[KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

Sun Dec 4 03:27:32 EST 2011

As for the impact of the Iran crisis: let me ask if one should give credit to the story that Park Chung Hee attributed to the downfall of the shah to the latter's alleged unwillingness to resort to sufficiently harsh repressive measures. It is said that the fatal argument between him and KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu erupted over the issue whether one should or should not use lethal force to deal with the "Pusan political turmoil," on which occasion Park allegedly said that he, unlike the shah, was ready to kill a substantial number of opponents if this was necessary to stay in power. This issue is an important one, because Chun's decision to use lethal force in Kwangju broke an informal taboo of the Park regime (under which demonstrators were doused in tear gas and beaten up, but not gunned down), and consequently this act haunted him ever since. But if Park himself was getting ready to use the same type of measures, the picture is somewhat more
 complex.

Best,
Balazs Szalontai 

________________________________
From: Jim Thomas <jimpthomas at hotmail.com>
To: aoverl at yahoo.co.uk; don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>; Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws> 
Sent: Saturday, 3 December 2011, 3:33
Subject: RE: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

In all of the discussions of Kwangju , US involvement, and US-Korea relations in 1980, Iran has never been mentioned once (at least according to the global search I just did). For those who were conscious of such events at the time, let's not forget that May 18, 1980 was day 197 of the hostage crisis in Tehran , which plagued Carter throughout the last third of his presidency and, according to many analysts, is probably the single most important factor leading to Reagan's victory in November, 1980. George H.W. Bush, ex-Director of the CIA who was running against Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination at the time, had a “paramilitary plan” to free the hostages in Iran . Unfortunately, Carter listened and a clandestine military rescue attempt was hatched. On April 24th, 1980, it failed, ending in the death of eight American soldiers in the Iranian desert.Iranwas a great distraction--pushing Korea and most of the rest of the world off of
 the political radar screen--at least for the Carter administration. The hostage crisis severely compromised Carter's hard line on human rights abuse and soft line on military interventionism (which, as we all know, was aggressively used by Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and then triumphed under the three or four administrations that succeeded Carter). In mid-May 1980, "security" was the name of the game, not the least of which because American military readiness and Carter were both widely portrayed as "weak." And no, "bastards" is not too harsh a word to use in Chun's case. It is a word I reserve only for the most egregious abuse. And, I believe, so does Mark.jim

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Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 14:44:21 +0000From: aoverl at yahoo.co.ukTo: kirkdon at yahoo.com; koreanstudies at koreaweb.wsSubject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising 
In a sense, we may say that Chun's strongest card was to create a fait accompli. I would not overemphasize the legal context (that is, the specific legal constraints which could or could not have enabled General Wickham to prevent Chun from making one military move or another), because it did happen on several occasions that some influential American policy-makers, such as Philip Habib or Kissinger, succeeded in dissuading Park Chung Hee from assassinating Kim Dae Jung or pursuing a nuclear weapon option, not so much because the U.S. had a specific legal basis for such interference but mostly by raw political pressure that Park could not ignore. Both Habib and Kissinger were very tough and no-nonsense guys when it came to deal with Park, but I would not characterize Gleysteen as such, not least because he tended to disagree with Carter's human rights policy. Such an attitude might have worked in 1980, too, but only if the U.S. could have known in
 advance that the paratroopers were to be dispatched to Kwangju and authorized to use lethal force "if necessary." I think that even an advance warning might not have dissuaded Chun from staging his coup, but it might have prevented the tragedy in Kwangju. But once Chun succeeded in dispatching the paras to Kwangju and stirred up a hornet's nest there, he could justify his actions by pointing at the resulting upheaval. I wonder if he purposefully provoked a localized crisis, or "merely" badly mishandled the situation_terribly badly, in fact.

All the best,
Balazs   

________________________________
From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>
To: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>; Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws> 
Sent: Friday, 2 December 2011, 7:03
Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

Actually, the State Department was trying mightily during that period to curb excesses. Donald Ranard, on the Korea desk, formerly at the U.S. embassy in Seoul, crusaded on the topic. Jimmy Carter, then the US president, was the least likely US leader to advocate harsh tactics. Shorrock's FOIA request turned up these quotes from the minutes of a meeting chaired by Secy of State Muskie, also a soft-liner: "There was general agreement that the first priority is the restoration of order in Gwangju by the Korean authorities with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later. Once order is restored, it was agreed we must press the Korean government, and the military in particular, to allow a greater degree of political freedom to evolve." Further, Shorrock quoted Ambassador Gleysteen as saying "We did not want the special forces used further" and criticized Chun for ignoring warnings against a "political crackdown" while
 complaining of "a deliberate effort on the part of the Chun Doo Hwan group who are determined to manipulate American public opinion." 
Don Kirk

