[KS] Re-revised posting "Revoking a Recommendation"

Balazs Szalontai aoverl at yahoo.co.uk
Sun Sep 18 04:48:24 EDT 2016

Dear List members:
I have examinedthe source references on pp. 122-123 of Tyrannyof the Weak, to which Professor Armstrong had drawn our attention in his recentpost, and it seems that his concerns were fully justified. On p. 122, a Russianarchival source is cited with regard to the following information:

The KWP CentralCommittee in October 1960 criticized obsequious attitudes toward foreigncountries and mindless imitation of things foreign, a practice it labeled sadaejuui, or “flunkeyism,” as the term was officially translated in later NorthKorean texts. This term cropped up in numerous party publications and speechesby officials over the next several months, and the “factionalists” of 1956 werealso accused of practicing sadaejuui.131 

Footnote 131: SovietEmbassy in DPRK, Report, 28 November 1960. AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 16, Papka 85,Delo 7.

The Russianarchival folder cited above is identical with the one cited on p. 121, Footnote130, that is, with the diary of Soviet ambassador Puzanov from the period of 9August 1960 to 31 December 1960. As Professor Lankov confirmedin his recent post, Puzanov was in Moscow in the period from 10 November 1960 to3 December 1960, and thus his diary does not, and cannot, contain an entry for28 November 1960. This raises the question where the author found the aforesaidinformation. In Kim Il Sung in theKhrushchev Era (p. 162), the following details are provided about thedescribed events:

In October 1960,the CC Presidium passed a resolution that criticized the indiscriminate andmechanical adoption of foreign experiences, and condemned “flunkeyism” (sadaejuui).One should not kowtow to any foreign power, the leadership stated. In mid-November,an official of the party center delivered a lecture on “flunkeyism” for theparty activists of a certain (unspecified) ministry. He declared that Ho Ka-iand Pak Ch’ang-ok had regarded anybody who had dared to criticize the qualityof some Soviet product as “anti-Soviet.” Pro-Chinese “flunkeyism” also croppedup during the Korean War, represented by Pak Il-u, Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik, YunKong-hum, and others. In September 1956, Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai (the latterwas described by the lecturer as a person of “imperialist disposition”) hadcompelled the CC to readmit the “factionalists” it had recently expelled, butthe “fraternal” parties later practiced self-criticism for their intervention.124

Footnote 124: HungarianEmbassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 November 1960, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a,002481/1961 (p. 318).

On p. 123, aRussian archival source is cited with regard to the following information:

The NorthKoreans were reluctant to even publish the details of Khrushchev’s visit to theUnited States, until pressured to do so by the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang. 135

Footnote 135: SovietEmbassy in DPRK, Report, 16 December 1959. AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 15, Papka 81,Delo 7.

The Russianarchival folder cited above holds Puzanov’s diary from the period of 2 January1959 to 19 December 1959. In the electronic text ofPyŏngyang soryŏn taesakwan pimil sŏch’ol, the relevant PDF file isKM012003, pp. 26-34. It does contain an entry for 16December 1959, but the recorded long conversation between Puzanov and Kim IlSung makes no reference either to North Korea’s reluctance to Khrushchev’svisit or to Soviet pressure on North Korea with regard to this issue, thoughthe visit is briefly mentioned by Kim Il Sung (p. 27). This raises the questionwhere the author found the aforesaid information. In Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era (p. 143), the following detailsare provided about the described events:

On 16 December,a Soviet diplomat named Yulin told Dobozi, a Hungarian colleague, that “whilethe world’s press devoted whole pages to the reports which dealt with ComradeKhrushchev’s visit to America, the Korean press published nothing, or just veryshort news . . ., about it. It was only the intervention of the [Soviet]Embassy that ensured that subsequently the Korean press dealt appropriatelywith the visit.”31

Footnote 31: HungarianEmbassy to the DPRK, Report, 16 December 1959, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b,001660/1960 (p. 314).

In sum, the contentof the AVPRF documents cited in Footnotes 131 and 135 of Tyranny of the Weak shows a strong discrepancy with the documentsheld in the cited AVPRF folders but their content and date shows a strongcorrelation with the Hungarian documents cited above. For these reasons,Professor Armstrong’s concerns about these specific archival sources were fullyjustified, and I am most grateful to him for drawing our attention to them.

