[KS] Central Bank independence in Korea

[Bernhard Seliger]

Dear List members,

since the revision of the revision of the Bank of Korea Act in December
31, 1997, the Bank of Korea enjoys legal independence under a single,
dominant goal - price stability - with a formulation very close to
similar stipulations in the European Union's or the former German
Deutsche Bundesbank law. Both - independence and price stability as the
main goal - were parts of IMF conditionality.

However, how far is the Bank of Korea de facto able to make decisions
independently from government?

I found in the daily press numerous instances of government pressure,
open conflict between government and BOK and common decision making in
informal committees.

However, I would be interested in a review of these questions, academic
or newspaper articles  and additional data.

I think this question is also interesting for the list, since it is a
detail in the broader question, inhowfar the change of formal
institutions after the crisis of 1997 resulted in conflict with informal
institutions and decision-making processes or how much the informal
processes also changed.

Any suggestions are highly welcome, either to the list or my private
e-mail (below).

Best regards,

Bernhard

______________________________________________________________
Dr. Bernhard Seliger
Graduate School of International Area Studies
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
270, Imun-Dong
Dongdaemun-gu
130 791 Seoul
Republic of Korea
Tel. 00 82 2 964 8517
Fax. 00 82 2 965 4792
e-mail: Seliger at maincc.hufs.ac.kr


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