[KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

[Charles Montgomery]

“the bastards”

Is a phrase that calls your objectivity into question.

Charles..

On 12/2/11 11:57 AM, "Mark Peterson" <mark_peterson at byu.edu> wrote:

> Don,
> 
> Shouldn't the last line of your quote be "to manipulate Korean public opinion"
> ?   Or "determined to manipulate American public policy"?
> 
> I don't know what efforts the Chun clique would have used to manipulate
> American public opinion???
> 
> I know plenty of things they did to manipulate American policy.
> 
> I visited USIS a year after Chun formally took office, and the USIS staff were
> talking about an odd request that came from the Korean government for the
> President Reagan to send a letter of congratulations on the first anniversary
> of the new regime.  And the USIS staff thought that highly unorthodox and
> clearly manipulative and rejected the request, saying that as a matter of
> course the U.S. government does not issue congratulatory messages from the
> President on the first anniversary of a new political administration.
> 
> A short while later, on another visit to the USIS offices (as Fulbright
> director I had frequent contact with USIS people since they funded Fulbright)
> they were all buzzing about a press release from the Chun Blue House, a
> booklet of things, congratulatory messages and the like, in colorful booklet
> form.  And the first letter in the booklet was from President Reagan -- the
> bastards had forged it.  And USIS was snuttering about trying to decide how to
> protest such a thing, whether to go public (not a serious option), and how big
> of a diplomatic stink to make of forging the signature and a letter from the
> President of the United States.
> 
> I'm not sure this account is written anywhere by anyone, but I am an
> eyewitness and I'm sure we could find the documents in some files somewhere.
> Perhaps some government officers on one side or the other have a memory of the
> event?
> 
> best,
> Mark
> 
> 
> On Dec 1, 2011, at 4:03 PM, don kirk wrote:
> 
>> Actually, the State Department was trying mightily during that period to curb
>> excesses. Donald Ranard, on the Korea desk, formerly at the U.S. embassy in
>> Seoul, crusaded on the topic. Jimmy Carter, then the US president, was the
>> least likely US leader to advocate harsh tactics. Shorrock's FOIA request
>> turned up these quotes from the minutes of a meeting chaired by Secy of State
>> Muskie, also a soft-liner: "There was general agreement that the first
>> priority is the restoration of order in Gwangju by the Korean authorities
>> with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide
>> disorders later. Once order is restored, it was agreed we must press the
>> Korean government, and the military in particular, to allow a greater degree
>> of political freedom to evolve." Further, Shorrock quoted Ambassador
>> Gleysteen as saying "We did not want the special forces used further" and
>> criticized Chun for ignoring warnings against a "political crackdown" while
>> complaining of "a deliberate effort on the part of the Chun Doo Hwan group
>> who are determined to manipulate American public opinion."
>> Don Kirk
>> 
>> 
>> --- On Thu, 12/1/11, Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>
>>> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>> To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>>> Date: Thursday, December 1, 2011, 1:47 AM
>>> 
>>> I think that it might not be sufficient to focus solely on the Kwangju
>>> events to explain why Gleysteen & Co. adopted such an attitude. After all,
>>> on several previous occasions the U.S. government acted otherwise. For
>>> instance, in April 1960 the U.S. disapproved Rhee's use of force against
>>> demonstrators, and in 1961 it briefly withheld recognition from Park Chung
>>> Hee's junta. NB, in 1960-61 South Korea's economic situation, if compared
>>> with North Korea, was far more unfavorable than in 1980, and still the U.S.
