[KS] Citizens appeal for American mediation -- Kwangju

don kirk kirkdon at yahoo.com
Thu Dec 15 15:59:39 EST 2011


The material that we've seen confirms an overall view of bumbling and fumbling at high levels in the U.S. establishment. There is nothing, however, to support the view of "no way that Washington would accept a ceasefire" and clear sign that Washington had no real grasp of the realities or what to do. The evidence also shows that Washington was not "lying about its knowledge and authority over Korean units actions" -- to the contrary, didn't know about them at the critical phase and again had no idea what to do. Survey results of popular opinion -- the survey not identified -- do not constitute evidence, any more than the outcome of a People's Tribunal.
Don Kirk

--- On Wed, 12/14/11, Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu> wrote:

From: Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
Subject: Re: [KS] Citizens appeal for American mediation -- Kwangju
To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>, "Edward J. Baker" <ejbaker at fas.harvard.edu>
Cc: "Mark Peterson" <mark_peterson at byu.edu>
Date: Wednesday, December 14, 2011, 6:27 PM



 
 
 
 
 
 





Dear all,



In his memoirs, US Ambassador William Gleysteen acknowledged he did receive the Gwangju insurgents' request for the US to "mediate a truce." As he wrote: "At the time, the decision tugged at my conscience…Later,
 when the request was linked to one of the militant hold-outs [Yoon Sang-won] in the provincial capital building, I was reassured that I made the right decision."
William H. Gleysteen Jr.,
Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korean in Crisis (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) p.
 140.



His refusal to mediate was part of US policy to "restore order." There was no way Washington would accept
 a cease fire, especially since Gleysteen had mistakenly informed Washington of people's tribunals and executions in Gwangju.



Make no mistake about it: This policy was not accident nor chance decision-making since it continues
 even today. The official US position, originally stated in the  June 19, 1989 State
 Department’s
 White Paper and maintained until the present, is that the US
“had neither authority over nor prior knowledge of the movement of the Special Warfare Command units to Gwangju…”



By lying about its knowledge of and authority over Korean units actions in Gwangju in 1980, the US inflicts fresh damage on itself. Remember Watergate? Nixon's coverup
 was as much a problem for him (possibly more) as his original approval of the plumbers.



When you've done something wrong, it's proper behavior to acknowledge it and apologize. 



Continuing US refusal to acknowledge and apologize for its role is a poor model for others to follow—and only hurts the US image. In
 1996, one survey found 82.5% of Gwangju people believe the US was involved in suppressing the uprising; 50.8% for the rest of South Koreans. Further, 44.5% of Gwangju people wanted a US apology and  21.8% thought
 the US should pay reparations. On May 18, 2002, Jimmy
 Carter and seven other US officials were found guilty by a Peoples Tribunal of crimes against humanity for violation of the civil rights of the people of Gwangju.

George Katsiaficas






From: Mark Peterson <mark_peterson at byu.edu>

Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 16:30:06 +0000

To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>, "Edward J. Baker" <ejbaker at fas.harvard.edu>

Cc: Mark Peterson <mark_peterson at byu.edu>

Subject: [KS] Citizens appeal for American mediation -- Kwangju










Friends, and especially Ed,



Ed, we need to compare notes more often.  I have a story exactly parallel to yours at the time of the Kwangju citizens takeover of the city.



The military had withdrawn on Wednesday, May 21.  For five days, tense discussions took place between the military and the citizens committees -- I wouldn't call them negotiations.  



On the evening of Monday, May 26, as I was returning from our Monday night basketball at Seoul Foreign School, the 10 o'clock news on AFKN led with the item that you heard, Ed.  AP or one of the major news outlets reported that the Kwangju citizens committee
 had asked for American, and specifically Amb. Gleysteen's intervention to help negotiate a close to the standoff.



