[KS] Some comments on Yusin

[Jiyul Kim]

To Dr. Levkowitz and to others who have commented:

I base comments on my current dissertation work that posits that South 
Korea's response to a profound period of crisis between 1968 and 1972 
led to a concerted program of national spiritual and material 
mobilization that created the modern South Korean and South Korea. One 
source I have consulted extensively is the diplomatic archives that only 
recently became available. I also conducted a close study of how this 
process operated in one local region, Kangwon province.

The term Yusin (I prefer the M-R spelling), as it relates to the Yusin 
Constitution (YC) (and this is the common understanding among scholars 
and the average South Korean), must be seen as a specific historical 
issue rather than in some generic way as suggested by Drs. Baker and 
Ruediger. It was a specific response to a specific circumstances of 
national crisis. Other studies have suggested a similar process at work 
in other nations -  a deliberate effort to mobilize the nation's 
physical and spiritual resources and restore/revitalize/renovate the 
nation in the face of profound internal and external crisis. Two quick 
examples spanning time and space: Lynn Hunt's work on the French 
Revolution and Frederick Dickinson's study of Japan's response during WW 
I.  The U.S. has gone through this process a number of times in its 
history, most recently and currently as result of 9/11 (President Bush's 
emphasis on the moral dimension of America's tasks and challenges is 
very much in synch with history's examples).

When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park 
(PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived, that 
began in early 1968.  Internally and externally the world order and the 
desired course of internal development upon which PCH  based his long 
range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The symbolic and 
psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be 
compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid (1/21), 
seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (1/31). 
Jan 68 was SK's 9/11.

Internally, ordinary South Koreans seemed to be getting restless, 
socially and politically, on the laurels of the success of the first 
Five Year Development Plan (1962-66). In 1967 NK stepped up its campaign 
to destabilize SK (decision made by Kim Il-sung in late 1966). Nixon's 
detente policy and specifically his decision to visit and establish 
relations with China, coming as it did when SK social-economic-political 
situation was becoming increasingly troubled, seems to have been the 
final straw.  By the end of 1972 PCH perceived SK's circumstances as 
dire: there were domestic troubles a plenty, but the external situation 
was even more compelling: NK provocations, betrayal of  Taiwan by US and 
Japan, betrayal of Vietnam, rise of NK's legitimacy (because of China's 
stature), and potential betrayal of SK by US (Guam doctrine and troop 
withdrawal, reduction of aid, etc.).

In the "crumbling" regional situation of 1971/72, the image of a weak 
Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19th century with 
disastrous results was often evoked. Internal documents show that this 
was not simply rhetoric, but believed at the highest levels. The 
establishment of national mobilization movements during this period was 
thus directly the result of the perceived crises: most importantly the 
Homeland defense reserve force & system in 1968, and the Saemaul 
Movement in 1971. Both concepts had been in working for some time but it 
was  Both of these movements must also be seen more importantly as 
spiritual mobilizations, one that was joined by other moral suasion 
campaigns.

One dimension of this history that may be of specific interest to Dr. 
Levkowitz is the role that Israel played, materially but more 
importantly as a symbol. Much of this thought is based on the recently 
declassified documents on SK-Israel contacts as well as public rhetoric. 
Israel resonated deeply for PCH and seemingly for ordinary South 
Koreans. Both modern states were founded in 1948, both were small and 
surrounded by powerful threats, and both were poor in natural resources 
and thus human resources were emphasized. On a different dimension, and 
one that continues to operate today, is a religious one. The spread of 
Christianity made the land of Bible significantly meaningful. Some 
Koreans even imagined a shared heritage liking the Koreans to the Jews 
of the Exodus. Other nations occupied a similar symbolic position such 
as Switzerland, but Israel was the most powerful, not only because of 
this "shared" history and circumstances, but Israel's stunning victory 
in the Six-Day War (June 67) made a deep impression on the success of 
the Israel nation building project. It must be said that Israel also 
seemed to have looked at SK in a special way. It was one of the first 
nation to send assistance when the Korean War broke out (a modest amount 
of  medical supplies, but diplomatic documents show that it was never 
forgotten and had a deep symbolic significance). We must remember that 
Israel was mounting an international effort to establish ties with 
nations in competition with the Arab nations. There were embarrassingly 
few who chose Israel over the oils and markets provided by the 
infinitely larger Arab community. Despite the resonant symbolism of 
Israel SK practiced pragmatic diplomacy simply because Israel's one UN 
vote was less important than the dozen or more Arab UN votes in the days 
when the Korea Question came up for annual referendum at the UN, but 
that's another story. On a material level I just want point out that the 
Israeli reserve and the kibbutz system were used as models for SK's 
Homeland reserve system and the establishment of "strategic villages" 
near the DMZ (the strategic village system in Manchuria during the 
colonial period also probably served as a model although I have not 
found any direct evidence of that linkage - it is plausible given PCH's 
service in Manchuria).

