[KS] Chinese "control" over Choson

[Kirk W Larsen]

Hello all, 

Some belated comments on what has been a fascinating thread on “Chinese
‘control’ over Chosôn” follow:

Many thanks to all who have participated in this discussion. It is these
types of exchanges that make this discussion list so interesting and
worthwhile.

The way I would describe Qing-Chosôn relations (a topic about which I go to
considerable lengths in my book which hopefully will see the light of day
some time soon) is in terms of Qing informal imperialism in Korea. 

Why imperialism? Because the relationship included two salient features of
what many (though surely not all) recognize as requirements for a
relationship to be described as such: 1) assertion of dominance or control
by one polity over another polity that is beyond the metropole’s boundaries,
and 2) recognition of such a relationship by the prevailing regional or
international orders of the day. This would appear to apply quite nicely to
the case of the Qing and Chosôn polities as both sides (as well as other
polities in the region) agreed that the relationship was unequal and
hierarchical. That the Qing did not “control” most aspects of Chosôn’s
domestic or even foreign policy should not distract from the fact that it
did assert control over the terms of the relationship, much in the same way
that many Western imperialist powers insisted that their relations with the
world be predicated on Westphalian assumptions of treaty-bound relations
between sovereign and equal nation-states (even while often actually
behaving in ways that were rather un-Westphalian). The Jurchen/Manchus were
very explicit on this point when they demanded in 1636 that “You break off
relations with them [the Ming], stop using the era name of [the Ming], and
all the documents will treat us as the suzerain state.” In addition, the
Qing demanded tribute (including human tribute in the early years) and the
expensive reception of Qing envoys who visited Korea from time to time. It
has become fashionable to dismiss these aspects of Qing-Chosôn relations as
mere (and empty?) ritual that shed little light on the “real” state of
affairs in “substantive” arenas. Such a conclusion, however, downplays the
importance and significance of such rituals. One of the benefits of James
Hevia’s book that Ken Robinson mentioned earlier is that it prompts one to
reconsider the role of ritual in Western diplomatic and commercial
interactions: if the ketou (kowtow) were such an insignificant ritual, a
distraction from the real issues of commercial, political and diplomatic
import, why didn’t MacCartney simply knock his head on the ground in order
to be able to move on to real issues of substance? MacCartney refused to do
so because he recognized that rituals matter as much (if not more) than
matters of substance. 

Why informal imperialism? Because the Qing never asserted direct territorial
control in the same way that it (albeit though different mechanisms and
avenues) asserted control of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia as Gari points
out. Why the Qing never contemplated the annexation and absorption of Korea,
even in the expansionistic heyday of the Kangxi or Qianlong periods is still
something of a mystery to me (though I have some suspicions). But the fact
remains that the Qing did not do so. Hence, when foreigners approached the
Zongli Yamen in the late 19th century and asked for a precise definition of
Qing-Chosôn relations, they were often given a reply something along the
lines of: "Korea, though a dependency of China, is completely autonomous in
her politics, religion, prohibitions and orders. China has never interfered
into it.” or “It is known by all nations of the world that Korea is a
dependent state of China. It is also known by all that she is an autonomous
country.” These replies confused many Westerners but they actually nicely
encapsulated the nature of Qing-Chosôn relations: Qing assertion of control
over the terms and ritual expression of Korea’s foreign relations combined
with complete Korean autonomy in nearly all other matters. 

Even in the late 19th century when the Qing essentially abandoned its
long-standing practice of non-interference in Chosôn’s domestic affairs, the
leading Qing statesman of the time, Li Hongzhang, consistently and
vigorously refused to heed the calls of some “purist party” (qingliudang)
elements who called for the direct annexation of Korea.  Li and his man on
the ground, Yuan Shikai may have meddled and interfered in Korean affairs in
a matter unprecedented in the history of Qing-Chosôn relations (and arguably
in Sino-Korean relations more generally) but the Qing sought to maintain the
“informal” nature of its more aggressive imperialism in Korea. And, with a
few exceptions, most other major powers—Britain, the U.S., France, and
Germany—accepted this state of affairs, at least until Japan asserted its
claim that Korea should be pried loose from its Sino-centric orbit by
defeating the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War. 

As for Mr. P’ung, the various descriptions of him jogged a memory of an
enjoyable conversation with an amiable gentleman one afternoon at the
Kyujanggak years ago. I had no idea that he was something of a Kyujanggak
institution. Had I known that, I probably would have pestered him with all
sorts of pressing questions. Talk about lost opportunities!

Cheers,

Kirk W. Larsen
Korea Foundation Assistant Professor of
History and International Affairs
Co-director International Affairs Program
1957 E Street, 503H
The George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052
(202) 994-5253
kwlarsen at gwu.edu