>>> did not automatically accept the argument that force should be used for the
>>> sake of "security" because of the potential North Korean threat. Let me ask
>>> what you found in the U.S. documents about the State Department's and DoD's
>>> evaluation of the internal political situation in the months preceding
>>> Chun's May 1980 coup. If these institutions were in an alarmist mood already
>>> before Chun's takeover, and criticized student protests, etc., they were
>>> more likely to approve both the coup and the suppression of the Kwangju
>>> uprising than to disapprove them. Or it may have been the State Department's
>>> general (implicit or explicit) interpretation of post-1960 South Korean
>>> history along the following lines: "The brief democratic period in 1960-61
>>> failed to yield considerable results in political stability and economic
>>> development, whereas Park's authoritarian rule did; therefore, dictatorship
>>> is better suited for South Korea in general, and for our interests in
>>> particular, than an unstable democracy; hence, we should consider Chun the
>>> lesser evil, and hope that he will evolve into a second Park, preferably
>>> without the latter's disagreeable actions" (my hypothetical summary). I may
>>> be mistaken, however.
>>>  
>>> All the best,
>>> Balazs Szalontai
>>> 
>>> From: "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
>>> To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>>> Sent: Thursday, 1 December 2011, 9:49
>>> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>> Dear Don and all,
>>> 
>>> If we permit everyone to be judged by the standard of evaluating their
>>> actions only by their own self-description, then all prisons would be empty.
>>> The US Embassy may or may not have used the word "suppression" in the
>>> hundreds of pages of declassified documents the City of Gwangju received.
>>> They are not digitized. If the "restoration of order" is not clear enough
>>> (which the White House meeting called for), how about Gleysteen's meeting
>>> with Korean Prime Minister Park Choong-hoon ion May 23 in Seoul, when the US
>>> Ambassador acknowledged that “firm anti-riot measures were necessary.”
>>> ­May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement Materials, hereafter GDMM, Gwangju
>>> City May 18 Historical Materials Compilation Committee (광주광역시 5-18사료 편찬위원회,
>>> 5-18 광주 민주화운동자료총서), December 17, 1997 p. 235 (State Department document
>>> 80Seoul 006610).
>>> Or "subdue the crowds": On May 22, 1980, a  US DOD spokesperson stated that
>>> US Commanding Gen.
>>> Wickham “has accepted and agreed to the request by the Korean government to
>>> allow the use of certain
>>> selected Korean armed forces under his operational control in operations to
>>> subdue the crowds."
>>> 
>>> I could go on but I think, again, if we want the prisons empty, then let's
>>> apply universally the standard of
>>> taking people at their own self-description
>>> 
>>> George
>>> 
>>> 
>>> From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com
>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=kirkdon@yahoo.com> >Reply-To: Korean Studies
>>> Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> >Date: Tue, 29 Nov
>>> 2011 01:07:10 -0800To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>>> <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> >Subject: Re: [KS]
>>> U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>> 
>>> You're going a step beyond what was said. The U.S. interest, as noted in a
>>> message from a long-time observer, was indeed "stability." The U.S. also was
>>> no doubt interested in "liberalization of the economy from tight central
>>> control" -- a goal actually that many of the protesters shared. Did the
>>> material that Shorrock picked up via FOIA contain the word "suppression" as
>>> such or is that your interpretation? The real problem was U.S. analysts,
>>> intel people etc. had little comprehension of the forces at work on either
>>> side -- that is, the concerns of the protesters, their willingness to defy
>>> central authority, or the extent to which Chun Doo-hwan was willing to go
>>> to, yes, "suppress" them. Another far more abstract issue is whether Park,
>>> had he been alive, would have been so blatantly heavy-handed -- or would
>>> have been more skilled in going after adjudged foes earlier, thereby
>>> "suppressing" dissent and protest before they took over the city. But Park
>>> also had shown he was out of touch by bloody suppression of labor dissent in
>>> the industrial centers of Masan and Changwon in the southeast -- a response
>>> to a different form of protest.