So, to answer Dr. Levkowitz's first question, yes "Yusin" was chosen for 
the specific goal of national restoration/renovation/revitalization that 
was seen, by 1972, as vital for national survival and continued 
construction.  The need to fight and build simultaneously was neatly 
summarized in a popular slogan of the time that exists in many 
variations "fight while you build and build while you fight."

With regard to Dr.Levkowitz's second question, on the valuation of the 
term, my opinion is that it is quite ambiguous and divided especially 
among South Koreans. On the one hand, the searing memory of the 
mobilization campaigns (spiritual, physical, material) and the 
oppression and suppression of dissent and democracy created an instant 
connection between "Yusin" and dictatorship and oppression of the people 
(minjung).  On the other hand, in as much as most South Koreans still 
say that PCH was the one person most responsible for South Korea's 
development and that the Saemaul movement was the most important 
national project that contributed to development, Yusin may not have 
such polemical and essentialized negative connotation. There is a 
certain sense of "well, it was necessary then."

This brings me to my final point and one of my biggest challenges in the 
dissertation. The perception of national crisis and that the measures 
(mobilization, Yusin) taken were appropriate seem to have been shared by 
the people. For now I can only suggest circumstantial and indirect 
evidence for this for now: the "success" of South Korea's development 
that can only happen with national effort, the retrospective and 
relatively positive evaluation of PCH in current polls (it is no 
accident in these terms that PCH became a powerful symbol of what South 
Korea had to do in response to the 97 financial crisis), the relative 
absence of resistance in "ordinary" places like Kangwon province (indeed 
there seemed to have been wide support, but Kangwon can also be seen as 
a smaller version of the national crisis because it was the target of 
most of the NK incursions, it was one of the least developed areas,and 
it lacked a powerful political patron in Seoul). One emerging discourse 
in SK is the notion of mass/popular dictatorship, one that has been 
directly influenced by recent studies on European fascism. The thesis of 
course,and simplified, is that the authoritarian rulers were able to 
stay in power because the people allowed it. I think there is a 
significant measure of truth in this.

An aside on NK: It should also be pointed out that at about the same 
period, late 60s and early 70s, NK also went through a similar period of 
perceived national crisis (Mitchell Lerner's book on the Pueblo Crisis 
has a succinct treatment of this in a chapter) and responded essentially 
in identical manner - the need to simultaneously fight and build.

RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely 
because of the above situation that his speculation that he suspects "he 
[PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what the 
Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and 
powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's thought is 
correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime? As far 
as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious 
connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is 
closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted traditional 
term and concept.

Sorry for the lengthy comment.

Jiyul Kim


Ruediger Frank wrote:

> Dear Mr. Levkowitz and all,
>
> on a side note, I was always struck by the similarities
> between the Saemaeul Undong (New Village Movement), evolving
> around the same time as the Yushin Constitution, and  Mao's
> Cultural Revolution. If you read some of Park Chung-hee's
> speeches from that time, he stops short of talking about
> "the most beautiful characters" that could only be written
> "on a blank sheet of paper", to paraphrase the Great
> Helmsman who wanted to erase all traces of old thought to
> make room for new thinking in the minds of his Chinese
> subjects. Park, too, emphasizes the alleged "backwardness"
> of Koreans and their attitudes and calls for a thorough
> ideological modernization. Institutionalists such as
> Clarence E. Ayres would say that he tried to fight
> ceremonialism and supported technlogical dynamism. On a
> smaller scale, this is a process that repeats itself quite
> frequently in Korean politics until present time. The
> renaming of political parties, for example, is one
> expression of this continuous desire to "renew" or
> "revitalize". The official slogan "Dynamic Korea" fits
> perfectly into this way of looking at the issue.
>
> Best,
>
> Ruediger Frank
>
> William Brown wrote:
>
>>
>> For some reason I seem to remember they translated yushin into 
>> "revitalizing reforms" in English.
>>
>> Bill Brown
>>
>> From: "Alon Levkowitz" <levko at smile.net.il>
>> Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> To: <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> Subject: [KS] question
>> Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2006 22:24:21 +0200
>>
>> Dear group.
>> I would like to consult the group about a word - Yushin (Yusin). Was 
>> the term Yushin for the yushin constitution under Park's regime was 
>> chosen for a specific goal. Does the word, without the problematic 
>> applications of the constitution by Park, means positive or negative?
>> Thanks
>> Alon
>> Dr. Alon Levkowitz
>> Email: levko at smile.net.il
>> Tel/Fax: 972-3-6133045
>>
>>
>>
>>
>