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Dear Balazs, you are absolutely correct. There were stages of
deployments (1964, 1965, 1966, and an unexecuted planned deployment
in 1968) and each stage had different rationale. My thesis looks at
these developments closely and also link the timing and rationale
with US's situation in VN and the ROK-Japan treaty (US and Korea in
Vietnam and the Japan-Korea Treaty: Search for Security, Prosperity
and Influence, Harvard, 1991 available at <a
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.dtic.mil">www.dtic.mil</a>
"ADA237979"). As my subtitle indicates the three primary reasons in
order of importance, i my opinion, were homeland security, economic
development and regional/international stature and influence. <br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/16/2012 9:12 PM, Balazs Szalontai wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:1334625158.35322.YahooMailClassic@web28804.mail.ir2.yahoo.com"
type="cite">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="font: inherit;" valign="top">Dear George, Jiyul
and all,<br>
<br>
I think that we need to pay close attentions to the stages
of South Korean military involvement in Vietnam if we are
to specify which were Park Chung Hee's primary and
secondary motives for sending ROKA troops to Vietnam. I do
agree with the point that the economic benefits thus
gained were substantial, to put it mildly, and new combat
experience for the ROKA also must have mattered a lot.
Still, these considerations do not satisfactorily explain
why Park, instead of trying to maximize these benefits by
fulfilling each American request for ROKA troops, put a
ceiling to the deployments in November 1966, and refused
to send additional troops in 1967-68, no matter how
persistently the U.S. asked for them. To be sure, the
North Korean commando raids that started in November 1966
probably influenced his decision, but since at first he
tended to downplay their importance, and later responded
to them by launching counter-raids, a fear of the North
might not be a sufficient explanation. Thus I consider it
likely that his primary motives for the troop deployment
were to (1) secure a U.S. commitment to the defense of the
ROK, such as a pledge not to withdraw US troops from South
Korea without consultation, and (2) use the troop
deployments as a bargaining chip to conclude the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) on terms more favorable to Seoul.
NB, Park's decision to halt deployments was made right
after the ratification of the SOFA by the ROK National
Assembly in October 1966. Once he achieved as much as he
could in this field, he probably calculated that it was no
longer necessary to send additional troops, since the
US-ROK agreements signed in 1966 settled these issues. If
this was really so, he miscalculated, because Nixon
withdrew one-third of the US troops anyway.<br>
<br>
All the best,<br>
Balazs Szalontai<br>
Kwangwoon University<br>
<br>
--- On <b>Tue, 17/4/12, Michael Pettid <i><a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mjpettid2000@yahoo.com"><mjpettid2000@yahoo.com></a></i></b>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16,
255); margin-left: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><br>
<br>
<br>
<div id="yiv990197699">
<div>
<div
style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:garamond,
new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt;">
<blockquote type="cite"
style="margin:1em;display:block;color:rgb(0, 0,
0);font-family:garamond, times,
serif;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;orphans:2;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;widows:2;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,
255, 255);font-size:16px;">
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_133461966697369">
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_133461966697381"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_1334619666973177"><span>Mr. Kim,</span><br>
</span>
<div class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"
style="margin:0px 0px 0.0001pt;"><span><br>
It is too easy to blame war and violence
on some predisposed human condition (and
that is very convenient for militaristic
governments and individuals who hope to
profit from such violence). And
preparing for war is surely the best way
to prevent it and make the world safe.
We are certainly doing a fine job of
that as I write.<br>
</span></div>
<div class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"
style="margin:0px 0px 0.0001pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"
style="margin:0px 0px 0.0001pt;"><span>I
am a premodernist and I teach my
students about the futility and
uselessness of war and how that damaged
the lives of individuals and society.
It is not a human condition as you
state, but rather resultant from greed
and the desire to take from others what
one might not have. I find it rather
amazing that this is something I need to
state in academia, but clearly we have a
ways to go.</span></div>
<div class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"
style="margin:0px;"> </div>
</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_133461966697381"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_1334619666973177">Michael J. Pettid<br>
Professor of Premodern Korean Studies<br>
Department of Asian and Asian American
Studies</span>
<div><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_19_1334619666973179">Director,
Translation, Research and Instruction
Program<br>
Binghamton University<br>
607.777.3862</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family:garamond, new york, times,
serif;font-size:12pt;">
<div style="font-family:times new roman, new
york, times, serif;font-size:12pt;">
<div dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial" size="2">
<hr size="1"> <b><span
style="font-weight:bold;">From:</span></b>
Sheila Miyoshi Jager
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:sheila.jager@oberlin.edu"><sheila.jager@oberlin.edu></a><br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold;">To:</span></b>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a> <br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold;">Sent:</span></b>
Monday, April 16, 2012 8:22 AM<br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold;">Subject:</span></b>
Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question<br>
</font> </div>
<br>
<div id="yiv990197699">
<div> Unfortunately war is a necessary evil
in the human condition. The better you are
prepared for it the better the chance of
preventing it. No one is more anti-war
then the people who have to fight it if it
occurs. You can condemn war, and
rightfully so, but you can't eliminate it.