I did the same thing you did, Ed, but I called the Embassy.  Fortunately, someone I knew was on duty; someone I considered a friend (I'll withhold his name).  I asked if he had heard the request.  He said no, and asked the details.  I said it was the lead
 item on the 10 o'clock news.  He said thank you very much -- to that point, I thought everything was going well and that my friend at the embassy was looking at it as I was -- and as you did, Ed -- that this was an opportunity for the U.S. to take positive
 action on the side of the people.  Then the Embassy official said, thanks for calling, "We'll take care of this."



I thought the phrasing odd, but still I was optimistic.  And then he said something about contacting AFKN to get that spot off the news.



Sure enough.  The lead item on the 11 o'clock news was something else, and Kwangju was not mentioned at all.



It was an eye-opener for me.



Later, when I talked to the embassy about it, various officials there said, "It was a no-win situation."  "We certainly would not have wanted to get involved in a thing like that."



Not quite as bad as "we have no interests in Kwangju", but in the same vein.



Just think of how different the narrative about the U.S. involvement in Korea would have been, had our embassy taken a courageous position.



best,
Mark






Dear Friends,



This is kind of late, but Norm's revival of the topic prompts me to describe a Kwangju experience.




While listening to the radio in Brookline, Massachusetts, a few days after May 18, I heard that the citizens of Kwangju had taken control of the broadcasting station and broadcast a request for the U.S. government to mediate between them and the Korean government.
 Especially since the request had come from the citizens, I thought it offered an excellent chance for the U.S. to bolster its standing with the people of Korea in a situation where it seemed that its reputation was likely to suffer. Aroused I called the Korea
 desk at the DOS to urge that the the request be honored. Doug McNeil answered. Expecting a sympathetic ear, I enthusiastically urged that the U.S. move immediately to offer to mediate. Doug replied that the Embassy had not received a formal request. Stunned
 I replied, "But Doug the city of Kwangju is surrounded by troops! Normal means of communication are cut off! How can the people of Kwangju make a formal request?" Doug paused and then said, "But Ed, the U.S. has no interests in Kwangju."



Ed Baker







On Dec 12, 2011, at 1:32 AM, Norman Thorpe wrote:



In response to Don Kirk’s urging, I will add a couple late comments related to the events of 1979 and 1980.  I didn't post earlier because I was traveling and didn't have access to my notes and writing from the period.





1.   Very briefly, yes there is great sensitivity to the terms used to describe the participants and events in Kwangju. A few years ago, a fellow who had had a few drinks took great offense at my use of the term “rebels” to describe
 the participants in the Kwangju uprising. It was only with great effort that my drinking companions got him calmed down.





2.  Questions about the U.S. role in Korea persist not only in relation to the events of Kwangju, but also about the response of U.S. officials during the period following President Park Chung Hee’s assassination in the fall of 1979
 – several months before Kwangju. I learned about this from research done by Tim Shorrock and from formerly classified U.S. documents he obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. He kindly shared the documents with me in 1996 for an op-ed article I was
 writing for the Asian Wall Street Journal.





Among the documents were cables between U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen in Seoul and the Carter Administration’s assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke.  I want to share some of that information
 here because I think it tells a lot about the mindset U.S. officials had about Korea during the months leading up to Kwangju, and probably carrying over into the Kwangju period, and also their naiveté.





After Park’s assassination, which ended his 18 years of strongman rule, there was a groundswell of hope among many Koreans that the country would finally be able to return to democracy. Amazingly, though, the cables show that Holbrooke
 in Washington wanted the pro-democracy dissidents in Seoul to back off from their campaign for political change, and when they were arrested by the military, he saw that as their own fault for pressing too hard.





One of the most stunning documents was a secret cable that Holbrooke had sent to Gleysteen on Dec. 6, 1979.  Holbrooke said that top U.S. officials were preoccupied with the hostage crisis at the United States embassy in Iran. They didn’t
 want the U.S. to do anything that could cause instability in Korea, or “lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally.”