At the sametime, I am somewhat in disagreement with Professor Armstrong’s observation thatimplies that the problems affecting Tyrannyof the Weak are confined to the citation of Russian archival sources. Apartfrom the East German, North Korean, and secondary sources mentioned earlier(pp. 63, 81, 105, and 156), one may also raise concerns about some of theChinese archival sources cited in Tyrannyof the Weak. On p. 128 of said book, the following information is provided:

Three monthslater Liu Shaoqi made a return visit to the DPRK, where he had a series ofmeetings with Kim Il Sung and Ch’oe Yong-gon. Later in the year, the twocountries carried joint military exercises and signed a new agreement on economicexchange. 154  

Footnote 154: Recordof Conversation between Premier Liu Xiaoqi [sic]and Premier Kim IL Sung,” September 15, 1963. CFMA No. 203–00566–05.

The Chinesearchival document cited in Footnote 154 is publicly accessible in NKIDP’sDigital Archives: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116542 . Due to its date, this source cannotprovide information about events that occurred after the recorded conversation(as the author clearly specifies). Nor do the secondary sources cited on thesame page (Footnote 152: Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations; Footnotes 153, 155 and 157: Chung, P’yongyangbetween Peking and Moscow) makeany reference to Sino-North Korean joint military exercises. This raises the question where the author found the aforesaidinformation. In Kim Il Sung in theKhrushchev Era (p. 200), the following details are provided about thedescribed events:

In the fall of 1963,joint Sino–North Korean military exercises took place, and the North Koreangovernment resolved to electrify the Pyongyang–Sinuiju railroad line so as toreinforce economic cooperation between the DPRK and the PRC. On 14 October, thetwo countries signed a protocol on commodity exchange for 1964.124

Footnote 124: HungarianEmbassy to the DPRK, Report, 26 August 1963, KTS, 9. doboz, 11/f, 006346/1963;Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 June 1964, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a,004092/1964; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 15 August 1963, VTS, 5.doboz, 5/i, 006371/1963; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 15 August 1963,VA, 4. doboz, 15/b, 006366/1963; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 24August 1963, CTS, 9. doboz, 5/e, 006342/1963. See also Chung, P’yongyang Between Peking and Moscow,81–92 (p. 327).

Of these sources, it wasthe 1 June 1964 report that mentioned the joint exercises, whereas the protocolon commodity exchange was covered by Chin O. Chung. I made the relevant chapterof my book accessible on my website: https://korea-kr.academia.edu/BalazsSzalontai

Another problematic casewas recently pointed out to me by another KS list member, who would prefer tostay anonymous but who expressed the opinion that the issue deservedinvestigation. On p. 113 of Tyranny ofthe Weak, the following information is provided:

Zhou Enlai, meetingwith Kim Il Sung in November 1958, similarly promised Kim China’s noninterferencein North Korea’s internal affairs. 96  

Footnote 96: Record of Meeting between Premier ZhouEnlai and Premier Kim Il Sung, 22 November 1958. CFMA No. 204–0064–02.

The Chinesearchival document cited in Footnote 96 is publicly accessible in NKIDP’sDigital Archives: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176. It does not contain any reference to a promise to Chinese noninterference inthe DPRK’s internal affairs. This raises thequestion where the author found the aforesaid information.

As Professors Stephan Haggard and Jim Hoare correctlypointed out, we all make mistakes. Some of these mistakes are mere misspellingsthat readers can easily notice, verify, and avoid repeating. The inaccuratecitation of archival sources is a somewhat different issue, because for themajority of readers, and especially for students (many of whom encounter Tyranny of the Weak as a requiredreading material), it would be a daunting task to double-check a monograph’ssource references to Russian, East German, and Chinese archival materials, andthus they might unknowingly repeat the inaccuracies described above.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Balazs Szalontai

