[KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

[Ruediger Frank]

Dear all,
I think around 1979/1980, as far as I know, US pressure for liberalization and deregulation was still rather low, or at least not higher than usual. This changed after Reagan became president in 1981 (Reaganomics), and in particular after events in the Soviet Union (deaths of Breshnev 1982, Andropov 1984 and Tschernenko 1985 as well as the emergence of Gorbatchev), Poland (since 1980) and Hungary (since 1984) showed to the U.S. government that its main opponent, the socialist system, was getting weaker and actually crubmled. This reduced the political need for Washington to keep both eyes closely shut when it came to the behavior of its key allies in the Cold War - and South Korea was one of them. I have spoken to members of the South Korean negotiating team in trade talks with the US in the late 1980s, and they reported about an abruptly changed attitude, now demanding liberalization or else. They were shocked, because the issues of state procurement or IPR had been handled much more cooperatively in the years before. In fact, South Korea was designated as a Priority Foreign Country in 1989 under Super 301, which is among the heaviest sanctions the US Trade Representative can initiate. 
In any case, I think the events above came too late to have any relevance for the fate of Korea's economy in late 1979 and May 1980. The failure, or better: the end of the Park Chung-hee model was much more of a long-term and systemic nature. To me, one of the strengths of the South Korean development approach was its ability to get rid of a set of policies that had outlived themselves, rather than to keep riding a dead horse. Park CH did it when he switched to indicative planning and from light industry to HCI, and those after him did it when they allowed more market and more competition. By 1980, South Korea's economy had become much more complex than in 1961 or 1972; the old tools, once having been responsible for growth, now became an obstacle and consequentially were replaced. That is a step socialism was never able to take, and hence it collapsed despite initial success.
As for the classification of the early Chun economic policy as a revision of the Park CH approach, I'd rather use the term "consolidation", which I believe Cho Soon has suggested or was it Tat Yan Kong (don't have the books at hand, must rely on memory here). "Soft landing" was another term applied to that period. The high growth rates were not sustainable, and one-sided industrial policy had created structural imbalances. Not to mention the state's bailout policy, and the moral hazard it meant for the chaebòl. So I'd actually suggest a linear Rostow-type model.
Regarding the intensity of the South Korean opposition, I'd add the North Korea factor. The South Korean government at that time was enormously nervous about its own citizens, some of who seemed to believe life was better on the Northern side of the fence.
In conclusion, I think the position of South Korea as a major US ally and front state in the Cold War and the permanent military and ideological threat from the North make the case of South Korea's economic development from 1961-1993 a very particular case. When we observe changes in policies or outcomes, we should always also consider possible changes that occurred in these two key areas.
Best,
Rudiger Frank



on Sonntag, 27. November 2011 at 12:02 you wrote:


Let me suggest a somewhat different model of explanation. Instead simply juxtaposing Chun's de-regulatory economic policies with the demands of the democratic movement, one might draw up a triangular model, with Park Chung Hee's state-directed authoritarian modernization policy (particularly his massive post-1972 HCI drive) as the third pole. Gleysteen's telegrams clearly indicate that Chun's economic policies constituted a partial revision of Park's growth-centered, state-controlled, inflation-prone development model. To be sure, Professor Katsiaficas' presentation correctly places Chun's measures (and neo-liberalism in general) into the context of stagflation, a situation that emerged in South Korea in 1979-80. What may be added is that certain specific features of Park's post-1972 development model that distinguished South Korea from other NICs, such as the relatively high inflation rate and the state-controlled credit policy that favored the chaebols, seems to have played a significant role in that popular opposition in South Korea in 1978-80 became unusually intensive by NIC standards. In other words, it was not simply the dismantlement of the pre-1980 economic model that negatively affected the population and provoked opposition but also the previous model itself. 
 
All the best,
Balazs Szalontai

From: "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>
To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>; Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> 
Cc: "youngeunchae at yahoo.com" <youngeunchae at yahoo.com> 
Sent: Saturday, 26 November 2011, 23:35
Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

A Power Point precisely on topic, is available at:
http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf

It takes time to open and can be saved to one's machine. A main argument, now fairly widely accepted in Korea, is that US insistence on the crushing of the Gwangju Uprising, like its support for the coup in Chile in 1973 and in Turkey later in 1980, was aimed at imposition of neoliberal economic policies. 

The Korean version is at:
http://eroseffect.com/korean/US_Gwangju.pdf

In addition, there are a number of articles in both languages on this website.

George





From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 16:03:49 -0800
To: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>, Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

<youngeunchae at yahoo.com>


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