[KS] Some comments on Yusin

[tgpark at snu.ac.kr]

Too all,


 


I think that Jiyul's comment is very helpful to understand Yusin in 1972. 
However, I would like to add something.  


 


> When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park 

> (PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived, that 

> began in early 1968. Internally and externally the world order and the 

> desired course of internal development upon which PCH based his long 

> range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The symbolic and 

> psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be 

> compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid (1/21), 

> seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (1/31). 

> Jan 68 was SK's 9/11. 


 


I believe that most of scholars consider those crises are the most crucial 
reason and background of Yushin in 1972. I agree with that argument. However, 
crisis in South Korea already started before 1968 security crisis, after sending 
combat troop to Vietnam in 1966. Acoording to UN Command's documents in 1966 and 
1967, conflicts between South and North along the DMZ increased dramatically 
compared to those before 1965. Even when President Johnson visited Korea in 
October 1966, North Koreans killed several U.S. soldiers near DMZ line. 


The reason NK increased the raids is to hinder South Korean troop dispatch to 
friend country, to response against modernization of South Korean army by the 
U.S. at the expense of sending troop, and to know that U.S. could not involve 
deeply in the Korean Peninsula due to the Vietnam War. 


Before the NK Blue House raid, Park already declared to change people's 
spirit as if Lee Kwang Soo had said during the colonial period, and Democratic 
Republican Party proposed new conscription law. Even in late 1967, UN Command 
and Korean politicians including PCH anticipated increase of NK activities in 
early 1968. 


I think that the road to Yusin was already started before 1968. Yusin is not 
passive, but very active one by PCH. 


 


> RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely 

> because of the above situation that his speculation that he suspects 
"he 
> [PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what 
the 
> Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and 

> powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's thought is 

> correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime? As 
far 
> as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious 

> connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is 

> closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted traditional 

> term and concept. 


I think that PCH seriously considered Meiji Ishin. He already wrote about 
Meiji Ishin in his book during the hunta era. The reason he could not do 
something like Meiji Ishin during 1960s is because he could not get currency 
from people. I believe that after 1967 presidential election, he seemed to have 
confidence to do something he thought. 


 


Tae Gyun Park


Assistant Professor, Korean Studies


GSIS, Seoul National University


 


 
--- Original Message ---
>From    : 
 "Jiyul Kim"<jiyulkim at fas.harvard.edu>
To      : 
 "Korean Studies Discussion List"<Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Date    : 
 2006/01/21 토요일 오후 5:21:22
Subject : 
 [KS] Some comments on Yusin
To Dr. Levkowitz and to others who have commented:



I base comments on my current dissertation work that posits that South 

Korea's response to a profound period of crisis between 1968 and 1972 

led to a concerted program of national spiritual and material 

mobilization that created the modern South Korean and South Korea. One 

source I have consulted extensively is the diplomatic archives that only 

recently became available. I also conducted a close study of how this 

process operated in one local region, Kangwon province.



The term Yusin (I prefer the M-R spelling), as it relates to the Yusin 

Constitution (YC) (and this is the common understanding among scholars 

and the average South Korean), must be seen as a specific historical 

issue rather than in some generic way as suggested by Drs. Baker and 

Ruediger. It was a specific response to a specific circumstances of 

national crisis. Other studies have suggested a similar process at work 

in other nations -  a deliberate effort to mobilize the nation's 

physical and spiritual resources and restore/revitalize/renovate the 

nation in the face of profound internal and external crisis. Two quick 

examples spanning time and space: Lynn Hunt's work on the French 

Revolution and Frederick Dickinson's study of Japan's response during WW 

I.  The U.S. has gone through this process a number of times in its 

history, most recently and currently as result of 9/11 (President Bush's 

emphasis on the moral dimension of America's tasks and challenges is 

very much in synch with history's examples).



When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park 

(PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived, that 

began in early 1968.  Internally and externally the world order and the 

desired course of internal development upon which PCH  based his long 

range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The symbolic and 

psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be 

compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid (1/21), 

seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (1/31). 