>>> Don Kirk
>>>  
>>> --- On Mon, 11/28/11, Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu
>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=katsiaficasg@wit.edu> > wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> From: Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu
>>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=katsiaficasg@wit.edu> >
>>>> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>> To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>>> <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> >, "J.Scott Burgeson"
>>>> <jsburgeson at yahoo.com <x-msg://892/mc/compose?to=jsburgeson@yahoo.com> >
>>>> Date: Monday, November 28, 2011, 11:58 PM
>>>> 
>>>> I suspect that Don Kirk and I would agree that anecdotal evidence based
>>>> upon experiences in 1980 is not by itself sufficient to evaluate whether or
>>>> not Washington insisted upon suppression of the Gwangju Uprising. Not until
>>>> years later did US government documents become publicly available (thanks
>>>> to a Freedom of Information Act by citizens of Gwangju and investigation by
>>>> reporter Tim Shorrock). After reading hundreds of pages of formerly
>>>> classified documents, two things became evident to me:
>>>> 1. The US did, indeed, insist on suppressing the uprising, especailly then
>>>> US Ambassador Gleysteen, who mistakenly reported executions and people's
>>>> courts in Gwangju. The White House meeting at 4 pm on May 22 was the
>>>> decisive point. At that same time, North Korea, it was noted by Washington,
>>>> was interested in building a "Rainbow Bridge" to the US.President Carter
>>>> told a CNN interviewer on May 31 that security interests must sometimes
>>>> override human rights concerns.
>>>> 2. Gleysteen and New York bankers insisted upon stability and
>>>> liberalization. Only a few days after the final  onslaught against Gwangju,
>>>> Gleysteen penned an article for the US Chamber of Commerce. He stated
>>>> clearly: "The next crucial step in the country’s economic development
>>>> ―liberalization of the economy from tight central control to a greater
>>>> reliance on market forces―is one which has been accepted in principle and
>>>> is being pursued as conditionspermit.” (my emphasis)
>>>> All of this and more (including scans of US declassified documents) is in
>>>> the Power Point. I encourage people to have a look at the slides. Graduate
>>>> students on at least four continents have found them useful, and I suspect
>>>> so will people who were in Gwangju and have long years of experience in
>>>> Korean studies.
>>>> Englsih version: http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf
>>>> "Neoliberalism and the Gwangju Uprising," an article published by Harvard's
>>>> Kennedy School Korea Policy Review is available at:
>>>> http://eroseffect.com/articles/neoliberalismgwangju.htm
>>>> George Katsiaficas
>>>> 
>>>> From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com
>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kirkdon@yahoo.com> >Reply-To:
>>>> Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws>
>>>> >Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 04:00:47 -0800To: "J.Scott Burgeson"
>>>> <jsburgeson at yahoo.com
>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=jsburgeson@yahoo.com> >,
>>>> Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws>
>>>> >Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>> I was in Seoul and Kwangju during that whole period. The U.S. was caught by
>>>> surprise by the whole thing -- there was no "insistence" on suppressing
>>>> anything. At the same time, General Wickham made the mistake of
>>>> rubber-stamping, at the request of the ROK military, the transfer of Roh
>>>> Moo-hyun's 20th division from duty under U.S. command near the DMZ to ROK
>>>> command in or around Gwangju. Wickham had no idea the ROK would then
>>>> dispatch special forces to Kwangju to suppress the revolt. Obviously the
>>>> U.S. command, under Wickham, was too close to the ROK command, out of touch
>>>> with political and social forces and had no clear comprehension of the
>>>> significance of what it was doing, much less the takeover of Kwangju and
>>>> mass protest in Seoul, which I witnessed. Later, Wickham was unhappy to
>>>> learn that Chun Doo-hwan (in power but not yet president) used the
>>>> authorization of transfer to say the U.S. was on his side.
