[KS] Foreign Policy In Focus: U.S.-N.Korea Relations

[Interhemispheric Resource Center]

Foreign Policy in Focus:  U.S.-North Korea Relations  

May, 1999
vol 4, no.15

By John Feffer, AFSC Asia Desk
Edited by Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)

Key Points 

o	The North Korean "threat" is a key justification for U.S. military
spending, the presence of U.S. troops in Asia, and a new theater missile
defense system.

o	North Korea has criticized the U.S. for not lifting economic sanctions.
The U.S. has criticized North Korean missile exports and has suspected
Pyongyang of secretly developing a nuclear weapons program.

o	Despite their often hostile rhetoric, North Korea and the United States
have cooperated successfully on MIAs as well as famine relief and technical
assistance programs.

North Korea is the United States' longest-standing adversary. The U.S.
helped to divide the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II, then
waged war against North Korea in the 1950s. It has maintained economic
sanctions against Pyongyang for nearly fifty years. In this post-cold war
era, North Korea remains a useful demon. The Pentagon has inflated the
North Korean threat in order to rationalize its desire for a missile
defense system, to justify a capacity to fight two wars simultaneously, and
to explain the need to maintain 37,000 troops in South Korea (and 100,000
troops in Asia overall).

Relations between the two countries worsened in the early 1990s when North
Korea expanded its nuclear program and the U.S. considered bombing the
suspected weapons development facilities. In 1994, after Jimmy Carter sat
down with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, the two sides eventually
negotiated their way back from the brink of war. The resulting Agreed
Framework required that North Korea freeze its nuclear program in exchange
for shipments of heavy fuel oil from the U.S. and two light-water nuclear
reactors to be built by an international consortium funded largely by Japan
and South Korea. As part of this agreement, the U.S. and North Korea
pledged to move toward full normalization of relations.

The Agreed Framework averted war but did not create a lasting peace. The
U.S. government has continued to criticize North Korean sales of advanced
missile technology to countries such as Pakistan and Iran. In August 1998,
without notification, North Korea launched a missile/satellite that passed
over Japan and demonstrated its possession of three-stage rocket
technology. At the same time, U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies
leaked information that an underground facility in North Korea might house
a nuclear weapons program. The Clinton administration, reluctant at first
to give much credence to the underground nuclear facility, eventually
insisted on access to determine if North Korea had departed from the terms
of the Agreed Framework (to which it had so far adhered).

North Korea, too, has a list of grievances. It has charged the United
States with violating the Agreed Framework by not delivering the heavy fuel
oil according to schedule and by not moving forward as planned with the
light-water reactors. It has also accused the Clinton administration of
backtracking on its promise to normalize relations and thus to lift
economic sanctions. Finally, North Korea hascriticized the U.S. military
buildup in Northeast Asia.

The relationship between the two powers is not entirely antagonistic. In
response to the food crisis that intensified in North Korea beginning in
1995, the Clinton administration has provided millions of dollars in
humanitarian aid (over $170 million in 1998), principally through the UN.
In April 1999, the U.S. government agreed to its first direct assistance to
North Korea: 100,000 metric tons of food as well as a project coordinated
with several U.S. nongovernmental organizations that will introduce new
potato varieties to North Korean farms. The two countries are also
cooperating to find the remains of U.S. soldiers killed in the North during
the Korean War. And North Korea has sent several delegations to the United
States for technical assistance regarding energy and agriculture.

One factor that has changed the terms of engagement on the Korean peninsula
is South Korea's new president, Kim Dae Jung. Although past South Korean
presidents supported Washington's hard-line policies, Kim Dae Jung has come
out clearly for engagement. On taking office in 1998, Kim immediately
unveiled his "sunshine policy." According to this policy, South Korea no
longer seeks to reunify the peninsula by absorbing North Korea. Despite
some patronizing overtones, whereby a more advanced South reaches out to
help a backward North, the sunshine policy's promotion of economic and
social contacts between the two Koreas is a marked improvement over
aggressive rhetoric and gestures. 

Clinton administration policy toward North Korea is currently caught
between a fifty-year legacy of containment and a tentative commitment to
engagement. An agreement signed in March 1999 regarding U.S. access to the
suspected underground nuclear weapons facility may point to greater
cooperation. But hard-line sentiment in Congress and among prominent
policymakers continues to pressure the administration to take a more
hawkish stance.

Problems With Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

o	U.S. support of the 1994 Agreed Framework has been inconsistent.
Washington has delayed shipments of heavy oil and made only token moves
toward normalizing relations with North Korea.

o	The Clinton administration has not thrown sufficient support behind South
Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea.

o	The U.S. has contributed to North Korea's siege mentality by pursuing a
theater missile defense system and by encouraging Japan to expand its
military role in the region.

There are at least two U.S. government policies toward North Korea.
Elements within the Clinton administration support limited engagement and
steps toward normalization of relations. In the CIA and the Pentagon,
however, many are deeply skeptical of engagement and would prefer to see
the imminent collapse of the regime, regardless of the consequences. 