Holbrook expressed concern about how “a relative handful of Christian extremist dissidents” had been bothering the Seoul government with their pro-democracy activities. Although President Carter had met with some dissidents during his
 visit to Seoul some months earlier, this wasn’t the time for their pro-democratic struggle, Holbrooke said.





Holbrooke told Gleysteen that the dissidents should receive a “blunt message,” that, “We favor the lifting of martial law, and the lifting of Emergency Measure 9, but we do not favor challenges to martial law at this delicate time.”
 Holbrooke noted that the military recently had jailed nearly 200 dissidents, but he said the dissidents “had provoked the military into the unfortunate reaction.”





Holbrooke proposed that Gleysteen launch a “delicate operation” to make the pro-democracy groups stop causing trouble. “What we have in mind is your sending a clear message to Christian dissidents who are now stirring up street demonstrations.
 . .” Holbrooke said.





The message, he said, “would be that, in this delicate time in Korean internal politics, the United States believes that demonstrations in the street are a throwback to an earlier era and threaten to provoke retrogressive actions on
 the part of the Korean government.”





The embassy should further tell them that, “Even when these are in fact not demonstrations, but rather just meetings in defiance of martial law, the U.S. government views them as unhelpful while martial law is still in effect.”





“Alert them (the dissidents) to the fact that they should not automatically count on the same degree of American support now that they might have had a few months ago. Our priority is on the development of the political process,” Holbrooke
 said.





Then Holbrooke made another surprising proposal. He suggested that the American ambassador tell the military that he was telling the pro-democracy forces to back off.






“We would propose that you discuss the message you are going to send to the Christian dissidents with the key military and civilian leadership of the government,” Holbrooke said. He added that that would show the interim Korean leaders
 that the U.S. was trying to help them as long as they committed to adopt more liberal policies in the future.





Could that message be misinterpreted by the military leaders as meaning they could suppress dissidents however they wished?  I asked Holbrooke that question in a telephone interview while I was writing my article.  He said of course
 that was a concern – that was why Gleysteen should get assurances there would be liberalization later on.





But the U.S. had dual objectives, he said:  stability and democracy. Stability was essential to keep North Korea from trying to take advantage of any chaos that occurred.





I have seen no evidence that Gleysteen acted on Holbrooke’s two proposals. If he didn’t, that probably was fortunate. Only six days after Holbrooke sent his cable, on December 12, 1979, Gen. Chun Doo Hwan grabbed power in a military
 takeover that Gleysteen characterized as “a coup in all but name.”





According to the declassified cables, the U.S. officials decided to try to portray the coup as just a military restructuring, and to press the generals to set a tentative schedule for political change in order to prevent protests from
 erupting.  








Norm Thorpe











--- On Tue, 12/6/11, Matt VanVolkenburg <mattvanv at yahoo.com> wrote:








From: Matt VanVolkenburg <mattvanv at yahoo.com>


Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising


To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>


Date: Tuesday, December 6, 2011, 7:38 AM








It was actually me Scott quoted about the Pusan Masan uprising regarding there being no deaths. At the time (4 years ago) I had read James Fowler's essay The United States and South Korean Democratization [from The New American Interventionism:
 Essays from Political Science Quarterly, Demetrios James Caraley, editor (Columbia University Press), 1999.] which was based a great deal on declassified cables between the embassy and state department. Here's the relevant part:











"On 4 October, Kim Young Sam was expelled from the National Assembly. Radicals responded in kind on 17 October, when 12,000 students took a demonstration to downtown Pusan where as many as five students were killed and 500 arrested.
 6   Though the Park government was very used to dealing with student protests, these demonstrations were much larger in scope and received widespread support from citizens other than students. 7   In response to continuing demonstrations in Pusan and Masan,
 the Park government declared martial law for the region including and immediately surrounding the two cities."











