[KS] KSR 2006-14:-South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy_, by Son Key-Young

[Stephen Epstein]

_South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy_, by Son Key-young, London: Routledge. 2006. XV + 250 pp. ISBN 0-415-375438-3 (hardcover). 

Reviewed by Alon Levkowitz

Tel Aviv University

levko at smile.net.il

 

Dr. Son Key-young’s manuscript has become an important book for policymakers and analysts thanks to the North Korean nuclear test. Some would say that the responsibility for the North Korean nuclear test lies in South Korea's Sunshine Policy. Others see the ultimate cause in the engagement policies of U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush towards the DPRK. All these policies are discussed in Son's book. 

The author has decided to analyze President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, one of South Korea's most significant policy initiatives with respect to North Korea. Initially, Kim’s Sunshine Policy received both widespread support from the South Korean public (more than 70%) and the support of the United States' President Clinton. (One might ask whether Kim would have been able to initiate his policy if Bush had already been in office). However, due to a lack of reciprocity from the DPRK among other reasons, the public’s support has waned with time. Furthermore, the changing of the guard in the White House after the 2000 election brought a president who offered not support but opposition. The Bush administration and his "Axis of Evil" policy led to a confrontation with Kim Dae-jung’s regime, which attempted to continue the Sunshine Policy while trying to prevent a crisis with the U.S. What was the logic behind the Sunshine Policy? Was it successful? Can states change their identities and values towards an "enemy"? All these questions are tackled in this important book. 

The book is divided into three parts. The first includes three chapters that discuss Son's theoretical and methodological framework. The second part includes two chapters that each treat particular case studies. The last section includes an appendix on the June 2000 Korean Summit and Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin declarations, and an extensive bibliography. 

In the first chapter, Dr. Son treats the U.S.' Cold War vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, as well as American policy towards 'rogue states,' offering a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on these issues. The second chapter analyzes different engagement case studies such as relations between the U.S.- China, the U.S. and Vietnam, and East and West Germany in order to identify underlining principles in engagement. Similarly, the third chapter deals with the framework of comprehensive engagement in order to explicate the Sunshine Policy. Son identifies three levels of comprehensive engagement: state, inter-state and global (pp.45-66). The author analyzes South Korean policymaking processes to see how the Sunshine Policy was implemented, focusing on South Korean key players: the president and the bureaucracy, the opposition party, the press, the private sector, and civil society. One sector that Son omits is South Korea's defense forces, and treating this subject would offer a profitable venue for further research, given the conflict between the logic of the defense forces, which perceive the DPRK as a potential enemy, and the Sunshine Policy. 

Son then turns his attention to the Hyundai Mt. Kumgang tourist project and the June 2000 Korean Summit. The Mt. Kumgang project, initiated by Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai, raises many questions: What is its main purpose? Why spend millions of dollars on a project whose costs exceed profits, especially given the fragility of regional stability? What is the connection between politicians, such as President Kim, and the private sector? Son analyzes these questions in detail (pp.135-136). Although, as the author says, there have been achievements and changes in North-South relations, one could question whether these have been tactical rather than strategic changes in both camps, as many U.S. republicans who criticize the Sunshine Policy have claimed. Son argues that although Kim Dae-jung's policy has not accomplished all its goals, it has achieved great changes both within the Republic of Korea itself and between the two Koreas. 

The fifth chapter, written at least a year before North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, will perhaps be most interesting from the perspective of Korean and U.S. politicians and researchers, because it allows the reader to understand the logic of President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy towards a potential nuclear North Korea: "For the Kim administration, the North Korean nuclear issue was the prime obstacle to its policies of engagement in view of its recurrence and magnitude" (p. 139). The North Korean nuclear issue has now become an even bigger obstacle for President Roh Moo-hyun, and his need to "juggle" between the players in the Six Party talks, who have, in some cases, conflicting interests in the Korean Peninsula. One of Kim Dae-jung’s challenges, which the author stresses, was to convince the U.S. (and in particular the George W. Bush administration), South Korea’s most important ally, that the Sunshine Policy was correct and not to pursue measures that might harm the policy and lead to an escalation in the Korean Peninsula. From Washington’s perspective, however, the issue was not simply a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, but that any lenient policy towards the DPRK would influence its relations with Iran and other potential nuclear states. 

Politicians and researchers are now raising the question of who is responsible for the failure to prevent North Korea's nuclear test. In the U.S., with elections pending, Republicans have accused Clinton for being too soft with the DPRK, while Democrats are blaming Bush for being too tough. In the Korean Peninsula some sources are blaming the Sunshine Policy for the escalation of the situation, while Kim Dae-jung has said that the Bush administration’s policy was the prime source of the nuclear crisis, which greater adherence to the Sunshine Policy could have prevented. Policymakers from Seoul and Washington would do well to read this book and consider how to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis without causing an unintentional escalation. Son's work is an excellent resource for scholars and students of Korea and, more broadly, for international relations students who not only want to understand the Korean Peninsula but to study issues of engagement and identity. 

Citation:
Levkowitz, Alon 2006
Review of _South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy_, by Son Key-young (2006)
_Korean Studies Review_ 2006, no. 14
Electronic file: http://koreaweb.ws/ks/ksr/ksr06-14.htm <https://webmail.vuw.ac.nz/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://koreaweb.ws/ks/ksr/ksr06-14.htm>