<br>
<br>
[5] Han Sung-joo, ?Korean Politics in an International Context,? in
Korean National Commission for UNESCO (editor) Korean Politics: Striving
for Democracy and Unification (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002) p. 620.<br>
<br>
<br>
From: don kirk <<a href="mailto:kirkdon@yahoo.com">kirkdon@yahoo.com</a>><br>
Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 15:04:41 -0700<br>
To: Kevin Shepard <<a href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>>, Korean Studies Discussion List <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
The question is whether or not they got bonuses in order to "volunteer"
for Vietnam. If they got no bonuses, then obviously they wouldn't be
"mercenaries." Even if they got bonuses, it would be difficult to pin
the mercenary label since soldiers in any army generally get combat pay
when fighting overseas. Also, I'm not sure ordinary draftees had any say
in where they were sent.<br>
All told, 300,000 Koreans served in Vietnam over nearly a ten-year
period. Five thousand of them were KIA, many more WIA. The White Horse
and Tiger divisions were the principal units. Korean special forces were
also in Vietnam. Those whom I have met are proud to have served there.
Many of them, grizzled old veterans, turn up at demonstrations in Seoul
protesting leftist demos, NKorean human rights violations, North Korean
dynastic rule etc. They love to wear their old uniforms with ribbons
awarded for Vietnam service, including acts of individual heroism.<br>
Some of them also talk quite openly about what they did in Vietnam --
and could provide material supporting your thesis re "the type of
warfare that they had to fight in Vietnam,<br>
including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare." Strongly suggest you
come here and interview some while they're still around. They'd tell you
a lot, good and bad. Sorry to say, one of them once boasted to me of a
personal "body count" of 300 victims -- would doubt if all of them were
"enemy." On the other hand, they were also known for high levels of
efficiency and success in their AO's.<br>
Good luck on the project.<br>
Don Kirk<br>
<br>
--- On Sat, 4/14/12, Kevin Shepard <<a href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Kevin Shepard <<a href="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>><br>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
To: "<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>" <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Date: Saturday, April 14, 2012, 1:40 PM<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I think you will be hard-pressed to justify calling individual soldiers
mercenaries - the Korean government may have received funds from the US,
but ROK soldiers were drafted into mandatory service. If you come
across documentation that individuals volunteered for Vietnam in order
to receive funds from the US, please send such documents to me.<br>
<br>
<br>
Kevin Shepard, Ph.D.<br>
Strategist<br>
UNC/CFC/USFK<br>
UCJ 5 Strategy Div.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: "<a href="mailto:koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws</a>" <<a href="mailto:koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 1:00 AM<br>
Subject: Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9<br>
<br>
<br>
Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Discussion Question (<a href="mailto:brianhwang@berkeley.edu">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a>)<br>
2. March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and<br>
Culture Review" Available Online (Center for Korean Studies)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:15:24 -0700<br>
From: <a href="mailto:brianhwang@berkeley.edu">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a><br>
To: <a href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Subject: [KS] Discussion Question<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<<a href="mailto:7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel@calmail.berkeley.edu">7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel@calmail.berkeley.edu</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8<br>
<br>
Hello all:<br>
<br>
I am a history student at University of California, Berkeley. Currently I<br>
am working on a paper regarding Korean involvement in the Vietnam War. My<br>
argument is that although Korean soldiers were 1) mercenaries (because<br>
they were paid predominantly by US dollars to go) and 2) anti communists<br>
(because of past history), the atrocities that they are accused of<br>
committing are not primarily due to the aforementioned reasons, but<br>
because of the type of warfare that they had to fight in Vietnam,<br>
including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare.<br>
<br>
Do you all think this is a valid argument? Are there any primary sources<br>
that would help me in my argument, including ones that attribute Korean<br>
atrocities to their mercenary and anticommunist nature?<br>
<br>
Thank you!<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>