Dear George, Jiyul and all,
I think that we need to pay close attentions to the stages of South Korean military involvement in Vietnam if we are to specify which were Park Chung Hee's primary and secondary motives for sending ROKA troops to Vietnam. I do agree with the point that the economic benefits thus gained were substantial, to put it mildly, and new combat experience for the ROKA also must have mattered a lot. Still, these considerations do not satisfactorily explain why Park, instead of trying to maximize these benefits by fulfilling each American request for ROKA troops, put a ceiling to the deployments in November 1966, and refused to send additional troops in 1967-68, no matter how persistently the U.S. asked for them. To be sure, the North Korean commando raids that started in November 1966 probably influenced his decision, but since at first he tended to downplay their importance, and later responded to them by launching counter-raids, a fear of the North might not be
a sufficient explanation. Thus I consider it likely that his primary motives for the troop deployment were to (1) secure a U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK, such as a pledge not to withdraw US troops from South Korea without consultation, and (2) use the troop deployments as a bargaining chip to conclude the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on terms more favorable to Seoul. NB, Park's decision to halt deployments was made right after the ratification of the SOFA by the ROK National Assembly in October 1966. Once he achieved as much as he could in this field, he probably calculated that it was no longer necessary to send additional troops, since the US-ROK agreements signed in 1966 settled these issues. If this was really so, he miscalculated, because Nixon withdrew one-third of the US troops anyway.
All the best,
Balazs Szalontai
Kwangwoon University
--- On Tue, 17/4/12, Michael Pettid <mjpettid2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
Mr. Kim,
It is too easy to blame war and violence on some predisposed human condition (and that is very convenient for militaristic governments and individuals who hope to profit from such violence). And preparing for
war is surely the best way to prevent it and make the world safe. We are certainly doing a fine job of that as I write.
I am a premodernist and I teach my students about the futility and uselessness of war and how that damaged the lives of individuals and society. It is not a human condition as you state, but rather resultant from greed and the desire to take from others what one might not have. I find it rather amazing that this is something I need to state in academia, but clearly we have a ways to go. Michael J. Pettid
Professor of Premodern Korean Studies
Department of Asian and Asian American
StudiesDirector, Translation, Research and Instruction Program
Binghamton University
607.777.3862
From: Sheila Miyoshi Jager <sheila.jager at oberlin.edu>
To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 8:22 AM
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
Unfortunately war is a necessary evil in the human condition. The
better you are prepared for it the better the chance of preventing
it. No one is more anti-war then the people who have to fight it if
it occurs. You can condemn war, and rightfully so, but you can't
eliminate it.
Jiyul Kim.
On 4/15/2012 7:50 PM, Michael Pettid wrote:
Mr. Kim
I am happy that you were able
to find a silver lining in a war that killed tens of
thousands of combatants and many, many more
non-combatants. The war experience that
was able to "bolster the competence and confidence" of
the SK troops was surely worth such a cost, right? Wars
are the plague of humankind and nothing more than the
actions of various governments to achieve their goals.
War must be condemned in whatever fashion necessary.
Michael J. Pettid
Professor of Premodern Korean Studies
Department of Asian and Asian American Studies
Director, Translation, Research and Instruction
Program
Binghamton University
607.777.3862
From: Jiyul Kim
<jiyulkim at gmail.com>
To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012
12:58 PM
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's
Discussion Question
This is all good and fine from a macro view and I
see nothing to disagree with, but numbers and
quantification and metrics do not make history. What
is left out is the psychology and emotions that
Vietnam generated in Park, the military, and the
populace. No doubt there were tremendous materiel
benefits for SK and other Asian countries from the
war, but the war also had unmeasurable "benefits" that
were recognized then as well for example consolidating
national pride and confidence and providing the
military with combat experience. Since 1953 the only
Korean forces, North and South, who have experienced
real combat were the Koreans in Vietnam including a
handful of North Korean fighter pilots. That
experience did much to bolster the competence and
confidence of the South Korean Army. This is not to
justify their deployment or to somehow legitimate the
Vietnam War. I for one believe it was a tragic unjust
war for the U.S. and its allies to have gotten
involved in, but we should not always paint everything
about the war in broad and condemning strokes.
Jiyul Kim
On 4/15/2012 10:15 AM, Katsiaficas, George wrote:
The larger context has
bearing on your question. The government of
South Korea received tremendous economic
benefits from the Vietnam War. Park Chung-hee's
grandiose scheme to build heavy industry
required enormous amounts of money, but he had only
limited domestic sources. As much as hesqueezed workers and
devalued the currency to stimulate exports, he
still needed farmore capital. Between 1953 and 1962,
US aid funded 70% of Korea’s imports and 80% of
its fixed capital investments—about 8% of its
GNP.Once the US needed its monies to fight the
war in Vietnam, however, it began to cut back. In order to find new
international sources of money, Park endorsed a
key US proposal: closer ROK ties with Japan. Staunch domestic
opposition to normalization prevented a treaty
from simply being finalized. On June 3, 1964, Park declared martial
law in Seoul and dismissed dozens of professors
and students. The US Combined Forces Commander
approved the release of two combat divisions to
suppress the protests. Despite thousands of
students threatening to storm the Blue House
(the presidentialresidence), Park rammed the
treaty through the rubber stamp legislature of
the Third Republic. When the opposition went on
a hunger strike to protest the treaty, the
ruling party took one minute to ratify it, and
at the same time, it also approved sending
20,000 troops to Vietnam to fight on the side of
the US. In exchange for normalization of
relations, Japan paid $300 million in grants
(for which Park indemnified Japan for all its
previous actions) and made available another
half-a-billion dollars in loans.
Sensing an
opportunity to channel public sentiment
against the communist enemy as well as
a second avenue to raise capital,
Park immediately offered thousands more
troops for deployment to Vietnam. Despite
scattered student protests, war with Vietnam
proved less controversial than his settling
of accounts with Japan. Park’s movement of
troops was so fast, that according to
figures released by the US State Department,
there were more South Korean soldiers
fighting in southern Vietnam in 1965 than
North Vietnamese.[1] South
Koreans soldiers were widely reported to be
even more brutal than their US counterparts.
At the end of 1969, some 48,000 ROK military
personnel were stationed in Vietnam, and by
the time they completed their withdrawal in
1973, some 300,000 veterans had fought
there. ROK casualties included 4,960 dead
and 10,962 wounded. Wars provide experiences
for military officers who go on to inflict
future casualties. Lieutenant No Ri-Bang
served in Jeju in 1948 and went to Vietnam.
Future dictators Chun Doo Hwan and Roh
Tae-woo served together in Vietnam, before
brutally ruling South Korea after Park’s
assassination in 1979.
The
economic benefits of military intervention
in Vietnam were extraordinary. From
1965-1970, the South Korean government
received $1.1 billion in payments—about 7%
of GDP and 19% of foreign earnings.[3] More
than 80 Korean companies did lucrative
business in Vietnam—from transportation to
supply, construction to entertainment—from
which the country accrued another $1 billion
for exports to and services in
Vietnam. Secret US bonuses paid to Park’s
government for Korean soldiers who fought in
Vietnam totaled $185 million from 1965-1973.
When we add all these funds to the $1.1
billion in direct payments, the total US
allocations to Park’s regime amounted to
about 30% of the ROK’s foreign exchange
earnings from 1966-1969.[4] Altogether
US aid to South Korea totaled $11 billion by
1973—more than to any other country except
South Vietnam—some 8% of worldwide US
military and foreign monies.[5] Regimes
friendly to the US in Japan, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Thailand also benefited
greatly from the tidal wave of dollars that
flooded the region during the Vietnam War.
Excerpted
from my book, Asia's Unknown Uprisings: Vol.
1 South Korean Social Movements in the 20th
Century
George
Katsiaficas
[1] See the
discussion in the volume I edited, Vietnam
Documents: American and Vietnamese
Views of the War (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 63.
[2] Chae-Jin
Lee, pp. 55, 70.
[3] Cumings, Korea’s
Place in the Sun, p. 321.
[4] Martin
Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.
[5] Han
Sung-joo, “Korean Politics in an
International Context,” in Korean
National Commission for UNESCO
(editor) Korean Politics: Striving
for Democracy and Unification (Elizabeth,
NJ: Hollym, 2002) p. 620.
From: don
kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Korean
Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Date: Sat,
14 Apr 2012 15:04:41 -0700
To: Kevin
Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>,
Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Subject: Re:
[KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
The
question is whether or not they got
bonuses in order to "volunteer" for
Vietnam. If they got no bonuses, then
obviously they wouldn't be "mercenaries."
Even if they got bonuses, it would be
difficult to pin the mercenary label since
soldiers in any army generally get combat
pay when fighting overseas. Also, I'm not
sure ordinary draftees had any say in
where they were sent.
All told, 300,000 Koreans served in
Vietnam over nearly a ten-year period.
Five thousand of them were KIA, many more
WIA. The White Horse and Tiger divisions
were the principal units. Korean special
forces were also in Vietnam. Those whom I
have met are proud to have served there.
Many of them, grizzled old veterans, turn
up at demonstrations in Seoul protesting
leftist demos, NKorean human rights
violations, North Korean dynastic rule
etc. They love to wear their old uniforms
with ribbons awarded for Vietnam service,
including acts of individual heroism.
Some of them also talk quite openly about
what they did in Vietnam -- and could
provide material supporting your thesis re
"the type of warfare that they had to
fight in Vietnam,
including guerrilla warfare and civilian
warfare." Strongly suggest you come here
and interview some while they're still
around. They'd tell you a lot, good and
bad. Sorry to say, one of them once
boasted to me of a personal "body count"
of 300 victims -- would doubt if all of
them were "enemy." On the other hand, they
were also known for high levels of
efficiency and success in their AO's.
Good luck on the project.
Don Kirk
--- On Sat, 4/14/12, Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com> wrote:
From: Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's
Discussion Question
To: "koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws"
<koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Date: Saturday, April 14, 2012, 1:40 PM
I think you will be
hard-pressed to justify calling
individual soldiers mercenaries -
the Korean government may have
received funds from the US, but
ROK soldiers were drafted into
mandatory service. If you come
across documentation that
individuals volunteered for
Vietnam in order to receive funds
from the US, please send such
documents to me.
Kevin Shepard,
Ph.D.
Strategist
UNC/CFC/USFK
UCJ 5 Strategy Div.
From: "koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws"
<koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws>
To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
Sent: Sunday, April
15, 2012 1:00 AM
Subject: Koreanstudies
Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9
Today's Topics:
1. Discussion Question (brianhwang at berkeley.edu)
2. March 2012 Issue of
"Cross-Currents: East Asian
History and
Culture Review" Available
Online (Center for Korean
Studies)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:15:24
-0700
From: brianhwang at berkeley.edu
To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
Subject: [KS] Discussion
Question
Message-ID:
<7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel at calmail.berkeley.edu>
Content-Type:
text/plain;charset=utf-8
Hello all:
I am a history student at
University of California,
Berkeley. Currently I
am working on a paper regarding
Korean involvement in the
Vietnam War. My
argument is that although Korean
soldiers were 1) mercenaries
(because
they were paid predominantly by
US dollars to go) and 2) anti
communists
(because of past history), the
atrocities that they are accused
of
committing are not primarily due
to the aforementioned reasons,
but
because of the type of warfare
that they had to fight in
Vietnam,
including guerrilla warfare and
civilian warfare.
Do you all think this is a valid
argument? Are there any primary
sources
that would help me in my
argument, including ones that
attribute Korean
atrocities to their mercenary
and anticommunist nature?
Thank you!
------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 11:00:21
-0700
From: "Center for Korean
Studies" <cks at berkeley.edu>
To: <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Subject: [KS] March 2012 Issue
of "Cross-Currents: East Asian
History
and Culture Review"
Available Online
Message-ID: <037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu>
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="utf-8"
March 2012 Issue of
"Cross-Currents: East Asian
History and Culture Review" now
online
The second issue of IEAS's new,
interactive e-journal
"Cross-Currents: East Asian
History and Culture Review" is
now online. The theme of the
March 2012 issue is "Japanese
Imperial Maps as Sources for
East Asian History: The Past and
Future of the Gaih?zu" (guest
edited by K?ren Wigen, professor
of History at Stanford). Visit http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2 to
read the articles, a review
essay written by Timothy Cheek
(University of British Columbia)
about Ezra Vogel's new book on
Deng Xiaoping, and abstracts of
important new scholarship in
Chinese. The March issue of the
e-journal also features a photo
essay by Jianhua Gong
documenting Shanghai's longtang
alleyways.
A joint enterprise of the
Research Institute of Korean
Studies at Korea University
(RIKS) and the Institute of East
Asian Studies at the University
of California at Berkeley
(IEAS), "Cross-Currents" offers
its readers up-to-date research
findings, emerging trends, and
cutting-edge perspectives
concerning East Asian history
and culture from scholars in
both English-speaking and Asian
language-speaking academic
communities.
* * ** **
March 2012 issue of
"Cross-Currents" e-journal
(See http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2)
*Co-Editors' Note*
Building an Online Community of
East Asia Scholars
Sungtaek Cho, Research Institute
of Korean Studies (RIKS), Korea
University
Wen-hsin Yeh, Institute of East
Asian Studies (IEAS), University
of California, Berkeley
*Japanese Imperial Maps as
Sources for East Asian History:
The Past and Future of the
Gaihozu*
Introduction to "Japanese
Imperial Maps as Sources for
East Asian History: The Past and
Future of the Gaihozu"
Guest editor K?ren Wigen,
Stanford University
Japanese Mapping of Asia-Pacific
Areas, 1873-1945: An Overview
Shigeru Kobayashi, Osaka
University
Imagining Manmo: Mapping the
Russo-Japanese Boundary
Agreements in Manchuria and
Inner Mongolia, 1907-1915
Yoshihisa T. Matsusaka,
Wellesley College
Triangulating Chosen: Maps,
Mapmaking, and the Land Survey
in Colonial Korea
David Fedman, Stanford
University
Mapping Economic Development:
The South Seas Government and
Sugar Production in Japan's
South Pacific Mandate,
1919--1941
Ti Ngo, University of
California, Berkeley
*Forum*
Asian Studies/Global Studies:
Transcending Area Studies and
Social Sciences
John Lie, University of
California, Berkeley/
Defenders and Conquerors: The
Rhetoric of Royal Power in
Korean Inscriptions from the
Fifth to Seventh Centuries
Hung-gyu Kim, Korea University
*Review Essays and Notes*
Of Leaders and Governance: How
the Chinese Dragon Got Its
Scales
Timothy Cheek, University of
British Columbia
A Note on the 40th Anniversary
of Nixon's Visit to China
William C. Kirby, Harvard
University
*Photo Essay*
"Shanghai Alleyways" by
photographer Jianhua Gong
Essay by Xiaoneng Yang, Stanford
University
*Readings from Asia*
Ge Zhaoguang , Dwelling in the
Middle of the Country:
Reestablishing Histories of
"China" [????:????"??"???]
Abstract by Wennan Liu, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences
Wang Qisheng, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution: Republican
Politics in Social-Cultural
Scope [???????????????????]
Abstract by Bin Ye, Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences
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