<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim.<br>
<br>
On 4/15/2012 7:50 PM, Michael Pettid
wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="color:rgb(0, 0,
0);background-color:rgb(255, 255,
255);font-family:tahoma, new york,
times, serif;font-size:12pt;">
<div>
<div style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:medium;"><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;">Mr. Kim</span></div>
<div style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:medium;"><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;"><br>
</span></div>
<div style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:medium;"><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;"><font>I am happy
that you were able to find a
silver lining in a war that
killed tens of thousands of
combatants and many, many more
non-combatants. The war </font>experience<font> that
was able to "bolster the
competence and confidence" of
the SK troops was surely worth
such a cost, right? Wars are
the plague of humankind and
nothing more than the actions
of various governments to
achieve their goals. War must
be condemned in whatever
fashion necessary.</font></span></div>
<div style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:medium;"><font
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;"><br>
</font></div>
<div style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:16px;"><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;">Michael J. Pettid<br>
Professor of Premodern Korean
Studies<br>
Department of Asian and Asian
American Studies</span>
<div><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;">Director,
Translation, Research and
Instruction Program<br>
Binghamton University<br>
607.777.3862</span></div>
</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419754"
style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:16px;">
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419761"
style="font-family:times,
serif;">
<div dir="ltr"><span
style="font-family:tahoma,
times, serif;"></span>
<hr size="1"><b
style="font-size:12pt;">From:</b><span
style="font-size:12pt;"> Jiyul
Kim <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
class="yiv990197699moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
ymailto="mailto:jiyulkim@gmail.com" target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=jiyulkim@gmail.com"><jiyulkim@gmail.com></a></span><br>
<b style="font-size:12pt;">To:</b><span
style="font-size:12pt;"> <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
class="yiv990197699moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws" target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a> </span><br>
<b style="font-size:12pt;">Sent:</b><span
style="font-size:12pt;"> Sunday,
April 15, 2012 12:58 PM</span><br>
<b style="font-size:12pt;">Subject:</b><span
style="font-size:12pt;"> Re:
[KS] Brian Hwang's
Discussion Question</span><br>
</div>
<br>
<div id="yiv990197699"
style="font-size:12pt;">
<div>This is all good and fine
from a macro view and I see
nothing to disagree with,
but numbers and
quantification and metrics
do not make history. What is
left out is the psychology
and emotions that Vietnam
generated in Park, the
military, and the populace.
No doubt there were
tremendous materiel benefits
for SK and other Asian
countries from the war, but
the war also had
unmeasurable "benefits" that
were recognized then as well
for example consolidating
national pride and
confidence and providing the
military with combat
experience. Since 1953 the
only Korean forces, North
and South, who have
experienced real combat were
the Koreans in Vietnam
including a handful of North
Korean fighter pilots. That
experience did much to
bolster the competence and
confidence of the South
Korean Army. This is not to
justify their deployment or
to somehow legitimate the
Vietnam War. I for one
believe it was a tragic
unjust war for the U.S. and
its allies to have gotten
involved in, but we should
not always paint everything
about the war in broad and
condemning strokes.<br>
<br>
Jiyul Kim<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/15/2012 10:15 AM,
Katsiaficas, George wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419769"
style="font-family:Calibri,
sans-serif;font-size:14px;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197119"
style="font-size:12pt;">The larger context has bearing on your question.