--- On Thu, 12/1/11, Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

>From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>
>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>Date: Thursday, December 1, 2011, 1:47 AM
>
>
>I think that it might not be sufficient to focus solely on the Kwangju events to explain why Gleysteen & Co. adopted such an attitude. After all, on several previous occasions the U.S. government acted otherwise. For instance, in April 1960 the U.S. disapproved Rhee's use of force against demonstrators, and in 1961 it briefly withheld recognition from Park Chung Hee's junta. NB, in 1960-61 South Korea's economic situation, if compared with North Korea, was far more unfavorable than in 1980, and still the U.S. did not automatically accept the argument that force should be used for the sake of "security" because of the potential North Korean threat. Let me ask what you found in the U.S. documents about the State Department's and DoD's evaluation of the internal political situation in the months preceding Chun's May 1980 coup. If these institutions were in an alarmist mood already before Chun's takeover, and criticized student protests, etc., they
 were more likely to approve both the coup and the suppression of the Kwangju uprising than to disapprove them. Or it may have been the State Department's general (implicit or explicit) interpretation of post-1960 South Korean history along the following lines: "The brief democratic period in 1960-61 failed to yield considerable results in political stability and economic development, whereas Park's authoritarian rule did; therefore, dictatorship is better suited for South Korea in general, and for our interests in particular, than an unstable democracy; hence, we should consider Chun the lesser evil, and hope that he will evolve into a second Park, preferably without the latter's disagreeable actions" (my hypothetical summary). I may be mistaken, however.
> 
>All the best,
>Balazs Szalontai   
>
>________________________________
>From: "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
>To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws> 
>Sent: Thursday, 1 December 2011, 9:49
>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>
>Dear Don and all,
>If we permit everyone to be judged by the standard of evaluating their actions only by their own self-description, then all prisons would be empty. The US Embassy may or may not have used the word "suppression" in the hundreds of pages of declassified documents the City of Gwangju received. They are not digitized. If the "restoration of order" is not clear enough (which the White House meeting called for), how about Gleysteen's meeting with Korean Prime Minister Park Choong-hoonion May 23 in Seoul, when the US Ambassador acknowledged that “firm anti-riot measures were necessary.”
>–May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement Materials, hereafter GDMM, Gwangju City May 18 Historical Materials Compilation Committee(광주광역시5-18사료편찬위원회, 5-18 광주민주화운동자료총서), December 17, 1997 p. 235 (State Department document 80Seoul 006610).
>Or "subdue the crowds": On May 22, 1980, a  US DOD spokesperson stated that US Commanding Gen. 
>Wickham “has accepted and agreed to the request by the Korean government to allow the use of certain 
>selected Korean armed forces under his operational control in operations to subdue the crowds."
>I could go on but I think, again, if we want the prisons empty, then let's apply universally the standard of 
>taking people at their own self-description
>GeorgeFrom: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 01:07:10 -0800To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>You're going a step beyond what was said. The U.S. interest, as noted in a message from a long-time observer, was indeed "stability." The U.S. also was no doubt interested in "liberalization of the economy from tight central control" -- a goal actually that many of the protesters shared. Did the material that Shorrock picked up via FOIA contain the word "suppression" as such or is that your interpretation? The real problem was U.S. analysts, intel people etc. had little comprehension of the forces at work on either side -- that is, the concerns of the protesters, their willingness to defy central authority, or the extent to which Chun Doo-hwan was willing to go to, yes, "suppress" them. Another far more abstract issue is whether Park, had he been alive, would have been so blatantly heavy-handed -- or would have been more skilled in going after adjudged foes earlier, thereby "suppressing" dissent and protest before they took over the city. But Park
 also had shown he was out of touch by bloody suppression of labor dissent in the industrial centers of Masan and Changwon in the southeast -- a response to a different form of protest.
>Don Kirk
>
>--- On Mon, 11/28/11, Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu> wrote:
>
>>From: Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
>>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>, "J.Scott Burgeson" <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>
>>Date: Monday, November 28, 2011, 11:58 PM
>>
>>
>>I suspect that Don Kirk and I would agree that anecdotal evidence based upon experiences in 1980 is not by itself sufficient to evaluate whether or not Washington insisted upon suppression of the Gwangju Uprising. Not until years later did US government documents become publicly available (thanks to a Freedom of Information Act by citizens of Gwangju and investigation by reporter Tim Shorrock). After reading hundreds of pages of formerly classified documents, two things became evident to me:
>>	1. The US did, indeed, insist on suppressing the uprising, especailly then US Ambassador Gleysteen, who mistakenly reported executions and people's courts in Gwangju. The White House meeting at 4 pm on May 22 was the decisive point. At that same time, North Korea, it was noted by Washington, was interested in building a "Rainbow Bridge" to the US.President Carter told a CNN interviewer on May 31 that security interests must sometimes override human rights concerns. 
>>	2. Gleysteen and New York bankers insisted upon stability and liberalization. Only a few days after the final  onslaught against Gwangju, Gleysteen penned an article for the US Chamber of Commerce. He stated clearly: "The next crucial step in the country’s economic development —liberalization of the economy from tight central control to a greater reliance on market forces—is one which has been accepted in principle and is being pursued as conditionspermit.”(my emphasis)
>>All of this and more (including scans of US declassified documents) is in the Power Point. I encourage people to have a look at the slides. Graduate students on at least four continents have found them useful, and I suspect  so will people who were in Gwangju and have long years of experience in Korean studies.
>>Englsih version: http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf
>>"Neoliberalism and the Gwangju Uprising," an article published by Harvard's Kennedy School Korea Policy Review is available at: http://eroseffect.com/articles/neoliberalismgwangju.htm
>>George Katsiaficas From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 04:00:47 -0800To: "J.Scott Burgeson" <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>, Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>I was in Seoul and Kwangju during that whole period. The U.S. was caught by surprise by the whole thing -- there was no "insistence" on suppressing anything. At the same time, General Wickham made the mistake of rubber-stamping, at the request of the ROK military, the transfer of Roh Moo-hyun's 20th division from duty under U.S. command near the DMZ to ROK command in or around Gwangju. Wickham had no idea the ROK would then dispatch special forces to Kwangju to suppress the revolt. Obviously the U.S. command, under Wickham, was too close to the ROK command, out of touch with political and social forces and had no clear comprehension of the significance of what it was doing, much less the takeover of Kwangju and mass protest in Seoul, which I witnessed. Later, Wickham was unhappy to learn that Chun Doo-hwan (in power but not yet president) used the authorization of transfer to say the U.S. was on his side. 
>>Don Kirk
>>
>>
>>--- On Sun, 11/27/11, J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>From: J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>
>>>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>>>Date: Sunday, November 27, 2011, 9:25 PM
>>>
>>>
>>>From:"Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
>>>
>>>To:Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>; Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> 
>>>Sent:Saturday, November 26, 2011 11:35 PM
>>>Subject:Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising
>>>
>>>
>>>A Power Point precisely on topic, is available at:
>>>http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf
>>>
>>>
>>>A main argument, now fairly widely accepted in Korea, is that US insistence on the crushing of the Gwangju Uprising, like its support for the coup in Chile in 1973 and in Turkey later in 1980, was aimed at imposition of neoliberal economic policies. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>Did the U.S. really "insist" that the Kwangju Uprising be "crushed"? 
>>>
>>>
>>>I am by no means an expert on the Kwangju Uprising, but have done enough research and interviewing over the years to know that such irresponsible language is simply not supported by the historical record.
>>>
>>>
>>>Having previously tussled with Dr. Katsiaficas on this Listserve over the 2008 beef protests, I am all too aware how history can easily be rewritten by individuals with a preexisting ideological framework through which to view such events.
>>>
>>>
>>>I am no fan of the U.S. military-industrial complex nor neoliberalism. However, I think it only fair to note that Dr. Katsiaficas' Power Point presentation relies on selective quotation and time bending to construct a narrative that strays dangerously at times into the realm of fiction. I can only imagine how many young students in Korea have seen his presentation, which in its own small way no doubt contributes to more recent phenomena such as the 2008 beef protests.
>>>
>>>
>>>Brother Anthony has already mentioned independent researcher Matt VanVolkenburg in this thread. I include below the original English-language text of part of an interview I did with him for my 2009 book, "더 발칙한 한국학," if only because it clearly and concisely addresses the issue of U.S. "complicity" in the "crushing" of the Kwangju Uprising, and directly contradicts a number of statements, or really "suggestions" and "innuendoes," made by Dr. Katsiaficas' in his Power Point presentation. If nothing else, the presentation should be read by all with a highly skeptical eye.
>>>
>>>
>>>   --Scott Bug
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>버거슨:  And what’s your basic position about U.S. involvement, for example? Was the U.S. responsible for it?