Note 6: Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, “Situation in Pusan Following Declaration of Martial Law,” 18 October 1979.   Note 7: Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, “More on Pusan Demonstration; Demonstration at EWHA University in Seoul,”
 17 October 1979.








An (admittedly cursory) bit of research into those protests did not turn up any confirmation of deaths, which I would have assumed would be widespread knowledge after 30 years. However, after reading your posting, I found an Ohmynews
 article from a month ago about the 'first confirmed death' from that time:








32년만에 드러난 진실... 부마항쟁 사망자 첫 확인 





http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001620595





As for other sources on the Kwangju uprising, one story that has never really been focused on is that of the Peace Corps volunteers in the city. Two have since spoken out, with Tim Warnberg writing one of the first English language essays
 on the uprising ("The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View", Korean Studies, v.11, 1987). It still stands out due to the fact he was there, and could report things like this:





"[On May 26] I walked to the hospital where I worked and talked to one of the doctors from the Dermatology Department. He had been on assignment at the military hospital on the edge of town, and reported seeing fifty bodies airlifted
 from the military hospital morgue in a one hour period."





One wonders if these bodies were ever accounted for.





The other PCV who has spoken out is David Dollinger, whose accounts of the uprising can be


read here:


http://518folkschool.blogspot.com/2005/11/eyewitness-testimony-of-david-dolinger.html


http://www.rjkoehler.com/2006/05/18/ghosts-of-gwangju/#comment-36329





As well, his account of his dealings with USIS, the peace corps office, and the embassy during and after the uprising is interesting:


http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2010/06/park-chung-hees-act-of-terrorism.html?showComment=1276519957503#c7651287543758252542





I've been told his presence in the Provincial Hall during the uprising led Chun to want to boot the Peace Corps out of Korea as quickly as possible.





-Matt























From: Don Baker <ubcdbaker at hotmail.com>


To: Bulletin Board Electronic <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>



Sent: Monday, November 28, 2011 12:39:39


Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising





As someone who has been studying what happened in Kwangju in May, 1980, for over three decades, I would like to add my two bits.   Scott Burgeson makes some factual errors. There were a few people killed in Pusan and Masan in early fall,
 1979. Posters stating that fact were plastered to the walls of the pedestrian underpass at Kwanghwamun shortly afterwards. (The rumor at the time was that those posters had been placed there by the KCIA, on the direct orders of Kim Chaegyu.)  And the soldiers
 who were first sent to Kwangju were


not sent there to arrest protestors. They were sent there to be so brutal that the whole city, and probably the whole country as well,  would be too intimidated to protest any more. They were paratroopers, not the usual riot police,
 and they had been told that North Korean had infiltrated Kwangju. How else can we explain the attack on peaceful demonstrators at Chunnam University's front gates at 10 am on the morning of Sunday, May 18?    The clubs they wielded were intended to maim, not
 arrest. And the bayonets they used later on Keumnanno were not intended to arrest people. They were intended to kill.

























From:
"Tracy L. Stober" <tracys2 at uw.edu>



Subject:
[KS] Journal of Korean Studies 1st Thematic Issue "Unsettling the National in Korean Cinema"



Date:
December 12, 2011 3:58:04 PM MST



To:
"koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>



Reply-To:
Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>






Dear Korean Studies List Members,



The Journal of Korean Studies (JKS) is pleased to announce that our first thematic/guest edited issue “Unsettling the National in Korean Cinema” Volume 16 No. 2 (Fall 2011) is now available!  Digital copies are available NOW through Project Muse.  Please visit
 your institution’s online library to download a copy 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_korean_studies/



Over 80 films are discussed in this issue dating from the era of silent films and "talkies" though to movies made during the first decade of the 2000s.