The government of
South Korea received
tremendous economic
benefits from the
Vietnam War. </span><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197121"
style="font-size:12pt;">Park
Chung-hee's grandiose
scheme to build heavy
industry required
enormous amounts of
money</span><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197123"
style="font-size:12pt;">, but he had only limited domestic sources. As
much as he</span><span
style="font-size:12pt;">squeezed workers and devalued the currency to
stimulate exports, he
still needed farmore
capital.</span><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197127"
style="font-size:12pt;"> </span><span style="font-size:12pt;">Between
1953 and 1962, US aid
funded 70% of Korea’s
imports and 80% of its
fixed capital
investments—about 8%
of its GNP.Once the US
needed its monies to
fight the war in
Vietnam, however, it
began to cut back. </span><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197131"
style="font-size:12pt;">In
order to find new
international sources
of money, Park
endorsed a key US
proposal: closer ROK
ties with Japan. </span><span
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span" style="font-size:16px;">Staunch
domestic opposition to
normalization
prevented a treaty
from simply being
finalized. </span><span
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span
yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197137" style="font-size:16px;">On
June 3, 1964, Park
declared martial law
in Seoul and dismissed
dozens of professors
and students. The US
Combined Forces
Commander approved the
release of two combat
divisions to suppress
the protests. </span><span
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span" style="font-size:16px;">Despite
thousands of students
threatening to storm
the Blue House (the
presidentialresidence),
Park rammed the treaty
through the rubber
stamp legislature of
the Third Republic.
When the opposition
went on a hunger
strike to protest the
treaty, the ruling
party took one minute
to ratify it, and at
the same time, it also
approved sending
20,000 troops to
Vietnam to fight on
the side of the US. </span><span
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span
yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197145" style="font-size:16px;">In
exchange for
normalization of
relations, Japan paid
$300 million in grants
(for which Park
indemnified Japan for
all its previous
actions) and made
available another
half-a-billion dollars
in loans.<span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197151"
style="font-size:12pt;"></span></span></span></span></div>
<div><font
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span"
face="Times New Roman"><span
class="yiv990197699Apple-style-span">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoBodyText"
style="text-align:left;" align="left"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"></span></span></div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal">Sensing
an opportunity to
channel public
sentiment against
the communist
enemy as well as
a second avenue to
raise capital,
Park immediately
offered thousands
more troops for
deployment to
Vietnam. Despite
scattered student
protests, war with
Vietnam proved
less controversial
than his settling
of accounts with
Japan. Park’s
movement of troops
was so fast,
that according to
figures released
by the US State
Department, there
were more South
Korean soldiers
fighting in
southern Vietnam
in 1965 than North
Vietnamese.<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:12pt;">[1]</span></span></span></a> South Koreans
soldiers were
widely reported to
be even more
brutal than their
US counterparts.
At the end of
1969, some 48,000
ROK military
personnel were
stationed in
Vietnam, and by
the time they
completed their
withdrawal in
1973, some 300,000
veterans had
fought there. ROK
casualties
included 4,960
dead and 10,962
wounded. Wars
provide
experiences for
military officers
who go on to
inflict future
casualties. Lieutenant
No Ri-Bang served
in Jeju in 1948
and went to
Vietnam. Future
dictators Chun Doo
Hwan and Roh
Tae-woo served
together in
Vietnam, before
brutally ruling
South Korea after
Park’s
assassination in
1979.</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"> </div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal">The
economic benefits
of military
intervention in
Vietnam were
extraordinary.
From 1965-1970,
the South Korean
government
received $1.1
billion in
payments—about 7%
of GDP and 19% of
foreign earnings.<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span style="font-size:12pt;">[3]</span></span></span></a> More
than 80 Korean
companies did
lucrative business
in Vietnam—from
transportation to
supply,
construction to
entertainment—from
which the
country accrued
another $1 billion
for exports to and
services in
Vietnam. Secret US
bonuses paid to
Park’s government
for Korean
soldiers who
fought in Vietnam
totaled $185
million from
1965-1973. When we
add all these
funds to the $1.1
billion in direct
payments, the
total US
allocations to
Park’s regime
amounted to about
30% of the ROK’s
foreign exchange
earnings from
1966-1969.<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:12pt;">[4]</span></span></span></a> Altogether US aid
to South Korea
totaled $11
billion by
1973—more than to
any other country
except South
Vietnam—some 8% of
worldwide US
military and
foreign monies.<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftn5"
name="_ftnref5"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span style="font-size:12pt;">[5]</span></span></span></a> Regimes
friendly to the US
in Japan, Taiwan,
the Philippines,
and Thailand also
benefited greatly
from the tidal
wave of dollars
that flooded the
region during the
Vietnam War.</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"><br>
</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal">Excerpted
from my book,
Asia's Unknown
Uprisings: Vol. 1
South Korean
Social Movements
in the 20th
Century</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal"><br>
</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoNormal">George
Katsiaficas</div>
<div><br clear="all">
<hr align="left"
size="1"
width="33%">
<div
id="yiv990197699ftn1">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteText"
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;"><a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:10pt;"><span class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197209"
style="font-size:10pt;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span
style="font-size:10pt;"> See the discussion in the volume I edited, <i>Vietnam
Documents:
American and
Vietnamese
Views of the
War</i> (Armonk,
NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1992)
p. 63.</span></div>
</div>
<div
id="yiv990197699ftn2">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteText"
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;"><a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftnref2"
name="_ftn2"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:10pt;"><span class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197221"
style="font-size:10pt;">[2]</span></span></span></span></a><span
style="font-size:10pt;"> Chae-Jin Lee, pp. 55, 70.</span></div>
</div>
<div
id="yiv990197699ftn3">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteText"
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;"><a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftnref3"
name="_ftn3"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:10pt;"><span class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197231"
style="font-size:10pt;">[3]</span></span></span></span></a><span
style="font-size:10pt;"> Cumings, <i>Korea’s Place in the Sun</i>, p.