Korea University, Sejong Campus, Department of NorthKorean Studies

      From: Charles K. Armstrong <cra10 at columbia.edu>
 To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com> 
 Sent: Saturday, 17 September 2016, 23:30
 Subject: Re: [KS] Re-revised posting "Revoking a Recommendation"
Dear list members,
I have observed this criticism of my recent book from some distance and have finally decided I cannot avoid responding. I will not here go into a detailed defense of my book, which I continue to stand by as a sound work of scholarship. But every complex work of scholarship has its flaws, often not evident to the author at the time. I appreciate the questions brought up by Brian, Balazs and now Andrei. I would like to point out that most of the criticism is directed to a small section of Chapter 3 of the book, basically pp. 121 -23. This has caused me to re-examine carefully that section and the chapter as a whole, where I have indeed found problems with some citation of Russian sources. I do not believe this affects the overall narrative and argument, but I have endeavored to make corrections where warranted. I am in the process of going carefully over the footnotes, with the help of Balazs, and see where corrections should be made. If these are indeed extensive, I will send a revision to Cornell University Press and ask them to republish the book in a revised edition. 
I have learned a great deal from my colleagues in the study of North Korea's history, particularly Andrei and Balazs, who are much more familiar with the Soviet sources than I am. I hope to have made a contribution to this field in my own way, one that complements their fine work. For the errors in my own work I of course take full responsibility, which includes the responsibility to correct my errors and improve the work. 
Charles Armstrong
On Sat, Sep 17, 2016 at 9:23 AM, Sheila Miyoshi Jager <sheila.jager at oberlin.edu> wrote:

  Dear List members:

I received this e-mail from Andre Lankov this morning who asked me to post this for him as he is not currently a member of KS.

Sheila Miyoshi Jager

------------------------------ --------------------
Dear list members,

I am not an active participant here, but the recent postings prompted
me to make a small contribution to the ongoing debate around Charles
Armstrong’s recent book.

Initially, I liked the book, and widely recommended it as a good and
thoughtful summary of North Korean foreign policy. However, I have
also noted some problems with footnotes. I have not gone through the
footnotes as carefully as others, but I still noticed that there are
cases the footnotes lead to the wrong sources, while the information
in the text could possibly obtain only from other sources which by
some reasons are not mentioned in the book.

Right now, I can indicate three cases.


One of the cases has already been mentioned, but I would repeat it,
since I am myself directly involved in the situation which now seems
to be typical.

On page 105, Tyranny of the Weak one can find such a statement “In a
conversation with a Soviet diplomat in 1960, Pang Hak-se, minister of
the interior, referred to some 100,000 “reactionaries” detained
between October 1958 and May 1959 alone”. Then a footnote 57 follows,
saying: “Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 2, The Society,

However, nothing like this can be found in Scalapino and Lee, because
at the time when Scalapino and Lee wrote their book the document in
question (like all other documents of this kind) was classified and as
such deeply buried in the Soviet archives. To the best of my
knowledge, I was the first person to find this document in the
mid-1990s, and then I provided it to Balasz Szalontai who cited it,
clearly mentioning in the text that the document in question had been
provided by me (Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, footnote 58, page
297). I also mentioned this document and data myself in my 2004 book
(Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of
De-Stalinization, 1956, page 182)

It is remarkable, though, that in Balasz Szalontai’s book, few lines
below reference to 100,000 arrested, one can find a reference to page
833 Scalapino and Lee – the very same reference Charles Armstrong
wrongly used in his book. In the book of Balazs Szalontai, the
footnote in question (“Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 2,
The Society, 833-35.”) follows the entire paragraph we discuss here.
There the footnote is related to the last few sentences, not to the
figure ‘100,000’ and Pang Hak-se’s statement which is clear referenced
to me.

Thus, it seems likely that Charles Armstrong borrowed the data from
Balazs Szalontai wholesale, together with a reference to Scalapino and
Lee’s book, but did not notice that the reference is related to the
final sentence alone, not to the data Charles Armstrong cites.


The second case is quite remarkable and strongly supports the
suggestion that something is seriously wrong with footnotes and/or
quotes in the book.

On page 121 of The Tyranny of the Weak, one can find such sentence
“the Bulgarian ambassador remarked to his Soviet counterpart that he
had never seen such a hostile incident in another “fraternal”
country.” This is followed by footnote 130 which says “Soviet Embassy
in DPRK, Report, 30 November 1960. AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 16, Papka
85, Delo 7.”

A couple of months ago, while writing a journalistic piece on the
crisis in relations between North Korea and Bulgaria in the 1960s
(abduction of NK students etc.), I decided to check the reference. I
checked the digital collection of PDF files containing the photocopies
of the Soviet diplomatic papers, including the Ambassadors’ Diaries
(the collection is held in the National Library of Korea, Pyŏngyang
soryŏn taesakwan pimil sŏch’ol, the photocopy of the diary in question
can be found at the file 012204, pages 22-50, of this collection).