Articles include: National Cinema: An Anachronistic Delirium? by JungBong Choi, Visibility, Nationality, Archive by Steven Chung, The Power of Representation: Korean Movie Narrators and Authority by Roald Maliangkay, The Transnational Constitution of Im Kwon-Taek’s
 Minjok Cinema in Chokpo, Sŏp’yŏnje, and Ch’wihwasŏn by Kyung Hyun Kim, Restoring the Transnational from the Abyss of Ethnonational Film Historiography: The Case of Chung Chang Wha by Aaron Han Joon Magnan-Park, Cartography of Catastrophe: Pre-Colonial Surveys,
 Post-Colonial Vampires, and the Plight of Korean Modernity by Soyoung Kim



Book Reviews include:

Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea: New Women, Old Ways by Hyaeweol Choi, 

Reviewed by Su Yun Kim

Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945 by Mark Caprio,

Reviewed by Michael Kim

Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea by Marcus Noland and Stephan Epstein, Reviewed by Ivo Plsek

Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-totalitarian Politics, by Patrick McEachern and: The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit Kingdom by  Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, Reviewed by Scott Thomas Bruce

Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema by Jinhee Choi and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, Reviewed by Kyu Hyun Kim



The JKS publishes a regular, varied issue each spring and a thematic issue in the fall.  



The Journal of Korean Studies welcomes submissions year round. 

Call for Papers Deadlines:

February 1, 2012 – Spring regular issue (2013)

July 31, 2012—Thematic issue (Fall 2013) “The End of War? The Korean Armistice after Sixty Years” Guest edited by Charles Armstrong



For detailed information about submitting manuscripts for publication please contact:



The Journal of Korean Studies

c/o Managing Editor

500 Thomson Hall Box 353650

Seattle, Washington 98195-3650

E-mail: jourks at u.washington.edu

Website: http://jsis.washington.edu/korea/jks/





Subscriptions and Back Issues:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers handles print subscriptions to the JKS.  Subscriptions are available to individuals and institutions for 1, 2, or 3 year periods.  Back issues are also available.  

To subscribe to The Journal of Korean Studies please call 1-800-273-2223 or E-mail:
journals at rowman.com   

If you have any questions please don’t hesitate to contact me by phone or email.  



Sincerely,



Tracy L. Stober

Managing Editor

The Journal of Korean Studies

Join the JKS on Facebook! 

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Journal-of-Korean-Studies/302074140679



















Tracy L. Stober

Managing Editor

The Journal of Korean Studies

Center for Korean Studies Publication Series

University of Washington-Seattle

206- 543-7896 FAX 206-685-0668

    The JKS is now on Facebook.



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Today's Topics:



  1. Position: Oberlin College - MELLON POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW IN

     KOREAN/EAST ASIAN ARCHEOLOGY AND HISTORY (Jiyul Kim)





----------------------------------------------------------------------



Message: 1

Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 11:30:12 -0500

From: Jiyul Kim <jiyulkim at gmail.com>

To: Korean Studies Discussion List <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Subject: [KS] Position: Oberlin College - MELLON POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW

       IN KOREAN/EAST ASIAN ARCHEOLOGY AND HISTORY

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*MELLON POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW IN KOREAN/EAST ASIAN ARCHEOLOGY AND HISTORY*



The East Asian Studies and Anthropology Departments at Oberlin College

invites applications for a non-continuing faculty position as a Mellon

Postdoctoral Fellowship in the College of Arts and Sciences. Appointment

to this position will be for a term of two years beginning Fall 2012 and

will carry the rank of Visiting Assistant Professor. The position is

supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and by a challenge grant

from the National Endowment for the Humanities.



The incumbent will teach in the general area of Korean/East Asian

archeology and history of any period from 2nd c. BCE - 900 CE (pre-Three

Kingdoms period to Unified Silla).The area of specialization is open. We

encourage candidates to apply whose research interests also focus on

international disputes over historical interpretation, the

popularization of the ancient past in popular culture as well the

politicization of history. Qualified candidates should have substantial

experience of research and scholarship in Korean and East Asian

archeology as well as full command of the regional historical debates

related to these more contemporary issues. Total course load is two

courses per academic year. Further information is available at:

http://www.oberlin.edu/eastasianstudies.