Jan 68 was SK's 9/11.



Internally, ordinary South Koreans seemed to be getting restless, 

socially and politically, on the laurels of the success of the first 

Five Year Development Plan (1962-66). In 1967 NK stepped up its campaign 

to destabilize SK (decision made by Kim Il-sung in late 1966). Nixon's 

detente policy and specifically his decision to visit and establish 

relations with China, coming as it did when SK social-economic-political 

situation was becoming increasingly troubled, seems to have been the 

final straw.  By the end of 1972 PCH perceived SK's circumstances as 

dire: there were domestic troubles a plenty, but the external situation 

was even more compelling: NK provocations, betrayal of  Taiwan by US and 

Japan, betrayal of Vietnam, rise of NK's legitimacy (because of China's 

stature), and potential betrayal of SK by US (Guam doctrine and troop 

withdrawal, reduction of aid, etc.).



In the "crumbling" regional situation of 1971/72, the image of a weak 

Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19th century with 

disastrous results was often evoked. Internal documents show that this 

was not simply rhetoric, but believed at the highest levels. The 

establishment of national mobilization movements during this period was 

thus directly the result of the perceived crises: most importantly the 

Homeland defense reserve force & system in 1968, and the Saemaul 

Movement in 1971. Both concepts had been in working for some time but it 

was  Both of these movements must also be seen more importantly as 

spiritual mobilizations, one that was joined by other moral suasion 

campaigns.



One dimension of this history that may be of specific interest to Dr. 

Levkowitz is the role that Israel played, materially but more 

importantly as a symbol. Much of this thought is based on the recently 

declassified documents on SK-Israel contacts as well as public rhetoric. 

Israel resonated deeply for PCH and seemingly for ordinary South 

Koreans. Both modern states were founded in 1948, both were small and 

surrounded by powerful threats, and both were poor in natural resources 

and thus human resources were emphasized. On a different dimension, and 

one that continues to operate today, is a religious one. The spread of 

Christianity made the land of Bible significantly meaningful. Some 

Koreans even imagined a shared heritage liking the Koreans to the Jews 

of the Exodus. Other nations occupied a similar symbolic position such 

as Switzerland, but Israel was the most powerful, not only because of 

this "shared" history and circumstances, but Israel's stunning victory 

in the Six-Day War (June 67) made a deep impression on the success of 

the Israel nation building project. It must be said that Israel also 

seemed to have looked at SK in a special way. It was one of the first 

nation to send assistance when the Korean War broke out (a modest amount 

of  medical supplies, but diplomatic documents show that it was never 

forgotten and had a deep symbolic significance). We must remember that 

Israel was mounting an international effort to establish ties with 

nations in competition with the Arab nations. There were embarrassingly 

few who chose Israel over the oils and markets provided by the 

infinitely larger Arab community. Despite the resonant symbolism of 

Israel SK practiced pragmatic diplomacy simply because Israel's one UN 

vote was less important than the dozen or more Arab UN votes in the days 

when the Korea Question came up for annual referendum at the UN, but 

that's another story. On a material level I just want point out that the 

Israeli reserve and the kibbutz system were used as models for SK's 

Homeland reserve system and the establishment of "strategic villages" 

near the DMZ (the strategic village system in Manchuria during the 

colonial period also probably served as a model although I have not 

found any direct evidence of that linkage - it is plausible given PCH's 

service in Manchuria).



So, to answer Dr. Levkowitz's first question, yes "Yusin" was chosen for 

the specific goal of national restoration/renovation/revitalization that 

was seen, by 1972, as vital for national survival and continued 

construction.  The need to fight and build simultaneously was neatly 

summarized in a popular slogan of the time that exists in many 

variations "fight while you build and build while you fight."



