[KS] Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 127, Issue 28
Younghae Chi
younghae.chi at orinst.ox.ac.uk
Sat Feb 1 18:40:34 EST 2014
I am glad that Bruce raised an 8th possibility, although it may not necessarily mean endorsing the Augustinian dictum that any government is better than no government. In the present fluid situation, political order can be a gift, in its severely diminished sense of course, even to the people who suffer abuse and violation under the very order that their government offers. This imposes on the interested parties obligation to ensure that the regime achieves a smooth transition or at least not to promote the opposite (particularly in relation to the 6th possibility), given the enormous human cost having followed the collapse of order often brought by foreign powers to this volatile region in the past. A patience of a quarter-century looks definitely worthwhile.
Kind regards
Young-hae
------------
Dr Young-hae Chi
Faculty of Oriental Studies
University of Oxford
-----Original Message-----
From: Koreanstudies [mailto:koreanstudies-bounces at koreanstudies.com] On Behalf Of Bruce Cumings
Sent: Friday, January 31, 2014 2:50 PM
To: <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com>
Subject: Re: [KS] Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 127, Issue 28
Here is an 8th possibility, perhaps less likely than items 1 through 7: collapsists might someday reflect on why they have been wrong for a quarter-century.
Regards,
Bruce
On Jan 30, 2014, at 5:54 PM, <koreanstudies-request at koreanstudies.com> <koreanstudies-request at koreanstudies.com> wrote:
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> <<------------ KoreanStudies mailing list DIGEST ------------>>
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. 7 Scary Things That Could Happen After A North Korean
> Collapse (Bill Streifer)
> 2. CFP Korean Religions Group AAR (DeberniereTorrey)
> 3. Re: 7 Scary Things That Could Happen After A North Korean
> Collapse (Roald Maliangkaij)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2014 09:11:17 -0800 (PST)
> From: Bill Streifer <photografr7 at yahoo.com>
> To: "koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com"
> <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com>
> Subject: [KS] 7 Scary Things That Could Happen After A North Korean
> Collapse
> Message-ID:
> <1391101877.43914.YahooMailNeo at web120902.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Here is an story by Jeremy Bender via KCNA / Reuters you may have missed:
>
>
> A report recently released by the RAND Corporation highlights a series of unfortunate events that could follow if North Korea, already on unsteady footing, were suddenly to collapse.?The risk of a collapse has been growing in North Korea ever since Kim Jong-un took power back in December 2011.?As Dr. Bruce W. Bennet, a North Korea security expert of RAND, notes:
>
> Given that Kim Jong-un in two years has turned over the North Korean military leadership as many times as his father did in 17 years, there is now more concern that Kim Jong-un could become the target of an assassination or coup by senior military personnel. Many of these personnel already likely fear for their future and the future of their families, given North Korean brutality.
>
> We have summarized some of the alarming possibilities mentioned in the RAND report:
>
> 1. Competition between rival factions in North Korea could lead to warlordism.
>
> The North Korean regime encourages competition among its secondary rank of generals. There is already fear that this competition is causing the military to divide into factions. If Kim Jong-un was suddenly deposed, the country could be split into hostile military zones. Some territories could also see all out anarchy on the rise, similar to Somalia's current situation.
>
> 2. Food hoarding and an even worse humanitarian situation could become the norm.
>
> The sudden collapse of the state could lead to the currency completely failing. If this was the case, many North Korean elites could take to hoarding food in an attempt to recreate their former wealth. This would likely trigger massive famines throughout the country.
>
> 3. A new, equally tyrannical, military regime could come to power.
>
> It is impossible to say who could seize control of North Korea if Kim was suddenly out of power. It is likely, though, that whoever would manage to seize power would be just as brutal as Kim was.
>
> 4. A South Korean push for reunification could lead to increased organized crime.
>
> If anarchy was ruling in the north, South Korea could see it as the perfect opportunity to strike in the name of reunification. If successful, South Korea would trade one major problem for another. The North Korean army stands at 1 million people who would need to be reintegrated into civil society. Failure to do so could lead to a rise in insurgency and organized crime. The country is, after all, already one of the world's meth hubs.
>
> 5. WMDs and nuclear scientists could proliferate to terrorists.
>
> Unlike Iraq, North Korea absolutely has WMDs. If they are not contained immediately after the government falls, they may be sold to the black market and be lost.
>
> 6. China could end up in military conflict with South Korea and the United States.
>
> Some within the military in China already have plans to establish a 50 - 100 km buffer zone in North Korea should the regime fall. More warmongering elements within the Chinese military could push for the creation of an entire buffer state, which would lead to military conflict with South Korean and US unification attempts.
>
> 7. North Korea could be partitioned into hostile sections, like Germany after WWII.
>
> If an agreement is not made between South Korea and China, both countries may end up seizing as much of North Korea as possible. Instead of going to war, they could instead partition the country and create another demilitarized zone, basically just prolonging the current Korean crisis.
>
> In a report like this, it is hard to find a silver lining. We can only hope that, should this come to pass, Bennet's observations can lead to an increased state of preparedness which could ease any future transitions in the region.?
> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2014 07:55:44 -0800 (PST)
> From: DeberniereTorrey <djtorrey at yahoo.com>
> To: koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com
> Subject: [KS] CFP Korean Religions Group AAR
> Message-ID:
> <1391097344.31840.YahooMailBasic at web125504.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
>
> Dear Moderator, please disregard this CFP if you've already received it.
> Thank you, Deberniere T.
>
> Call for Papers
>
> American Academy of Religion: Korean Religions Group Annual Meeting,
> November 22?25, 2014 San Diego, California
>
> The American Academy of Religion is holding its 2014 meeting in San Diego, California, November 22?25. And the Korean Religions Group of the AAR invites you to submit proposals for panels or individual papers. Any proposal relating to Korea and religion will be considered but particular consideration will be given to proposals addressing the following themes:
>
> Possible Themes for the Standalone Session:
>
> 1. Religion and society in Korea: How religions have influenced and
> have been influenced by societal forces in Korea from the premodern
> period to the present 2. Religion and politics: Formation and
> dissolution of official religions in Korean history; doctrinal,
> cultic, and institutional expressions of official religions; religious
> legitimation in politics; contestation over the representation of
> religions in secondary schools and the military in South Korea;
> religion and the Kim regimes in North Korea 3. Popular religions in
> Korea: magical beliefs and practices; cultic and material dimensions;
> demographic changes and popular religions 4. Environment, climate
> change, and religion in Korea 5. Healing in Korean religions 6.
> Gender and religion in Korea 7. Religion and social conflict in Korea
>
>
> Themes for the Cosponsored Session with the Christian Spirituality Group:
>
> Sacred Places and Spaces over Time in Korea: issues regarding sacred places and spaces in Korean history (for a cosponsored Session with the Space, Place, and Religion Group):
>
> Formation and evolution of sacred places in Korea: Examples: Mt. Odae
> in Kangw?n Province (Korea?s Mt. Wutai with links to the Bodhisattva
> Manjusri); Mt. T?oham, S?kkuram, and Pulguksa; and the evolution of
> sacred space at Ky?ngju's Hwangnyongsa; Namsan in Ky?ngju (from being
> a Buddhist Elysium to a UNESCO World Heritage site); Ch?ltusan, the
> sacred site of Catholicism; Mt. Paektu in North Korea (and Tan?gun and
> Km Il S?ng); and Yanghwajin Foreigners? Cemetery in Seoul (from being
> a burial ground for the foreign deceased to a sacred place for Korean
> Protestants)
>
> Contests over sacred places and environment in Korea: e.g., conflict
> between early Protestants and traditionalists over the construction of
> churches on certain sites; contestation over the building a naval
> station at Kangn?ng, Chejudo; Mt. Mani on Kanghwa Island and Tan?gun
>
> Mountains and mountain gods of Korea
>
> The effect of rapid industrialization on sacred sites of Korea
>
> Comparing sacred places and spaces in major religious traditions of
> Korea
>
> Paper proposals for either of these sessions must be submitted through the PAPERS system on the AAR website. The deadline for proposal submission is Monday, 3 March 2014, EST. Notification of acceptance or rejection of proposals will be made by 1 April 2014.
>
> For further information about the 2014 meeting, visit, the American Academy of Religion web site (www.aarweb.org). If you have any questions about KRG?s session, please e-mail them to Deberniere Torrey (djtorrey at gmail.com ) and Richard McBride (rick_mcbride17 at hotmail.com). Thank you.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Deberniere Torrey, Cochair, University of Utah Richard McBride,
> Cochair, Brigham Young University, Hawaii
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2014 23:25:17 +0000
> From: Roald Maliangkaij <roald.maliangkay at anu.edu.au>
> To: Bill Streifer <photografr7 at yahoo.com>, Korean Studies Discussion
> List <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com>
> Subject: Re: [KS] 7 Scary Things That Could Happen After A North
> Korean Collapse
> Message-ID: <CF11278F.D999%roald.maliangkay at anu.edu.au>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Dear Bill,
>
> Thanks for sharing. I love Mr Bender's sense of irony. The "North Korea, already on unsteady footing" and "turned over leadership as many times in two years as his father did in 17" parts are my favourite. I love how he mocks his readers with the sense of urgency created by unsubstantiated hearsay. Wonderful stuff!
>
> Best,
>
> Roald
>
>
>
>
> From: Bill Streifer
> <photografr7 at yahoo.com<mailto:photografr7 at yahoo.com>>
> Reply-To: Bill Streifer
> <photografr7 at yahoo.com<mailto:photografr7 at yahoo.com>>, Korean Studies
> Discussion List
> <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com<mailto:koreanstudies at koreanstudies.co
> m>>
> Date: Friday, 31 January 2014 4:11 am
> To:
> "koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com<mailto:koreanstudies at koreanstudies.co
> m>"
> <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com<mailto:koreanstudies at koreanstudies.co
> m>>
> Subject: [KS] 7 Scary Things That Could Happen After A North Korean
> Collapse
>
> Here is an story by Jeremy Bender via KCNA / Reuters you may have missed:
>
> A report recently released by the RAND Corporation highlights a series of unfortunate events that could follow if North Korea, already on unsteady footing, were suddenly to collapse. The risk of a collapse has been growing in North Korea ever since Kim Jong-un took power back in December 2011. As Dr. Bruce W. Bennet, a North Korea security expert of RAND, notes:
>
> Given that Kim Jong-un in two years has turned over the North Korean military leadership as many times as his father did in 17 years, there is now more concern that Kim Jong-un could become the target of an assassination or coup by senior military personnel. Many of these personnel already likely fear for their future and the future of their families, given North Korean brutality.
>
> We have summarized some of the alarming possibilities mentioned in the RAND report:
>
> 1. Competition between rival factions in North Korea could lead to warlordism.
>
> The North Korean regime encourages competition among its secondary rank of generals. There is already fear that this competition is causing the military to divide into factions. If Kim Jong-un was suddenly deposed, the country could be split into hostile military zones. Some territories could also see all out anarchy on the rise, similar to Somalia's current situation.
>
> 2. Food hoarding and an even worse humanitarian situation could become the norm.
>
> The sudden collapse of the state could lead to the currency completely failing. If this was the case, many North Korean elites could take to hoarding food in an attempt to recreate their former wealth. This would likely trigger massive famines throughout the country.
>
> 3. A new, equally tyrannical, military regime could come to power.
>
> It is impossible to say who could seize control of North Korea if Kim was suddenly out of power. It is likely, though, that whoever would manage to seize power would be just as brutal as Kim was.
>
> 4. A South Korean push for reunification could lead to increased organized crime.
>
> If anarchy was ruling in the north, South Korea could see it as the perfect opportunity to strike in the name of reunification. If successful, South Korea would trade one major problem for another. The North Korean army stands at 1 million people who would need to be reintegrated into civil society. Failure to do so could lead to a rise in insurgency and organized crime. The country is, after all, already one of the world's meth hubs.
>
> 5. WMDs and nuclear scientists could proliferate to terrorists.
>
> Unlike Iraq, North Korea absolutely has WMDs. If they are not contained immediately after the government falls, they may be sold to the black market and be lost.
>
> 6. China could end up in military conflict with South Korea and the United States.
>
> Some within the military in China already have plans to establish a 50 - 100 km buffer zone in North Korea should the regime fall. More warmongering elements within the Chinese military could push for the creation of an entire buffer state, which would lead to military conflict with South Korean and US unification attempts.
>
> 7. North Korea could be partitioned into hostile sections, like Germany after WWII.
>
> If an agreement is not made between South Korea and China, both countries may end up seizing as much of North Korea as possible. Instead of going to war, they could instead partition the country and create another demilitarized zone, basically just prolonging the current Korean crisis.
>
> In a report like this, it is hard to find a silver lining. We can only hope that, should this come to pass, Bennet's observations can lead to an increased state of preparedness which could ease any future transitions in the region.
> -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was
> scrubbed...
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> <http://koreanstudies.com/pipermail/koreanstudies_koreanstudies.com/at
> tachments/20140130/2d736eea/attachment.html>
>
> End of Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 127, Issue 28
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