To be assured of consideration, applicants should submit a cover letter,

a /curriculum vitae/, graduate transcripts, a writing sample, title and

brief summary of a proposed course; and three letters of reference

to:Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Chair, East Asian Studies Program 50 North

Professor Street Peters Hall 316 Oberlin Ohio 44074. Review of the

applications will begin on January 23, 2012, and will continue until the

position is filled.



Oberlin College is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer

committed to creating an institutional environment free from

discrimination and harassment based on race, color, sex, marital status,

religion, creed, national origin, disability, age, military or veteran

status, sexual orientation, family relationship to an employee of

Oberlin College, and gender identity and expression.



Oberlin was the first coeducational institution to grant bachelor's

degrees to women and historically has been a leader in the education of

African-Americans; the college was also among the first to prohibit

discrimination based on sexual orientation.In that spirit, we are

particularly interested in receiving applications from individuals who

would contribute to the diversity of our faculty in all respects.



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From:
don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>



Subject:
Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising



Date:
December 12, 2011 4:50:11 PM MST



To:
Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>



Reply-To:
Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>









Very interesting -- and never "late" -- it's all part of the history, before we forget.

Don Kirk



--- On Mon, 12/12/11, Edward J. Baker <ejbaker at fas.harvard.edu> wrote:




From: Edward J. Baker <ejbaker at fas.harvard.edu>

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Date: Monday, December 12, 2011, 3:48 PM



Dear Friends,



This is kind of late, but Norm's revival of the topic prompts me to describe a Kwangju experience.




While listening to the radio in Brookline, Massachusetts, a few days after May 18, I heard that the citizens of Kwangju had taken control of the broadcasting station and broadcast a request for the U.S. government to mediate between them and the Korean government.
 Especially since the request had come from the citizens, I thought it offered an excellent chance for the U.S. to bolster its standing with the people of Korea in a situation where it seemed that its reputation was likely to suffer. Aroused I called the Korea
 desk at the DOS to urge that the the request be honored. Doug McNeil answered. Expecting a sympathetic ear, I enthusiastically urged that the U.S. move immediately to offer to mediate. Doug replied that the Embassy had not received a formal request. Stunned
 I replied, "But Doug the city of Kwangju is surrounded by troops! Normal means of communication are cut off! How can the people of Kwangju make a formal request?" Doug paused and then said, "But Ed, the U.S. has no interests in Kwangju."



Ed Baker







On Dec 12, 2011, at 1:32 AM, Norman Thorpe wrote:



> In response to Don Kirk’s urging, I will add a couple late comments related to the events of 1979 and 1980.  I didn't post earlier because I was traveling and didn't have access to my notes and writing from the period.

>   

> 1.   Very briefly, yes there is great sensitivity to the terms used to describe the participants and events in Kwangju. A few years ago, a fellow who had had a few drinks took great offense at my use of the term “rebels” to describe the participants in the
 Kwangju uprising. It was only with great effort that my drinking companions got him calmed down.

>   

> 2.  Questions about the U.S. role in Korea persist not only in relation to the events of Kwangju, but also about the response of U.S. officials during the period following President Park Chung Hee’s assassination in the fall of 1979 – several months before
 Kwangju. I learned about this from research done by Tim Shorrock and from formerly classified U.S. documents he obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. He kindly shared the documents with me in 1996 for an op-ed article I was writing for the Asian Wall
 Street Journal.

>   

> Among the documents were cables between U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen in Seoul and the Carter Administration’s assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke.  I want to share some of that information here because I
 think it tells a lot about the mindset U.S. officials had about Korea during the months leading up to Kwangju, and probably carrying over into the Kwangju period, and also their naiveté.