>>>> Don Kirk
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --- On Sun, 11/27/11, J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com
>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=jsburgeson@yahoo.com> >
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> From: J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com
>>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=jsburgeson@yahoo.com> >
>>>>> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>>> To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws> >
>>>>> Date: Sunday, November 27, 2011, 9:25 PM
>>>>> 
>>>>> From: "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu
>>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=katsiaficasg@wit.edu> >
>>>>> To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=koreanstudies@koreaweb.ws>
>>>>> >; Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk
>>>>> <http://us.mc394.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=aoverl@yahoo.co.uk> >
>>>>> Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2011 11:35 PM
>>>>> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>>> 
>>>>> A Power Point precisely on topic, is available at:
>>>>> http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf
>>>>> <http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf>
>>>>> 
>>>>> A main argument, now fairly widely accepted in Korea, is that US
>>>>> insistence on the crushing of the Gwangju Uprising, like its support for
>>>>> the coup in Chile in 1973 and in Turkey later in 1980, was aimed at
>>>>> imposition of neoliberal economic policies.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Did the U.S. really "insist" that the Kwangju Uprising be "crushed"?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I am by no means an expert on the Kwangju Uprising, but have done enough
>>>>> research and interviewing over the years to know that such irresponsible
>>>>> language is simply not supported by the historical record.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Having previously tussled with Dr. Katsiaficas on this Listserve over the
>>>>> 2008 beef protests, I am all too aware how history can easily be rewritten
>>>>> by individuals with a preexisting ideological framework through which to
>>>>> view such events.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I am no fan of the U.S. military-industrial complex nor neoliberalism.
>>>>> However, I think it only fair to note that Dr. Katsiaficas' Power Point
>>>>> presentation relies on selective quotation and time bending to construct a
>>>>> narrative that strays dangerously at times into the realm of fiction. I
>>>>> can only imagine how many young students in Korea have seen his
>>>>> presentation, which in its own small way no doubt contributes to more
>>>>> recent phenomena such as the 2008 beef protests.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Brother Anthony has already mentioned independent researcher Matt
>>>>> VanVolkenburg in this thread. I include below the original
>>>>> English-language text of part of an interview I did with him for my 2009
>>>>> book, "더 발칙한 한국학," if only because it clearly and concisely addresses the
>>>>> issue of U.S. "complicity" in the "crushing" of the Kwangju Uprising, and
>>>>> directly contradicts a number of statements, or really "suggestions" and
>>>>> "innuendoes," made by Dr. Katsiaficas' in his Power Point presentation. If
>>>>> nothing else, the presentation should be read by all with a highly
>>>>> skeptical eye.
>>>>> 
>>>>>    --Scott Bug
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 버거슨:  And what’s your basic position about U.S. involvement, for example?
>>>>> Was the U.S. responsible for it?
>>>>> 매트밴:  Well, you kind of have to look at the micro and macro view. The U.S.
>>>>> probably could have done something about 전두환 before it happened, like when
>>>>> he had his coup in December of 1979, but their options then were basically
>>>>> either economic sanctions or military sanctions. But because of the U.S.’s
>>>>> relationship with Korea, especially during the Cold War, that was simply
>>>>> never going to happen. From their point of view, they couldn’t possibly
>>>>> use sanctions or do anything that would weaken South Korea, so they just
>>>>> had to allow Chun to do as he pleased ­ though they did protest along the
>>>>> way. One thing that often gets misunderstood is that the paratroopers who
>>>>> were sent to Kwangju ­ and whose violence set off the Uprising ­ were
>>>>> never under U.S. control. The Combined Forces Command, which was headed by
>>>>> U.S. General [John A.] Wickham, had no say in how and when those troops
>>>>> were used. Before the Kwangju Uprising happened, the U.S. knew that
>>>>> special forces troops were being set aside to be used as reinforcements if