321.</span></div>
</div>
<div
id="yiv990197699ftn4">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteText"
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;"><a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftnref4"
name="_ftn4"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:10pt;"><span class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197243"
style="font-size:10pt;">[4]</span></span></span></span></a><span
style="font-size:10pt;"> Martin Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.</span></div>
</div>
<div
id="yiv990197699ftn5">
<div
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteText"
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;"><a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
href="http://us.mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo/#_ftnref5"
name="_ftn5"
title=""><span
class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference" style="vertical-align:super;"><span
style="font-size:10pt;"><span class="yiv990197699MsoFootnoteReference"
style="vertical-align:super;"><span
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197253"
style="font-size:10pt;">[5]</span></span></span></span></a><span
style="font-size:10pt;"> Han Sung-joo, “Korean Politics in an
International
Context,” in
Korean
National
Commission for
UNESCO
(editor) <i>Korean
Politics:
Striving for
Democracy and
Unification</i> (Elizabeth,
NJ: Hollym,
2002) p. 620.</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</span>
<div><br>
</div>
</font></div>
<span
id="yiv990197699OLK_SRC_BODY_SECTION"
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197259"
style="font-family:Calibri,
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<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419787"
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223);"><span
style="font-weight:bold;">From: </span>don
kirk <<a
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rel="nofollow"
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<span
style="font-weight:bold;">Reply-To: </span>Korean
Studies Discussion
List <<a
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<span
style="font-weight:bold;">Date: </span>Sat,
14 Apr 2012 15:04:41
-0700<br>
<span
style="font-weight:bold;">To: </span>Kevin
Shepard <<a
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rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com"
target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>>,
Korean Studies
Discussion List <<a
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<span
style="font-weight:bold;">Subject: </span>Re:
[KS] Brian Hwang's
Discussion Question<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<table border="0"
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<td
style="font:inherit;"
valign="top">The
question is
whether or not
they got bonuses
in order to
"volunteer" for
Vietnam. If they
got no bonuses,
then obviously
they wouldn't be
"mercenaries."
Even if they got
bonuses, it
would be
difficult to pin
the mercenary
label since
soldiers in any
army generally
get combat pay
when fighting
overseas. Also,
I'm not sure
ordinary
draftees had any
say in where
they were sent.<br>
All told,
300,000 Koreans
served in
Vietnam over
nearly a
ten-year period.
Five thousand of
them were KIA,
many more WIA.
The White Horse
and Tiger
divisions were
the principal
units. Korean
special forces
were also in
Vietnam. Those
whom I have met
are proud to
have served
there. Many of
them, grizzled
old veterans,
turn up at
demonstrations
in Seoul
protesting
leftist demos,
NKorean human
rights
violations,
North Korean
dynastic rule
etc. They love
to wear their
old uniforms
with ribbons
awarded for
Vietnam service,
including acts
of individual
heroism. <br>
Some of them
also talk quite
openly about
what they did in
Vietnam -- and
could provide
material
supporting your
thesis re "the
type of warfare
that they had to
fight in
Vietnam,<br>
including
guerrilla
warfare and
civilian
warfare."
Strongly suggest
you come here
and interview
some while
they're still
around. They'd
tell you a lot,
good and bad.
