Korea: Division, Reunification, & U.S. Foreign Policy, by Martin Hart-Landsberg. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998. (ISBN 0-85345-928-2 cloth; ISBN 0-85345-927-4 paper).
Reviewed by Alon
Levkowitz
Hebrew University
Korea has for many years drawn attention as one of the last places on earth to exhibit the remains of the Cold War. The end of the Korean conflict would solve one of the most important problems in Asia, and one of the main solutions that has been discussed and researched is reunification, an idea boosted after the reunification of Germany. Many papers and books have been written and conferences held on the topic since German reunification, a list too long to condense easily. Over the years several questions have been raised, among them: who is responsible for the division of Korea; and why did it take so many years for South Korea to become a democratic state? Hart-Landsberg in his new book Korea: Division, Reunification, and U.S. Foreign Policy claims that the answers to these questions can largely be found in U.S. foreign policy towards Korea.The author analyzes the relationship between Korea and the U.S. since the 19th century. Hart-Landsberg starts with the relations of the U.S. towards Korea under Japanese rule, and continues analyzing relations until after the end of the Second World War. U.S. policy is criticized by the author for the preference given to security and regional considerations over the promotion of the democratic process in Korea. (This conflict over the need to achieve several at times inconsistent goals has been one of the dilemmas for the U.S. in the post WWII years in Korea, Japan and other areas. cf. Press-Barnathan (1998)). U.S. policy in Korea before the Korean war has been incisively documented in the two volumes of Cumings (1981, 1990). Cumings in a very detailed manner, and Hart-Landsberg in a more concise way, show their readers what they consider to be the mistakes that American generals and diplomats have made in dealing with Korea.
One example cited by Hart-Landsberg is what Commanding General Hodge told his officers in August 1945 before arriving in southern Korea, that "Korea was an enemy of the United States" (p.71). Korea and not Japan is the enemy, according to General Hodge. This statement came from Hodge although the Americans fought the Japanese not the Koreans; indeed, many Koreans fought with the Chinese forces against the Japanese occupation.
In chapters 3-4, the author states that the American forces under the guise of the Cold War assisted the Korean regime to oppress many South Korean opposition groups that called for democracy and Korean reunification in the years prior to the Korean War. Any attempt to promote a socialist government was seen in South Korea as a threat to the regime.
The Korean War is one of the great influential events in twentieth century Asia. The legacy of the Korean War still influences the policies of both Koreas and U.S. policy in the region, and the remains of it can be seen at the DMZ. Who is responsible for the Korean War? Was the U.S. defending the democratic world against the communist world? The author argues that we should reinvestigate the origins of the Korean War and look at other elements that might shed new light on the responsibility of the U.S. He does not blame the U.S. as being solely responsible, but as one of the factors. The U.S. stressed the idea that it was defending democracy and that is why it should join the war. One of the main reasons, according to the author, was that it was just defending its interests in wider regional considerations. American officials believed that Japan and Europe were at stake, and that the loss of South Korea would cause the loss of Japan and parts of western Europe.
Comparing U.S. policy towards Korea and towards states in South and Central America it is possible to demonstrate that the promotion of democracy in these nations was just a slogan and not the real basis of policy. For the Cold War decision makers, democracy was seen as a weakness in some parts of the world. That is why the U.S. was willing to support non-democratic regimes in some parts of the world and at the same time support and promote other, democratic regimes elsewhere.
Hart-Landsberg quotes MacDonald who says that the first opinion survey carried out by the American forces in Korea showed that a majority supported a socialist economy. But at that stage in history no American official would accede to such majority opinion. The result was that the American forces worked together with the forces that opposed socialism and communism, even though these movements had a following in South Korea (p.175).
The anti-communist policy of President Rhee and his successors found support in the American government. The problem was that sometimes the main goal of this policy was to strengthen the regime in order to provide it with legitimacy, which it was not, in fact, accorded by the public (Hong 1999). President Park established the KCIA, whose main stated goal was to strengthen the security of South Korea against North Korea. However, it was also used many times against political rivals (pp.182-3), most well-known among them being Kim Dae Jung, who suffered greatly at the hands of the KCIA during the years of the Park era.
At the beginning of the 70s, Park Chung Hee passed the Yushin constitution which allowed him a free hand in various areas. Any attempts by students or other organizations to protest against the new constitution or other harsh policies were dealt with by force. The U.S. government did not express any strong opposition to Park's anti-democratic actions. The Carter administration was critical of Park, but once the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan had changed, policy towards Korea changed due to security considerations.
One of the most controversial issues is the Kwangju uprising, or, alternatively, massacre: at the crux of the matter is whether the Americans gave the green light to the Korean military to 'solve' the problem in Kwangju by using military force. The highest military officer of the Americans was also in charge of the Korean forces. At this time, U.S. concerns were not limited exclusively to Korea. They also focussed on Iran, where the Shah was ousted and replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini. The Americans were afraid that the Kwangju uprising would weaken the regime in Korea. According to the author they were therefore willing to support some of Chun's non-democratic actions in order to strengthen his regime (pp.189-192). The Kwangju monument stands as an eloquent symbol showing the price that people had to pay for their freedom.
The last chapter of the book is dedicated to the question of Korean reunification. What is the best solution for the Korean peninsula? The formal policy of South Korea is commitment to reunification. The South Korean government supports reunification, but their biggest fear is that North Korea will collapse imminently and that reunification will start all too soon. The only comparable case study is the reunification of Germany. German reunification took place after the collapse of East Germany and the subsequent absorption of East Germany by West Germany. Should Korean reunification proceed like the German model (i.e. after the collapse of North Korea), or should it be handled between equal partners? Through the years South Korea has tried to approach the reunification process from a position of supremacy. Hart-Landsberg's proposes negotiations between equals and assistance to North Korea in order to prevent its collapse.
If the author had published this work a year or two later, he would, no doubt, have discussed the change that occurred in South Korea since the election of President Kim Dae Jung, who has stressed a "sunshine" policy as a process of gradual reunification. In years past, some of the sorts of provocation that North Korea has committed would have caused South Korea to convince the U.S. to stop any assistance to North Korea. President Kim and his "Sunshine" policy display a changed attitude towards the North, however. There is an ongoing effort to try to change the Balance of Power philosophy that has prevailed in South Korea for many years, and a possibility exists that Kim Dae Jung will be able to fulfil the "Alternative Solution" offered by Hart-Landsberg.
It would have been better if, in addition to the footnotes, the author had supplied a bibliography. The book covers a long period in Korean-U.S. relations, and by doing so, does not get into more detailed discussion of specific events. The author could also have included a list of recommended books dealing with each period for students. While Hart-Landsberg has succeeded in his aim of showing that democracy was not the main goal of U.S. policy towards Korea, and that reasons for some of the events that have occurred in modern Korean history should be re-examined, some of the issues dealt with in this book have already received more thorough examination elsewhere, although these latter works have focused on more limited timespans. This book is a useful introduction to the relationship between Korea and the United States, but it cannot replace the need to read more detailed accounts of modern Korean history.
ReferencesCumings, Bruce 1990. The Origins of The Korean War. Volume 2: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cumings, Bruce 1981. The Origins of The Korean War. Volume 1: Liberation and Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Press-Barnathan, Galia 1998. Choosing Cooperation Strategies - The U.S. and Regional Cooperation in Asia and Europe in the Early Post- W.W.II Years. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.
Hong, Yong-Pyo 1999. State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea 1953-60. London: Macmillan Press.