[KS] re: Taema-do/Tsushima

Kenneth R. Robinson robinson at icu.ac.jp
Wed Oct 21 08:44:08 EDT 1998


Dear Professor Ledyard and Professor Paik,

        Thank you for your comments.  First, I do not have publication
information, but I have been told that the Yonsei index to the <KoryO sa>
(<KoryO sa saegin>) which Professor Ledyard mentioned has been reissued. 
Second, my apologies for the late reply.  My lovely wife was visiting and I
attended the Chosenshi kenkyukai conference over the weekend.  And my
apologies in advance to you and other readers for this rather long, and
dry, post.
        The three of us concur on many points.  We agree that the Choson
court never directly administered the island as Korean territory.  The
court never appointed Korean officials to the island, never enforced Korean
law there, and never taxed the islanders, among other possible examples. 
(Please see my article in <Korean Studies> no. 20, 1996.)  I did not
"mention or criticize" Professor Ledyard's comments about Shin Sukchu
because I agree with him.  And I agree that the map of Tsushima in the
<Haedong chegukki> is a map of Japan's Tsushima.  I am sorry that my brief
note was not worded more precisely and read to imply or to mean direct,
Korean administrative control and possession of the island.
        Regarding Korean government posts, Professor Paik makes reference
to military posts which Korean kings bestowed upon Japanese living in Japan
and Japanese living in Choson.  I agree that some among the former grants
were honorary.  Many other such issuances were nominal.  Over time, if not
from the 1390s, the bestowal of a military post upon a Japanese living in
Japan became a common way of situating that individual within the court's
schedule of reception procedures.  To expand upon one of Professor Paik's
other points, posts issued to immigrants seem to have been more than
symbolic in meaning.  Immigration also could bring an individual or a group
a higher standard of living, so to speak.  Kings often bestowed family
names, wives, horses, a house, slaves, and a stipend (or salary, in
Professor Paik's wording).  The bestowal of a military post was part of a
package; that package (including the possibility, the lure of improved
economic conditions) invited erstwhile, practicing, and would-be pirates,
and poor islanders and helpful Japanese in other instances, to leave their
communities in Japan.  
        The Choson government posts to which I referred were assigned to
Koreans selected for dispatch to Taema-do/Tsushima.  One such post was
"KyOngch'agwan," or Inspection Officer.  KyOngch'agwan were sent to places
within the peninsula proper for inspecting or investigating defense
preparations, agriculture and tax concerns, and other issues.  The Choson
court also sent officials bearing this post to the island at least 10
times.  In most cases, the appointees were military elites or civil
officials serving in the Board of Military Affairs or the Office of
Ministers-without-Portfolio.  They discussed, and perhaps even negotiated,
diplomatic issues with governors of Tsushima, and no doubt paid close
attention to conditions on the island.  Interestingly, these KyOngch'agwan
do not seem to have traveled beyond Taema-do/Tsushima to Iki island,
Kyushu, or Honshu.  And the court did not dispatch KyOngch'agwan directly
to those locations.
        The court also deployed the post of "SonUisa" or "SonUigwan," or
Welcoming Official or Providing Comfort Official, across the water.  Within
the area between Uiju and the trade ports of Kyongsang-do, SonUisa greeted
Chinese imperial, Japanese shogunal, and Ryukyuan royal envoys.  And at
least three and possibly four SonUisa were sent to Taema-do/Tsushima. 
Three of these men were civil officials, the fourth was a Japanese
immigrant assigned to an officer post in the Five Military Commands.  That
immigrant was selected upon the death of the governor's mother.  And
similar to the KyOngch'agwan post, the court did not deploy this post for
Kyushu or other locations.
        As noted, most if not all of these officials discussed diplomatic
concerns with the Governor of Tsushima.  It was the Governor of Tsushima,
of course, and not the shogun and officials of the Muromachi Bakufu whom
the Choson court expected, and relied upon, to manage and monitor the
everyday matters of Japanese interactions with kings, court officials,
government officials in the provinces, and other Koreans.  A few, some,
many, or all of the kings and court officials could consider the island
Korean territory, as part of the royal realm, and they could select
government posts commonly assigned for duties within the peninsula proper,
but they no doubt knew that they could not (re-)make the island as Korean
territory administered by Korean officials.  Again, we all agree.
        The court worked through the governors of Tsushima to influence how
Japanese, including the islanders, interacted with Koreans.  Officials used
barbarians to control barbarians, so to speak.  For this reason, as well,
direct administration of the island was not a necessity.  The court
enlisted the governors to issue access permits (K. <munin>) to Japanese
missions bound for the trade ports (and encouraged the governors
handsomely), enforced at the trade ports the requirement to obtain an
access permit, and rewarded preferred forms of contact through royal
bestowals of patents of identification that would enable repetition of the
cycle of access, reception, and exchange bestowals.  Influencing forms of
Japanese interaction through Tsushima elites and through the Korean tribute
system proved extremely effective.  As piracy faded, but never disappeared,
from immediate concerns, tribute system policies became a means of imposing
an order and a consistency upon maritime arrivals and interactions on the
peninsula, of permitting or denying regularized trade opportunities, and of
making it possible for government officials to at least estimate the annual
economic costs of reception (I am not including exchange in that
calculation).  (Committing self-promotion again, may I refer you to my
dissertation for further details?)
        Expressing territorial sovereignty by assertion or by dispatch of
officials for meetings with the Governor did not jurisdictional sovereignty
make.  Yet, perhaps a form of very limited jurisdictional sovereignty can
be seen in the governor's issuance of the access permit on behalf of the
king and the court's enforcement of the requirement that an access permit
be presented at the port of entry.  And/or perhaps the dispatch of
Inspection Officers implied a degree of asserted jurisdictional
sovereignty.  In effect, with each dispatch the court was reiterating that
the island belongs to Choson and officials will inspect it whenever the
king so chooses.  The governors could not prevent or effectively protest
the assignment or the dispatch, nor could the Bakufu.  And the governors
could not prevent the assertion or practice of limited jurisdictional
sovereignty.  Further, without goods obtained in Choson, there was little
else that Tsushima islanders could trade within Japan other than fish,
salt, and whatever items they acquired elsewhere in Japan or from long
voyages to and from Ryukyu.  On the other hand, dispatches of KyOngch'agwan
did not challenge the Sou's position as Governor of Tsushima.  Such
dispatches may even have helped the Sou strengthen their hand in island
politics and improve trade opportunities for the islanders, for they could
discuss trade matters and possibly even negotiate resolutions to concerns. 
I continue to think through certain of these points.  
        Again, I apologize for this long post.  It is not possible to gauge
how widespread was the view that the island was Choson territory.  But the
appearance of this assertion in official materials such as the <ShinjUng
Tongguk yOji sUngnam>, the <ChUngbo munhOn pigo>, and the <Kukcho pogam>
and in texts such as the <P'aegwan chapki> suggests that the view was taken
seriously by elites in Hansong.  I am not suggesting, and I have never
written, that the island was under complete Korean administration during
the early Choson/Muromachi period.  I do think that this view of
territorial sovereignty was one element in the Choson court's policies
toward the island, the islanders, and other Japanese.  


With thanks and sincerity,

Ken Robinson




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