>>>매트밴:  Well, you kind of have to look at the micro and macro view. The U.S. probably couldhave done something about 전두환 before it happened, like when he had his coup in December of 1979, but their options then were basically either economic sanctions or military sanctions. But because of the U.S.’s relationship with Korea, especially during the Cold War, that was simply never going to happen. From their point of view, they couldn’t possibly use sanctions or do anything that would weaken South Korea, so they just had to allow Chun to do as he pleased – though they did protest along the way. One thing that often gets misunderstood is that the paratroopers who were sent to Kwangju – and whose violence set off the Uprising – were never under U.S. control. The Combined Forces Command, which was headed by U.S. General [John A.] Wickham, had no say in how and when those troops were used. Before the Kwangju Uprising happened, the U.S.
 knew that special forces troops were being set aside to be used as reinforcements if student protests got out of hand, but those exact same paratroopers had been used in Busan and Masan right before 박정희 was killed. And, I mean, they might have been a bit violent, but no one had died. There was reason to worry, and the U.S. warned them to use “care and restraint” when using these troops, but there was nothing in the past that would have suggested the brutality that occurred in Kwangju, which was basically because of completely different orders. In Busan and Masan, they were ordered to just get people off the streets, but in Kwangju they were ordered to capture protesters – to arrest them – which made things much more brutal. So the U.S. did not have any control over the troops that were sent in initially, and likely did not realize that there were paratroopers being sent to Kwangju, because the main focus was on what was happening in Seoul.
 They didn’t realize what was happening in Kwangju for quite a while, and didn’t know the enormity of it for several days – it didn’t hit them till quite a bit later.
>>>
>>>
>>>Another thing worth noting is that the U.S. did not have to approve or disapprove the use of troops under the joint command. They couldn’t “approve” or “disapprove” – they could just “suggest.” “Oh, if you’re going to take these troops out, then you should move other troops to replace them.” They didneed to be notified that they were going to be moved – but they couldn’t approve or disapprove it. But then the problem was that the American Ambassador [William H. Gleysteen, Jr.] didn’t really understand the use of that language, so he did use the word “approve.” And a number of other people like in the [U.S.] State Department used it in media releases, which really confused things. Also, the Combined Forces Command was notified on May 16th, two days before the Kwangju Uprising began, that the ROK Army was going to remove the 20th Division from CFC control, and the response was, “Your request is approved.” A book I
 read seized on this response, saying, basically, “See? The U.S. does have to approve everything.” Except the problem is that General Wickham was in the U.S. at the time, so it couldn’t have been him – it was his Korean second-in-command, 백석주, who gave the response. As for the U.S. allowing the 20th Division to be moved down to Kwangju to end the Uprising, that was a lot of smoke and mirrors on Chun Doo-hwan’s part. The point is, the 20th Division had already been removed from the Combined Forces Command on May 16th, but then Chun still went about and asked if it was OK to send them down to Kwangju. He didn’t need to do that – he already had them under his command – but I think he did that to make it looklike he needed permission. At the same time, the U.S. asked that fliers be printed up and distributed showing the U.S. position, which called for “calm on both sides,” but Chun did not distribute them – he instead put out an
 announcement saying that the U.S. had approved the initial crackdown using the paratroopers.
>>>
>>>
>>>So I don’t think the U.S. is to blame for the Uprising, or for the brutality of the paratroopers which set off the Uprising. I’d lay responsibility for that at the feet of Chun Doo-hwan. Perhaps they can be criticized for not putting more pressure on the Korean military to find a peaceful way to end the Uprising, but at the same time, Chun controlled the press and controlled most of the information coming out of Kwangju, so they may have believed the military’s propaganda that these “hooligans are running around and they have guns,” and “Oh my God,” so that lack of information may have played into Chun’s hands. But, still, I don’t think they’re completely blameless, especially in how the U.S. embraced Chun after the Uprising. Because of the need for stability, the U.S. made a decision to back Chun Doo-hwan, essentially saying, “In the short term, support, in the longer term, pressure for political evolution.” Much as when they
 did little but complain to Chun after his coup in December of 1979, stability was the most important thing for the U.S. during and after the Kwangju Uprising. So you can certainly criticize that, and many did. For example, Horace G. Underwood III was talking to U.S. Embassy personnel at a meeting in 1980, and saying, “Chun is wrapping himself in the American flag, and if the U.S. does not do something about it, the U.S. will have hell to pay in the future.”    
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