>>>>> student protests got out of hand, but those exact same paratroopers had
>>>>> been used in Busan and Masan right before 박정희 was killed. And, I mean,
>>>>> they might have been a bit violent, but no one had died. There was reason
>>>>> to worry, and the U.S. warned them to use “care and restraint” when using
>>>>> these troops, but there was nothing in the past that would have suggested
>>>>> the brutality that occurred in Kwangju, which was basically because of
>>>>> completely different orders. In Busan and Masan, they were ordered to just
>>>>> get people off the streets, but in Kwangju they were ordered to capture
>>>>> protesters ­ to arrest them ­ which made things much more brutal. So the
>>>>> U.S. did not have any control over the troops that were sent in initially,
>>>>> and likely did not realize that there were paratroopers being sent to
>>>>> Kwangju, because the main focus was on what was happening in Seoul. They
>>>>> didn’t realize what was happening in Kwangju for quite a while, and didn’t
>>>>> know the enormity of it for several days ­ it didn’t hit them till quite a
>>>>> bit later.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Another thing worth noting is that the U.S. did not have to approve or
>>>>> disapprove the use of troops under the joint command. They couldn’t
>>>>> “approve” or “disapprove” ­ they could just “suggest.” “Oh, if you’re
>>>>> going to take these troops out, then you should move other troops to
>>>>> replace them.” They did need to be notified that they were going to be
>>>>> moved ­ but they couldn’t approve or disapprove it. But then the problem
>>>>> was that the American Ambassador [William H. Gleysteen, Jr.] didn’t really
>>>>> understand the use of that language, so he did use the word “approve.” And
>>>>> a number of other people like in the [U.S.] State Department used it in
>>>>> media releases, which really confused things. Also, the Combined Forces
>>>>> Command was notified on May 16th, two days before the Kwangju Uprising
>>>>> began, that the ROK Army was going to remove the 20th Division from CFC
>>>>> control, and the response was, “Your request is approved.” A book I read
>>>>> seized on this response, saying, basically, “See? The U.S. does have to
>>>>> approve everything.” Except the problem is that General Wickham was in the
>>>>> U.S. at the time, so it couldn’t have been him ­ it was his Korean
>>>>> second-in-command, 백석주, who gave the response. As for the U.S. allowing
>>>>> the 20th Division to be moved down to Kwangju to end the Uprising, that
>>>>> was a lot of smoke and mirrors on Chun Doo-hwan’s part. The point is, the
>>>>> 20th Division had already been removed from the Combined Forces Command on
>>>>> May 16th, but then Chun still went about and asked if it was OK to send
>>>>> them down to Kwangju. He didn’t need to do that ­ he already had them
>>>>> under his command ­ but I think he did that to make it look like he needed
>>>>> permission. At the same time, the U.S. asked that fliers be printed up and
>>>>> distributed showing the U.S. position, which called for “calm on both
>>>>> sides,” but Chun did not distribute them ­ he instead put out an
>>>>> announcement saying that the U.S. had approved the initial crackdown using
>>>>> the paratroopers.
>>>>> 
>>>>> So I don’t think the U.S. is to blame for the Uprising, or for the
>>>>> brutality of the paratroopers which set off the Uprising. I’d lay
>>>>> responsibility for that at the feet of Chun Doo-hwan. Perhaps they can be
>>>>> criticized for not putting more pressure on the Korean military to find a
>>>>> peaceful way to end the Uprising, but at the same time, Chun controlled
>>>>> the press and controlled most of the information coming out of Kwangju, so
>>>>> they may have believed the military’s propaganda that these “hooligans are
>>>>> running around and they have guns,” and “Oh my God,” so that lack of
>>>>> information may have played into Chun’s hands. But, still, I don’t think
>>>>> they’re completely blameless, especially in how the U.S. embraced Chun
>>>>> after the Uprising. Because of the need for stability, the U.S. made a
>>>>> decision to back Chun Doo-hwan, essentially saying, “In the short term,
>>>>> support, in the longer term, pressure for political evolution.” Much as
>>>>> when they did little but complain to Chun after his coup in December of
>>>>> 1979, stability was the most important thing for the U.S. during and after
>>>>> the Kwangju Uprising. So you can certainly criticize that, and many did.
>>>>> For example, Horace G. Underwood III was talking to U.S. Embassy personnel
>>>>> at a meeting in 1980, and saying, “Chun is wrapping himself in the
>>>>> American flag, and if the U.S. does not do something about it, the U.S.
>>>>> will have hell to pay in the future.”
>>>>> 
>>>>> 

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