This tension at the policymaking center has rendered U.S. foreign policy
toward North Korea inconsistent and, in some cases, deeply flawed. Instead
of addressing the full range of bilateral disagreements, Washington has
taken a piecemeal approach that has not meshed with the new policies of
South Korea's Kim Dae Jung. Moreover, the Clinton administration has
hardened its containment posture in the Northeast Asia region,
strengthening North Korea's siege mentality.

The problems begin with Washington's half-hearted commitment to the 1994
Agreed Framework. When the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework, many in the
administration expected the North Korean government to collapse before the
promised light-water nuclear reactors would be operational in 2003. Rather
than a step toward normalization, the agreement functioned as a stopgap
measure. The North Korean government, however, has not collapsed. The power
plant construction, whether by design or by accident, has encountered
delays. More critically, the Clinton administration gave in to
congressional opposition and lifted only the least important of the
economic sanctions that Pyongyang desperately wants removed. Although
Washington rhetorically supports a more open and internationally integrated
North Korea, the economic embargo further severs Pyongyang from the
capitalist world and reinforces the isolationist faction within the North
Korean political elite.

A second problem concerns interpretation. North Korea, in the grip of a
food crisis and a general economic collapse, is desperate to earn hard
currency. This desperation is one of the reasons for its provocative acts.
North Korea, negotiating from a weak position, is accumulating bargaining
chips to get the best deal from the U.S. and Japan. Washington, however,
has treated the missile launch and the missile sales as military gestures
designed to threaten the national security of the United States and its
Asian allies. In other words, the U.S. has developed military responses to
a crisis that requires primarily economic solutions. 

The South Korean government has understood North Korea's predicament as
economically based and has shaped its policy toward its northern neighbor
(Nordpolitik) accordingly. The "sunshine policy" has led to unprecedented
economic cooperation between North and South. The South Korean government
has given the go-ahead to several private ventures, including the Hyundai
project that has brought tens of thousands of tourists by boat to Mt.
Kumgang in the North. Dozens of South Korean businesses are poised to go
north to negotiate joint ventures and to supply surplus industrial
equipment. Meanwhile, the construction of the light-water reactors has
focused North and South Korean workers on a common goal-a prefiguring of
the kind of projects that will eventually knit together the broken halves
of the Korean peninsula. 

Yet the "sunshine policy" has its critics within South Korea, and economic
investments in the North are still mostly on paper. Without a similar push
for engagement from the Clinton administration, Kim Dae Jung's attempts to
reach out to North Korea may fall victim to conservative opposition.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, designated by the Clinton
administration to make policy recommendations on North Korea, will issue a
report of his findings in May or June. It is generally expected that he
will favor upholding the Agreed Framework, especially in light of the March
1999 agreement, under which North Korea has permitted U.S. access to the
suspected underground nuclear facility. Still, there are many voices within
Congress, such as Benjamin Gilman and Henry Hyde, who have opposed both
this deal and other moves toward engagement. A recent report produced for
the National Defense University by former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Armitage has argued that if North Korea doesn't satisfy all U.S.
demands, then the U.S. must take sterner measures. 

In Northeast Asia more generally, the U.S. has already taken sterner
measures. It continues to conduct war games in the vicinity of North Korea,
and in 1998 changed its battlefield simulation to include invasion and
defeat of the North. The administration plans to build a theater missile
defense system that will theoretically protect allies in the region from
perceived missile threats from North Korea and China. Despite billions of
dollars of research, missile defense has yet to be proven technically
feasible, and the proposed system has unnecessarily antagonized Russia and
China.

Moreover, in cooperation with conservative Japanese policymakers, the U.S.
has redefined its alliance with Japan so that the latter will provide more
support for U.S. operations in the region, shoulder more of the financial
burdern, and expand the military role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
For the first time in fifty years, Japan is considering the development of
first-strike capabilities. These moves challenge Japan's pacifist
constitution, raise fears among the victims of Japan's colonial past
(chiefly China and the two Koreas), and sharpen conflict in an already
volatile region.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

o	The Clinton administration must devise a comprehensive package for North
Korea that focuses on normalizing relations and lifting economic sanctions.

o	The U.S. must coordinate North Korean engagement so that it supports
South Korean initiatives and works with Japan's own efforts to normalize
relations with North Korea.

o	The U.S. must take the first steps in demilitarizing Asia by canceling
its missile defense plans, reducing troop counts, formally ending the
Korean War, and preparing for eventual disengagement from Korea.

Even as it simultaneously wages war in Iraq and Yugoslavia, the Clinton
administration could attempt to bring peace to the Korean peninsula. To do
so, it must take the dramatic first step of normalizing relations with
North Korea. This would form the centerpiece of a comprehensive package
addressing North Korea's economic and security concerns.

On the U.S. end, normalizing relations would begin with a substantial
amount of humanitarian aid to address North Korean famine and agricultural
problems. Though no one knows how many have died from hunger so far,
nutritional surveys have shown a frightening degree of malnutrition among
children. International agencies monitoring food distribution have
determined that little if any of the aid has been diverted from those in need.