>   

> After Park’s assassination, which ended his 18 years of strongman rule, there was a groundswell of hope among many Koreans that the country would finally be able to return to democracy. Amazingly, though, the cables show that Holbrooke in Washington wanted
 the pro-democracy dissidents in Seoul to back off from their campaign for political change, and when they were arrested by the military, he saw that as their own fault for pressing too hard.

>   

> One of the most stunning documents was a secret cable that Holbrooke had sent to Gleysteen on Dec. 6, 1979.  Holbrooke said that top U.S. officials were preoccupied with the hostage crisis at the United States embassy in Iran. They didn’t want the U.S. to
 do anything that could cause instability in Korea, or “lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally.”

>   

> Holbrook expressed concern about how “a relative handful of Christian extremist dissidents” had been bothering the Seoul government with their pro-democracy activities. Although President Carter had met with some dissidents during his visit to Seoul some
 months earlier, this wasn’t the time for their pro-democratic struggle, Holbrooke said.

>   

> Holbrooke told Gleysteen that the dissidents should receive a “blunt message,” that, “We favor the lifting of martial law, and the lifting of Emergency Measure 9, but we do not favor challenges to martial law at this delicate time.” Holbrooke noted that the
 military recently had jailed nearly 200 dissidents, but he said the dissidents “had provoked the military into the unfortunate reaction.”

>   

> Holbrooke proposed that Gleysteen launch a “delicate operation” to make the pro-democracy groups stop causing trouble. “What we have in mind is your sending a clear message to Christian dissidents who are now stirring up street demonstrations. . .” Holbrooke
 said.

>   

> The message, he said, “would be that, in this delicate time in Korean internal politics, the United States believes that demonstrations in the street are a throwback to an earlier era and threaten to provoke retrogressive actions on the part of the Korean
 government.”

>   

> The embassy should further tell them that, “Even when these are in fact not demonstrations, but rather just meetings in defiance of martial law, the U.S. government views them as unhelpful while martial law is still in effect.”

>   

> “Alert them (the dissidents) to the fact that they should not automatically count on the same degree of American support now that they might have had a few months ago. Our priority is on the development of the political process,” Holbrooke said.

>   

> Then Holbrooke made another surprising proposal. He suggested that the American ambassador tell the military that he was telling the pro-democracy forces to back off.


>   

> “We would propose that you discuss the message you are going to send to the Christian dissidents with the key military and civilian leadership of the government,” Holbrooke said. He added that that would show the interim Korean leaders that the U.S. was trying
 to help them as long as they committed to adopt more liberal policies in the future.

>   

> Could that message be misinterpreted by the military leaders as meaning they could suppress dissidents however they wished?  I asked Holbrooke that question in a telephone interview while I was writing my article.  He said of course that was a concern – that
 was why Gleysteen should get assurances there would be liberalization later on.

>   

> But the U.S. had dual objectives, he said:  stability and democracy. Stability was essential to keep North Korea from trying to take advantage of any chaos that occurred.

>   

> I have seen no evidence that Gleysteen acted on Holbrooke’s two proposals. If he didn’t, that probably was fortunate. Only six days after Holbrooke sent his cable, on December 12, 1979, Gen. Chun Doo Hwan grabbed power in a military takeover that Gleysteen
 characterized as “a coup in all but name.”

>   

> According to the declassified cables, the U.S. officials decided to try to portray the coup as just a military restructuring, and to press the generals to set a tentative schedule for political change in order to prevent protests from erupting. 