With regard to Dr.Levkowitz's second question, on the valuation of the 

term, my opinion is that it is quite ambiguous and divided especially 

among South Koreans. On the one hand, the searing memory of the 

mobilization campaigns (spiritual, physical, material) and the 

oppression and suppression of dissent and democracy created an instant 

connection between "Yusin" and dictatorship and oppression of the people 

(minjung).  On the other hand, in as much as most South Koreans still 

say that PCH was the one person most responsible for South Korea's 

development and that the Saemaul movement was the most important 

national project that contributed to development, Yusin may not have 

such polemical and essentialized negative connotation. There is a 

certain sense of "well, it was necessary then."



This brings me to my final point and one of my biggest challenges in the 

dissertation. The perception of national crisis and that the measures 

(mobilization, Yusin) taken were appropriate seem to have been shared by 

the people. For now I can only suggest circumstantial and indirect 

evidence for this for now: the "success" of South Korea's development 

that can only happen with national effort, the retrospective and 

relatively positive evaluation of PCH in current polls (it is no 

accident in these terms that PCH became a powerful symbol of what South 

Korea had to do in response to the 97 financial crisis), the relative 

absence of resistance in "ordinary" places like Kangwon province (indeed 

there seemed to have been wide support, but Kangwon can also be seen as 

a smaller version of the national crisis because it was the target of 

most of the NK incursions, it was one of the least developed areas,and 

it lacked a powerful political patron in Seoul). One emerging discourse 

in SK is the notion of mass/popular dictatorship, one that has been 

directly influenced by recent studies on European fascism. The thesis of 

course,and simplified, is that the authoritarian rulers were able to 

stay in power because the people allowed it. I think there is a 

significant measure of truth in this.



An aside on NK: It should also be pointed out that at about the same 

period, late 60s and early 70s, NK also went through a similar period of 

perceived national crisis (Mitchell Lerner's book on the Pueblo Crisis 

has a succinct treatment of this in a chapter) and responded essentially 

in identical manner - the need to simultaneously fight and build.



RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely 

because of the above situation that his speculation that he suspects "he 

[PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what the 

Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and 

powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's thought is 

correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime? As far 

as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious 

connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is 

closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted traditional 

term and concept.



Sorry for the lengthy comment.



Jiyul Kim





Ruediger Frank wrote:



> Dear Mr. Levkowitz and all,

>

> on a side note, I was always struck by the similarities

> between the Saemaeul Undong (New Village Movement), evolving

> around the same time as the Yushin Constitution, and  Mao's

> Cultural Revolution. If you read some of Park Chung-hee's

> speeches from that time, he stops short of talking about

> "the most beautiful characters" that could only be written

> "on a blank sheet of paper", to paraphrase the Great

> Helmsman who wanted to erase all traces of old thought to

> make room for new thinking in the minds of his Chinese

> subjects. Park, too, emphasizes the alleged "backwardness"

> of Koreans and their attitudes and calls for a thorough

> ideological modernization. Institutionalists such as

> Clarence E. Ayres would say that he tried to fight

> ceremonialism and supported technlogical dynamism. On a

> smaller scale, this is a process that repeats itself quite

> frequently in Korean politics until present time. The

> renaming of political parties, for example, is one

> expression of this continuous desire to "renew" or

> "revitalize". The official slogan "Dynamic Korea" fits

> perfectly into this way of looking at the issue.

>

> Best,

>

> Ruediger Frank

>

> William Brown wrote:

>

>>

>> For some reason I seem to remember they translated yushin into 

>> "revitalizing reforms" in English.

>>

>> Bill Brown

>>

>> From: "Alon Levkowitz" <levko at smile.net.il>

>> Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

>> To: <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

>> Subject: [KS] question

>> Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2006 22:24:21 +0200

>>

>> Dear group.

>> I would like to consult the group about a word - Yushin (Yusin). Was 

>> the term Yushin for the yushin constitution under Park's regime was 

>> chosen for a specific goal. Does the word, without the problematic 

>> applications of the constitution by Park, means positive or negative?

>> Thanks

>> Alon

>> Dr. Alon Levkowitz

>> Email: levko at smile.net.il

>> Tel/Fax: 972-3-6133045

>>

>>

>>

>>

>








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