The United States must also begin lifting economic sanctions to honor a
promise implicit in the Agreed Framework. For years, Washington refused to
consider removing sanctions in deference to Seoul. Kim Dae Jung, however,
now favors the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions, alone, do not isolate North
Korea, but other countries (as well as banks and companies) would more
readily consider loans to and investments in North Korea were sanctions
removed. 

North Korea, too, has a part to play in this comprehensive package. It must
agree to controls on the exporting and testing of its missiles. In the same
way that the Agreed Framework drew a line between the production of nuclear
energy and the building of nuclear weapons, a package deal must restrict
North Korea's missile tests while permitting further development of
satellite technology. As for missile exports, North Korea has already
demonstrated that it is willing to bargain for cash. Most recently, North
Korea offered to stop exports in exchange for $1 billion annually from the
United States for three years. This is an opening bid that can clearly be
negotiated, especially as there is evidence of a recent decline in North
Korean missile exports.

For North Korea to feel safe giving up its missile development program, the
U.S. must work with the other countries in the region to reduce militaries
and strengthen confidence-building measures-including consultations among
defense officials, notification of military maneuvers in the Sea of Japan,
and the exchange of information about defense expenditures. The U.S. is by
far the dominant military presence in the region with 100,000 troops and
billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry. Therefore it must take the
first steps toward demilitarization, including canceling plans for a
missile defense system. 

On the Korean peninsula, demilitarization must begin with a treaty to bring
a formal end to the Korean War. Four-party negotiations involving North
Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States have been inching toward a
peace treaty that can replace the current, uneasy armistice. To date, the
sticking point has been North Korea's demand that U.S. troops be withdrawn
from South Korea. First, the four-party talks should be expanded to include
Russia and Japan, to capitalize on Moscow's warming relations with
Pyongyang. Second, the U.S. must consider restructuring its military force
to become a true peacekeeping body in preparation for eventual
disengagement from Korea. 

Such a package deal is in line with South Korean proposals. It is
critically important for the U.S. government to support Kim Dae Jung's
"sunshine policy." A normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations must also
be coordinated with Japan. Currently, the Japanese 
government is considering a deal that would send 4-10 billion dollars to
North Korea if foreign relations are formally established. Such an
agreement would herald a new age of regional cooperation, much as the
normalization of Japan-South Korean relations did in 1965.

A package deal with North Korea will require President Clinton to use
substantial political capital to overcome objections in Congress and within
the administration. It will require a decisive swing away from the legacy
of containment and toward a policy of engagement. The rewards, however,
greatly outweigh the risks. By reaching out to North Korea, President
Clinton has a unique opportunity to make his mark on history by ending the
cold war in Asia.

John Feffer (EAQIAR at aol.com) of the American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC) is the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Representative. Based
in Tokyo, Feffer travels regularly to North and South Korea and China to
encourage dialogue on peace and justice issues.

Sources for More Information

Organizations

American Friends Service Committee, Asia Desk
1501 Cherry St.
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
Voice: (215) 241-7149
Fax: (215) 241-7026
Email: aandrews at afsc.org 
Website: http://www.afsc.org
Contact: Alice Andrews

Asia Pacific Center for Peace and Justice
110 Maryland Avenue NE (Box 70)
Washington, DC 20002
Voice: (202) 543-1094
Fax: (202) 546-5103
Email: apcjp at igc.apc.org

Korean American Peace Institute
60 Cedar St.
Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660
Voice: (201) 440-6975
Fax: (201) 229-0072
Email: kcc at igc.apc.org

National Council of Churches of Christ (USA)
Office of East Asia & Pacific
475 Riverside Drive, 6th Floor
New York City, NY 10115
Voice: (212) 870-2371
Fax: (212) 870-2055
Email: victor at ncccusa.org

Nautilus Institute
1831 Second St.
Berkeley, CA 94710
Voice: (510) 204-9296
Fax: (510) 204-9298
Email: napsnet at nautilus.org
Website: http://www.nautilus.org
Contact: Timothy Savage

U.S. Department of State
The Office of Korean Affairs
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Voice: (202) 647-7717
Fax: (202) 647-7388

Websites
Interaction
	http://www.interaction.org/disaster/nkorea.html
Korea Web Weekly
	http://www.kimsoft.com/korea.htm
Nautilus Institute
	http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/
United Nations
	http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/
Yahoo
	http://headlines.yahoo.com/Full_Coverage/World/North_Korea

Publications
Bruce Cumings, "North Korea Buyout?" The Nation, May 3, 1999.

Wade Huntley and Timothy Savage, "Agreed Framework at the Crossroads,"
Nautilus Policy Forum Online #99-05, March 11, 1999.

Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, Peace and Security in Northeast Asia
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1998).

David Wright, "The Case for Engaging North Korea," Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists (March/April, 1999.

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