Sorry to say,
one of them once
boasted to me of
a personal "body
count" of 300
victims -- would
doubt if all of
them were
"enemy." On the
other hand, they
were also known
for high levels
of efficiency
and success in
their AO's.<br>
Good luck on the
project.<br>
Don Kirk<br>
<br>
--- On <b>Sat,
4/14/12, Kevin
Shepard <i><<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com"
target="_blank" href="/mc/compose?to=kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>></i></b> wrote:<br>
<blockquote
style="margin-left:5px;border-left:2px
solid rgb(16,
16,
255);padding-left:5px;"><br>
From: Kevin
Shepard <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:kevin_shepard@yahoo.com"
target="_blank" href="/mc/compose?to=kevin_shepard@yahoo.com">kevin_shepard@yahoo.com</a>><br>
Subject: Re:
[KS] Brian
Hwang's
Discussion
Question<br>
To: "<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws" target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>"
<<a
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rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws" target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Date:
Saturday,
April 14,
2012, 1:40 PM<br>
<br>
<div
id="yiv990197699">
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419795"
style="font-family:arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif;font-size:10pt;">
<div>I think
you will be
hard-pressed
to justify
calling
individual
soldiers
mercenaries -
the Korean
government may
have received
funds from the
US, but ROK
soldiers were
drafted into
mandatory
service. If
you come
across
documentation
that
individuals
volunteered
for Vietnam in
order to
receive funds
from the US,
please send
such documents
to me.</div>
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_133413028419799"
style="font-family:times,
serif;text-align:left;"><font size="2"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197275"
style="font-family:times,
serif;"
size="2">Kevin
Shepard, Ph.D.<br>
Strategist<br>
UNC/CFC/USFK<br>
UCJ 5 Strategy
Div.</font></div>
<br>
<div
class="yiv990197699yui_3_2_0_26_1334130284197103"
style="font-size:10pt;">
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style="font-family:times,
serif;font-size:12pt;">
<div dir="ltr"><font
face="Arial"
size="2">
<hr size="1"><b>From:</b> "<a
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ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank" href="/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies-request@koreaweb.ws</a>"
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<b>To:</b> <a
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ymailto="mailto:koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws"
target="_blank" href="/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a> <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday,
April 15, 2012
1:00 AM<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Koreanstudies
Digest, Vol
106, Issue 9<br>
</font></div>
<br>
<br>
Today's
Topics:<br>
<br>
1.
Discussion
Question (<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a>)<br>
2. March
2012 Issue of
"Cross-Currents:
East Asian
History and<br>
Culture
Review"
Available
Online (Center
for Korean
Studies)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Fri, 13
Apr 2012
10:15:24 -0700<br>
From: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow">brianhwang@berkeley.edu</a><br>
To: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a><br>
Subject: [KS]
Discussion
Question<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow">7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel@calmail.berkeley.edu</a>><br>
Content-Type:
text/plain;charset=utf-8<br>
<br>
Hello all:<br>
<br>
I am a history
student at
University of
California,
Berkeley.
Currently I<br>
am working on
a paper
regarding
Korean
involvement in
the Vietnam
War. My<br>
argument is
that although
Korean
soldiers were
1) mercenaries
(because<br>
they were paid
predominantly
by US dollars
to go) and 2)
anti
communists<br>
(because of
past history),
the atrocities
that they are
accused of<br>
committing are
not primarily
due to the
aforementioned
reasons, but<br>
because of the
type of
warfare that
they had to
fight in
Vietnam,<br>
including
guerrilla
warfare and
civilian
warfare.<br>
<br>
Do you all
think this is
a valid
argument? Are
there any
primary
sources<br>
that would
help me in my
argument,
including ones
that attribute
Korean<br>
atrocities to
their
mercenary and
anticommunist
nature?<br>
<br>
Thank you!<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 2<br>
Date: Fri, 13
Apr 2012
11:00:21 -0700<br>
From: "Center
for Korean
Studies" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow">cks@berkeley.edu</a>><br>
To: <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow">koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws</a>><br>
Subject: [KS]
March 2012
Issue of
"Cross-Currents:
East Asian
History<br>
and
Culture
Review"
Available
Online<br>
Message-ID:
<<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
ymailto="mailto:037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu"
target="_blank"
href="/mc/compose?to=037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu">037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu</a>><br>
Content-Type:
text/plain;
charset="utf-8"<br>
<br>
March 2012
Issue of
"Cross-Currents:
East Asian
History and
Culture
Review" now
online <br>
<br>
The second
issue of
IEAS's new,
interactive
e-journal
"Cross-Currents:
East Asian
History and
Culture
Review" is now
online. The
theme of the
March 2012
issue is
"Japanese
Imperial Maps
as Sources for
East Asian
History: The
Past and
Future of the
Gaih?zu"
(guest edited
by K?ren
Wigen,
professor of
History at
Stanford).