I was rather surprised with what I saw. The AVPRF (Soviet/Russian
Foreign Ministry) archive has Ambassador Diary for November 10 to
December 28 period, but this diary has no reference to any talk with
the Bulgarian ambassador, and, for that matter, no entry for November
30 whatsoever. It could not possibly have such entry due to one
serious reason: as clearly stated on the first page of the diary,
Ambassador Puzanov happened to be away from Pyongyang for nearly a
month, from November 10 to December 3, 1960, and resumed his regular
duties only on December 5 (AVPRF, Fond 0102, opis 16, papka 85, delo
7, list 30). Being physically some 5000 miles away, the Ambassador
hardly could be engaged in a frank conversation with his Bulgarian
counterpart on November 30.

Admittedly, on December 15, 1960 Ambassador Puzanov did meet
Ambassador Georgii Kostov Bogdanov of Bulgaria. During that meeting,
Ambassador Bogdanov expressed in passing some dissatisfaction with the
treatment of the Bulgarian diplomats in North Korea, but there were no
references whatsoever to the episode mentioned by Charles Armstrong.
Bogdanov merely complained that North Koreans did not provide
statistical data and some publications (Pyŏngyang soryŏn taesakwan
pimil sŏch’ol, file 012204, pages 37-38).


The third case is the Memo of conversation between Counselor Yang
Yŏng-sun (DPRK Embassy in Moscow) and Halin (Deputy Head of the Far
Eastern Section in the Soviet Foreign Ministry), 29 September 1953.

In Charles Armstrong’s book, on page 56, one can read the following:
“Kim Il Sung led a delegation to Moscow in September 1953, primarily
to settle the terms of Soviet assistance. The Soviet government agreed
to cancel or postpone repayment for all of North Korea’s outstanding
debts and reiterated its promise to give the DPRK 1 billion rubles in
outright aid, both monetary and in the form of industrial equipment
and consumer goods.” This remark is followed by footnote 19 which
cites the above mentioned Memo of conversation between Yang Yŏng-sun
and Halin on 29 September.

The Memo indeed exists, and it is available in the above mentioned PDF
collection (file 010105, pages 12-14). However, the Memo’s content has
nothing in common with what is stated in the book. It does not mention
the issues of the Soviet assistance at all.

Actually, the Memo of the short talk (it lasted, as explicitly stated,
merely 20 min) is an itemized list of the issues which were discussed.
There were five issues: 1) The return of the North Korean workers from
the USSR; 2) The dispatch of teachers to a Soviet school in Pyongyang;
3) Request for the printed UN materials, difficult to obtain for the
North Koreans; 4) Inquiry about a young daughter of a North Korean
official of the Soviet origin; 5) Request for reference material about
the Soviet periodicals. None of these issues is in any way related to
the matters mentioned in the book. I would add that, given the
relatively low rank of both participants and shortness of their
encounter (mere 20 minutes), one would hardly expect that such issues
would be raised during the 29 September meeting.

Once again, I did not (and could not) check hundreds of footnotes, but
the very random and semi-incidental check of the materials I know
and/or have within few meters from my desk, has demonstrated that
footnotes are a mess. What we see from the above mentioned three
examples are:

a)       The use of data likely been obtained from work which is not
referenced and even mentioned, but supported with a footnote to an
irrelevant third source (to make things even more strange, the
footnote is the same as the footnote in the work that was omitted);

b)       The reference to a document which does not exist, describing
an event which did not (and could not possibly) happen on the date

c)        The reference to an existing document which, however, deals
with completely different issues.

So, there are issues to be clarified.


Andrei Lankov,
Kookmin University, Seoul 
 On 9/15/2016 12:09 AM, Jiyul Kim wrote:
  [NOTE TO ADMINISTRATOR: please discard two earlier versions and review this for posting] 
  I came across this recent posting by B. R. Myers revoking his recommendation for Charles Armstrong's Tyranny of the Weak (2013). Myers' revocation is, for me, unprecedented. 
  Myers compares Armstrong's Tyranny with  Balazs Szalontai's Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era (2005). He gives detailed examples why he can't support the book.  If there is any truth to what Myers says then it is all very disturbing since Armstrong's books are widely admired and used. 
  I wonder what others think.  Myers' post can be found at  http://sthelepress.com/ 
  Jiyul Kim Oberlin College Oberlin, Ohio  
Sheila Miyoshi Jager
Professor of East Asian Studies
Oberlin College

Charles K. ArmstrongProfessor of History, Columbia University516 Fayerweather Hall, 1180 Amsterdam AveNew York, NY 10027Tel: 212-854-1721

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