>   

>   

> Norm Thorpe

> 

> 

> 

> --- On Tue, 12/6/11, Matt VanVolkenburg <mattvanv at yahoo.com> wrote:

> 

> 

> From: Matt VanVolkenburg <mattvanv at yahoo.com>

> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

> To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

> Date: Tuesday, December 6, 2011, 7:38 AM

> 

> 

> It was actually me Scott quoted about the Pusan Masan uprising regarding there being no deaths. At the time (4 years ago) I had read James Fowler's essay The United States and South Korean Democratization [from The New American Interventionism: Essays from
 Political Science Quarterly, Demetrios James Caraley, editor (Columbia University Press), 1999.] which was based a great deal on declassified cables between the embassy and state department. Here's the relevant part:

> 

> 

> 

> "On 4 October, Kim Young Sam was expelled from the National Assembly. Radicals responded in kind on 17 October, when 12,000 students took a demonstration to downtown Pusan where as many as five students were killed and 500 arrested. 6   Though the Park government
 was very used to dealing with student protests, these demonstrations were much larger in scope and received widespread support from citizens other than students. 7   In response to continuing demonstrations in Pusan and Masan, the Park government declared
 martial law for the region including and immediately surrounding the two cities."

> 

> 

> 

> Note 6: Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, “Situation in Pusan Following Declaration of Martial Law,” 18 October 1979.   Note 7: Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, “More on Pusan Demonstration; Demonstration at EWHA University in Seoul,” 17 October 1979.

> 

> 

> An (admittedly cursory) bit of research into those protests did not turn up any confirmation of deaths, which I would have assumed would be widespread knowledge after 30 years. However, after reading your posting, I found an Ohmynews article from a month
 ago about the 'first confirmed death' from that time:

> 

> 

> 32년만에 드러난 진실... 부마항쟁 사망자 첫 확인 

> 

> 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001620595

> 

> As for other sources on the Kwangju uprising, one story that has never really been focused on is that of the Peace Corps volunteers in the city. Two have since spoken out, with Tim Warnberg writing one of the first English language essays on the uprising
 ("The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View", Korean Studies, v.11, 1987). It still stands out due to the fact he was there, and could report things like this:

> 

> "[On May 26] I walked to the hospital where I worked and talked to one of the doctors from the Dermatology Department. He had been on assignment at the military hospital on the edge of town, and reported seeing fifty bodies airlifted from the military hospital
 morgue in a one hour period."

> 

> One wonders if these bodies were ever accounted for.

> 

> The other PCV who has spoken out is David Dollinger, whose accounts of the uprising can be

> read here:

> 
http://518folkschool.blogspot.com/2005/11/eyewitness-testimony-of-david-dolinger.html

> 
http://www.rjkoehler.com/2006/05/18/ghosts-of-gwangju/#comment-36329

> 

> As well, his account of his dealings with USIS, the peace corps office, and the embassy during and after the uprising is interesting:

> 
http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2010/06/park-chung-hees-act-of-terrorism.html?showComment=1276519957503#c7651287543758252542

> 

> I've been told his presence in the Provincial Hall during the uprising led Chun to want to boot the Peace Corps out of Korea as quickly as possible.

> 

> -Matt

> 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> 

> From: Don Baker <ubcdbaker at hotmail.com>

> To: Bulletin Board Electronic <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>


> Sent: Monday, November 28, 2011 12:39:39

> Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

> 

> As someone who has been studying what happened in Kwangju in May, 1980, for over three decades, I would like to add my two bits.   Scott Burgeson makes some factual errors. There were a few people killed in Pusan and Masan in early fall, 1979. Posters stating
 that fact were plastered to the walls of the pedestrian underpass at Kwanghwamun shortly afterwards. (The rumor at the time was that those posters had been placed there by the KCIA, on the direct orders of Kim Chaegyu.)  And the soldiers who were first sent
 to Kwangju were

> not sent there to arrest protestors. They were sent there to be so brutal that the whole city, and probably the whole country as well,  would be too intimidated to protest any more. They were paratroopers, not the usual riot police, and they had been told
 that North Korean had infiltrated Kwangju. How else can we explain the attack on peaceful demonstrators at Chunnam University's front gates at 10 am on the morning of Sunday, May 18?    The clubs they wielded were intended to maim, not arrest. And the bayonets
 they used later on Keumnanno were not intended to arrest people. They were intended to kill.


> 

> 

> 
























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