Visit <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
target="_blank"
href="http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2">http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2</a> to
read the
articles, a
review essay
written by
Timothy Cheek
(University of
British
Columbia)
about Ezra
Vogel's new
book on Deng
Xiaoping, and
abstracts of
important new
scholarship in
Chinese. The
March issue of
the e-journal
also features
a photo essay
by Jianhua
Gong
documenting
Shanghai's
longtang
alleyways. <br>
<br>
A joint
enterprise of
the Research
Institute of
Korean Studies
at Korea
University
(RIKS) and the
Institute of
East Asian
Studies at the
University of
California at
Berkeley
(IEAS),
"Cross-Currents"
offers its
readers
up-to-date
research
findings,
emerging
trends, and
cutting-edge
perspectives
concerning
East Asian
history and
culture from
scholars in
both
English-speaking
and Asian
language-speaking
academic
communities. <br>
<br>
<br>
* * ** ** <br>
<br>
<br>
March 2012
issue of
"Cross-Currents"
e-journal<br>
(See <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
target="_blank"
href="http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2">http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2</a>)<br>
<br>
*Co-Editors'
Note*<br>
<br>
Building an
Online
Community of
East Asia
Scholars<br>
Sungtaek Cho,
Research
Institute of
Korean Studies
(RIKS), Korea
University<br>
Wen-hsin Yeh,
Institute of
East Asian
Studies
(IEAS),
University of
California,
Berkeley<br>
<br>
*Japanese
Imperial Maps
as Sources for
East Asian
History: The
Past and
Future of the
Gaihozu*<br>
<br>
Introduction
to "Japanese
Imperial Maps
as Sources for
East Asian
History: The
Past and
Future of the
Gaihozu"<br>
Guest editor
K?ren Wigen,
Stanford
University<br>
<br>
Japanese
Mapping of
Asia-Pacific
Areas,
1873-1945: An
Overview<br>
Shigeru
Kobayashi,
Osaka
University<br>
<br>
Imagining
Manmo: Mapping
the
Russo-Japanese
Boundary
Agreements in
Manchuria and
Inner
Mongolia,
1907-1915<br>
Yoshihisa T.
Matsusaka,
Wellesley
College<br>
<br>
Triangulating
Chosen: Maps,
Mapmaking, and
the Land
Survey in
Colonial Korea<br>
David Fedman,
Stanford
University<br>
<br>
Mapping
Economic
Development:
The South Seas
Government and
Sugar
Production in
Japan's South
Pacific
Mandate,
1919--1941<br>
Ti Ngo,
University of
California,
Berkeley<br>
<br>
*Forum*<br>
<br>
Asian
Studies/Global
Studies:
Transcending
Area Studies
and Social
Sciences<br>
John Lie,
University of
California,
Berkeley/<br>
<br>
Defenders and
Conquerors:
The Rhetoric
of Royal Power
in Korean
Inscriptions
from the Fifth
to Seventh
Centuries<br>
Hung-gyu Kim,
Korea
University<br>
<br>
*Review Essays
and Notes*<br>
<br>
Of Leaders and
Governance:
How the
Chinese Dragon
Got Its Scales<br>
Timothy Cheek,
University of
British
Columbia<br>
<br>
A Note on the
40th
Anniversary of
Nixon's Visit
to China<br>
William C.
Kirby, Harvard
University<br>
<br>
*Photo Essay*<br>
<br>
"Shanghai
Alleyways" by
photographer
Jianhua Gong<br>
Essay by
Xiaoneng Yang,
Stanford
University<br>
<br>
*Readings from
Asia*<br>
<br>
Ge Zhaoguang ,
Dwelling in
the Middle of
the Country:
Reestablishing
Histories of
"China"
[????:????"??"???]<br>
Abstract by
Wennan Liu,
Chinese
Academy of
Social
Sciences<br>
<br>
Wang Qisheng,
Revolution and
Counter-Revolution:
Republican
Politics in
Social-Cultural
Scope
[???????????????????]<br>
Abstract by
Bin Ye,
Shanghai
Academy of
Social
Sciences<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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Koreanstudies
Digest, Vol
106, Issue 9<br>
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