[KS] Re: literature types on NK perspectives

Sat Aug 9 14:46:56 EDT 2003

Dear Group:

Balazs Szalontai has hit the nail on the head in his discussion of North
Korean resiliency or staying power.  It makes many of the same points that I
and my CIA colleagues made for nearly a decade.  Inasmuch as I retired from
the Agency five years ago, I would not presume to speculate on what Agency
thinking is today, but I personally do not believe that North Korea is
"teetering on the edge of economic collapse" or that economic sanctions
would be effective or that the military option is a viable one.

I recognize that many people have very strong opinions about the North
Korean issue (and the Iraq issue), but I think more will be gained if the
dialogue is kept as much as possible on a calm and unemotional plane.  It is
sad to see intellectual discussion in this forum using expressions such as
"barking dogs,"  "CIA hacks and their idiot analysts," "fools," "too
stupid," "White House terriers barking," etc.  But then, being from the old
school, I guess I'm not accustomed to the language of today's scholarship.
Alas, times change.

Inasmuch as CIA has been tagged as one of the culprits, as a graduate of
that much maligned institution I feel constrained to put in a few words of
clarification, particularly as it regards Korea, to dispel some of the
misconceptions about CIA.

First, it is important to realize that CIA does not make policy.  That is
the function of the President, the NSC and the State and Defense
departments.  The mission of the CIA Intelligence Directorate (the
analytical arm) is to produce unbiased, well reasoned analysis to help the
policymaker in making his own policy decisions.  Therefore, if one has
problems with US foreign policy, he should talk to the policymakers and
their minions.

Of course, every profession has its hacks, but who are these "CIA hacks"
that Jay Lewis mentions and why are CIA analysts in particular singled out
for verbal flogging?   I have not seen any CIA analysis on North Korea in
the media that would lead one to make that comment, but I assume that there
must have been something out there to occasion that remark.  (Actually, the
general public rarely gets to see CIA analyses, which are declassified only
long after they have lost their relevance.  Hence my confusion as to the
reference to "idiot analysts."  Seriously, I would appreciate knowing about
such analysis just to bring myself up to speed.)

By the way, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which has been bruited
about of late, should not be confused with CIA analysis.  It is product of
the intelligence community or IC, which includes inter alia CIA, NSA
(National Security Agency), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), INR (the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research), the military
services, and several other agencies.  Often a CIA analyst is the principal
drafter of an NIE, but that draft is then subjected to intense IC scrutiny,
sentence by sentence, word by word, ad nauseum with a dozen or more agencies
all having a chance to agree or disagree with judgments or to offer
different wording.  During my years with the Agency I was the principal
drafter of a number of NIEs on Korea.  Some were accepted with few changes;
others were edited beyond recognition.  It's "consensus analysis," but
that's the way the game is played.

A few personal observations about CIA analysts in general.  Most senior
analysts have graduate degrees, some are fluent in several foreign
languages, and many have lived and studied in their countries of
specialization.  They usually have in-depth knowledge of their own
geographic areas and solid grounding in an academic discipline.  Some teach
university courses in their spare time and others publish scholarly research
papers.

Like other CIA analysts, the Korea analysts have access to information not
available to academic or think-tank researchers and they follow Korean
issues on a full-time basis.  They know Korean history and, most assuredly,
know about the Korean war.  These analysts also participate in round-tables
and seminars with specialists in the academic community; they make it a
point to keep up with research and opinions of Western, Korean and Japanese
scholars; and they travel to Korea and many other countries to exchange
views with academic and government specialists.  In short, they are as
passionate about their subject as any Korean-history professor is about his.

In my view, the analytical rigor of CIA analysts in general is on a par with
that of academic researchers.  If anything, the CIA analysts are more
objective than many of their academic counterparts, who have the luxury of
expressing their own personal views in their work.  A system of peer review
and multi-layered editing also helps to keep personal opinion out of Agency
judgments.  CIA analysts are of all stripes.  Some are liberals, some are
conservatives, and some are in the middle.  Within the intelligence
community there are many shades of nuance, especially when it comes to North
Korea.  That said, the common trait of the intelligence analysts is, I
believe, their intellectual honesty.

At the end of the day, no matter how well reasoned and sound the analytical
logic and judgments might be, the policymaker may well choose to ignore them
completely.  In my experience, many-if not most-senior policymakers never
even read CIA analyses.  Policymakers are usually too busy.  It is more
likely that their gatekeepers summarize or gist the findings and
conclusions.  Most importantly, CIA analysis-or any analysis, for that
matter-rarely changes a policymaker's mind.  It pains me to say this, but
the policymaker usually has already made up his mind and does not want to be
confused with facts.  Naturally, if the analysis happens to support his own
theories and policies, then he will latch on to it to bolster his arguments.

That, in a nutshell, is what it's all about.

Regards,
Morgan E. Clippinger

>From: Jay Lewis
Dear Group: