[KS] a documentary evidence on Kissinger's veiw?

[Yong-Ho Choe]

Some years ago--probably in the 1990s, I asked Gen. Chung Il-Kwon, a former
ROK Army chief of staff, if it would have been better had the ROK army and
the UN troops halted their advance along the waist line connecting
Pyongyang and Wonsan during the Korean War, he said: In restrospect yes,
but there was no such consideration at the time.

Yong-ho Choe

On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 11:59 AM, Kirk Larsen <kwlarsen67 at gmail.com> wrote:

> There does appear to be some documentary evidence to support Kissinger’s
> contention here.
>
>
>
> See Byong Moo Hwang’s “The Role and Responsibilities of China and the
> Former Soviet Union in the Korean War,” *International Journal of Korean
> Studies* ·  Vol. XIV, No. 2
>
>
>
> "Nevertheless, negotiations at the next stage were even more arduous. The
> Communist side proposed that the demarcation line would be based on the
> 38th parallel. The UN side, however, countered with a line running
> basically between Pyongyang and Wonsan, about 20-30 kilometers north of the
> existing front line between the Communist and UN forces. Having examined
> the military situation in Korea, the general international situation, and
> the fact that North Korea could not carry on the war, Chinese leaders came
> to believe that it would be better to consider the possibility of ceasing
> military actions along the existing front line than to fight for the 38th
> parallel and bring the conference to the breaking point" (116).
>
>
>
> Hwang cites the following source: Coded message N22834, August 13, 1951,
> The Second Chief Directorate, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces,
> Archives of the President of Russia, pp. 56-58, in Torkunov, *The War in
> Korea*, p. 170.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Kirk Larsen
>
> On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 7:46 PM, Yi, Hyunhwee <spcltn at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Dear sirs.
>>
>> Regarding Kissinger's view on Korean War, I would like to ask you a
>> question. In his *On China *(New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), p. 132,
>> Kissinger said like this: "As a result, the outcome of the American
>> military strategy was inevitably going to be at best an armistice along
>> whatever dividing line emerged - along the Yalu River, which denoted the
>> border between North Korea and China, if American design prevailed; along
>> some other agreed line if China intervened or the United States stopped
>> unilaterally short of Korea's northern frontier (for example, at the 38th
>> line or *at a line, Pyongyang to Wonsan, which emerged later in a Mao
>> message to Zhou*)." (emphasis added).
>>
>> Are there any documentary evidence supporting Kissinger's view underlined
>> above?  Kissinger did not give us documentary evidence.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Yi, Hyunhwee.
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Kirk W. Larsen
> Department of History
> Director, Academic Programs and Research
> David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies
> 2151 JFSB
> BYU
> Provo, UT 84602-6707
> (801) 422-3445
>
>
>
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