[KS] Chinese "control" over Choson

[gkl1 at columbia.edu]

   Hi Jonathan-- Yes, there was a big difference between Qing
relations with ChosOn on the one hand and the Mongols on the other.
On the bureaucratic level, Qing's relationship with ChosOn was
managed by the Board of Rites under the traditions and protocols of
the tributary (zhigong/chikkong) system as inherited from Ming and
earlier Chinese dynasties, while the relationship with the Mongols
was under the control of the Buffer Nations Administration
(Lifanyuan), along with those with the Tibetans, unaffiliated
Manchus, and various central Asian Turkic groups.
   Both relationships were similar in that they were hierarchical
and involved tribute and periodic court appearances. But the buffer
relationships had a different history and were more in the nature of
inter-tribal relations with non-Chinese peoples. The Manchus had
already subjected the Mongol tribes closest to China before their
conquest of China. The various buffer nations had permanent
facilities in Peking and much more access to China than the
tributary states; nomads periodically drove their herds of horses,
sheep, goats, pigs, and cattle to the Peking or Xi'an markets and
contributed mightily to the Chinese diet; while in Peking they
could move freely around the city and engage in petty trade. Large
open spaces were provided within the walls for their animals and
tents. There were also generous provisions for their religious
needs. Official Buddhism under the Manchus was Lamaist rather than
the traditional Chinese Buddhism. The ceremonial protocols were
traditional and tribal in nature; documents in Chinese played only
a minor role. Buffer attendance at court was kept completely
separate from that of the tributary states. In the case of Tibet
and the Central Asian buffer nations, Qing inherited the Ming
structure in which the Chinese military had managed the relations.
Interestingly enough, the peoples involved in buffer-type
relationships are mostly all under Chinese rule today, whether in
Tibet, Xinjiang (which was only made a province in 1881), or "Inner
Mongolia" (Reher, part ofLiaoning), the territories of which
correspond those of the Mongols with whom the Manchus had
pre-existing relationships, as opposed to those further north who
were more aloof but also less of a threat).
   The tributary states (principally Korea, Annam, the Ryukyu
Kingdom) conducted the diplomatic discourse in classical Chinese
according to long established classical precedents. In form it was
governed more by ritual than by legal requirements. There was a
considerable flow of documents; in Korea's case the archival
residue of these relations is immense. The states were ranked in
order of their privileges, and Korea was ranked highest during both
the Ming and Qing dynasties. It had more access (between two and
three embassies a year on average), larger numbers of officers and
staff participated, there was more trade, and richer gifts from the
emperor. Tributary requirements were much more costly for Korea
during Ming than in Qing times, and privileges while in China were
incomparably more permissive with Qing than Ming (which provide an
odd context for the Gratitude-to-Ming and hostility-to-the-Manchus
that obsessed the SOin/Noron politicians who dominated Korea in
Qing times). In terms of security, Korea was closer to the Chinese
capital and was more likely to have Chinese assistance if there was
trouble from a third party, as with the Imjin Wars. Still,
self-interest was always a determining factor, just as it usually
has always been in international relationships in general. It took
the Ming government a couple of months to commit to sending troops,
and it did so only when it was clear that Hideyoshi intended to
invade China. In fact, while he fully intended
to remain in and hold Korea, his principle objective was the
overthrow of the Ming dynasty. The Ming troops were not always
pleasant guests, but there is no question that without them Korean
history would have been very different than it turned out to be.
   Contrary to the case with the buffer nations, none of the
traditional tributary states are part of Chinese territory today.
This might give a little comfort to those who fear that the PRC, in
its "Northeast" project and KoguryO game, is really angling for
Korean territory. I don't believe it for a minute. That said, they
do like very much that Korea is divided. When Korea is unified, it
will take some getting used to for the Chinese. But they will
handle it. So will Korea, and it will have many more advantages
under the international/legal system in force throughout the
world today. The most onerous of the tributary requirements-- the
ritual submission and patronizing relationship--all the sadae stuff
which understandably galls Koreans today--will not be there. On the
other hand, even a unified Korea will be smaller than many of the
Chinese provinces, and its diplomats will have to be just as cany,
alert, and resourceful as they were in tributary times. The degree
to which Korea's traditional diplomacy with China was successful is
widely unappreciated today precisely because the sadae humiliations
have been kept in the foreground while the actual diplomatic
history is regarded as an unrewarding field for study. People might
be surprised! No one knows this better than the Chinese themselves.
No one understands it less than my own country. The Chinese have
always seemed to me to have some institutional memory of what tough
customers the Koreans were during tributary times. When pressed by
the US to "handle" the North Koreans, I always imagine the Chinese
thinking, "That's easy for you to say..."

   This has been much more than Jonathan asked for, but I wanted to
weigh in more directly on the so-called "control" that has named
this thread for the last week or so. I think that word has very
little to do with the actual substance of the traditional
Korea-China relationship, especially under the Ming and Qing
regimes.

Gari Ledyard

Quoting Jonathan Best <jbest at wesleyan.edu>:

> This is a question arising from the recent discussion of  Chinese
> "control": in the eyes of the Ch'ing government was there a
> difference in theory or practice in their relationships with
> Choson
> and Tibet?
>
> Wondering about things well beyond my time,
>
> Jonathan Best
> --
> Jonathan W. Best
> Art History Program, CFA
> Wesleyan University
> Middletown, CT 06459-0442
>
> Telephone: (860) 685-3025
> FAX: (860) 685-2061
> E-mail: jbest at wesleyan.edu
>
>
>