[KS] Why NK increased provocations in the late 1960s

[Jiyul Kim]

In a recent posting Prof. Park Tae gyun stated that:

'The reason NK increased the raids is to hinder South Korean troop
dispatch to friend country, to response against modernization of South
Korean army by the U.S. at the expense of sending troop, and to know
that U.S. could not involve deeply in the Korean Peninsula due to the
Vietnam War.'

A number of studies dispute this somewhat narrow and simplified
interpretation. In order to comprehend the increased NK activities one
has to take into account the 2nd KWP Conference of Oct 1966 that called
for a new effort to incite revolution in South Korea. Mitchell Lerner's
recent book on the Pueblo Incident provides an intriguing interpretation
of not only why the USS Pueblo was seized, but also the foundation of
the renewed conflict initiated in Oct 66. It was not simply about SK's
dispatch of troops to VN nor its military modernization nor to take
advantage of US involvement in VN (although those considerations remain
valid), but the central impetus may have been the sense that running out
on the NK project in building the idea Korean nation. SK was catching up
with and threatening to pass by NK. The calculations behind NK
provocations of the late 60s goes far beyond a simple calculus based on
power and material advantage, but to a competition of legitimacy based
on reality and action.

Jiyul Kim




tgpark at snu.ac.kr wrote:

> Too all,
>
> I think that Jiyul's comment is very helpful to understand Yusin in
> 1972. However, I would like to add something.
>
> > When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park
> > (PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived, that
> > began in early 1968. Internally and externally the world order and the
> > desired course of internal development upon which PCH based his long
> > range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The symbolic and
> > psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be
> > compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid (1/21),
> > seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (1/31).
> > Jan 68 was SK's 9/11.
>
> I believe that most of scholars consider those crises are the most
> crucial reason and background of Yushin in 1972. I agree with that
> argument. However, crisis in South Korea already started before 1968
> security crisis, after sending combat troop to Vietnam in 1966.
> Acoording to UN Command's documents in 1966 and 1967, conflicts
> between South and North along the DMZ increased dramatically compared
> to those before 1965. Even when President Johnson visited Korea in
> October 1966, North Koreans killed several U.S. soldiers near DMZ line.
>
> The reason NK increased the raids is to hinder South Korean troop
> dispatch to friend country, to response against modernization of South
> Korean army by the U.S. at the expense of sending troop, and to know
> that U.S. could not involve deeply in the Korean Peninsula due to the
> Vietnam War.
>
> Before the NK Blue House raid, Park already declared to change
> people's spirit as if Lee Kwang Soo had said during the colonial
> period, and Democratic Republican Party proposed new conscription law.
> Even in late 1967, UN Command and Korean politicians including PCH
> anticipated increase of NK activities in early 1968.
>
> I think that the road to Yusin was already started before 1968. Yusin
> is not passive, but very active one by PCH.
>
> > RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely
> > because of the above situation that his speculation that he suspects
> "he
> > [PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what the
> > Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and
> > powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's thought is
> > correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime? As
> far
> > as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious
> > connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is
> > closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted traditional
> > term and concept.
>
> I think that PCH seriously considered Meiji Ishin. He already wrote
> about Meiji Ishin in his book during the hunta era. The reason he
> could not do something like Meiji Ishin during 1960s is because he
> could not get currency from people. I believe that after 1967
> presidential election, he seemed to have confidence to do something he
> thought.
>
> Tae Gyun Park
>
> Assistant Professor, Korean Studies
>
> GSIS, Seoul National University
>
>     --- Original Message ---
>     *From : * "Jiyul Kim"<jiyulkim at fas.harvard.edu>
>     *To : * "Korean Studies Discussion List"<Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>     *Date : * 2006/01/21 토요일 오후 5:21:22
>     *Subject : * [KS] Some comments on Yusin
>
>     To Dr. Levkowitz and to others who have commented:
>
>     I base comments on my current dissertation work that posits that
>     South
>     Korea's response to a profound period of crisis between 1968 and 1972
>     led to a concerted program of national spiritual and material
>     mobilization that created the modern South Korean and South Korea.
>     One
>     source I have consulted extensively is the diplomatic archives
>     that only
>     recently became available. I also conducted a close study of how this
>     process operated in one local region, Kangwon province.
>
>     The term Yusin (I prefer the M-R spelling), as it relates to the
>     Yusin
>     Constitution (YC) (and this is the common understanding among
>     scholars
>     and the average South Korean), must be seen as a specific historical
>     issue rather than in some generic way as suggested by Drs. Baker and
>     Ruediger. It was a specific response to a specific circumstances of
>     national crisis. Other studies have suggested a similar process at
>     work
>     in other nations - a deliberate effort to mobilize the nation's
>     physical and spiritual resources and restore/revitalize/renovate the
>     nation in the face of profound internal and external crisis. Two
>     quick
>     examples spanning time and space: Lynn Hunt's work on the French
>     Revolution and Frederick Dickinson's study of Japan's response
>     during WW
>     I. The U.S. has gone through this process a number of times in its
>     history, most recently and currently as result of 9/11 (President
>     Bush's
>     emphasis on the moral dimension of America's tasks and challenges is
>     very much in synch with history's examples).
>
>     When YC was instituted in 1972 it was done so as a response by Park
>     (PCH) to a profound period of national crises, real and perceived,
>     that
>     began in early 1968. Internally and externally the world order and
>     the
>     desired course of internal development upon which PCH based his long
>     range plans for nation building all seemed to crumble. The
>     symbolic and
>     psychological impact to SK of three incidents in Jan 1968 can be
>     compared to the impact of 9/11 for the U.S.: NK Blue House raid
>     (1/21),
>     seizure of USS Pueblo (1/23), and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam
>     (1/31).
>     Jan 68 was SK's 9/11.
>
>     Internally, ordinary South Koreans seemed to be getting restless,
>     socially and politically, on the laurels of the success of the first
>     Five Year Development Plan (1962-66). In 1967 NK stepped up its
>     campaign
>     to destabilize SK (decision made by Kim Il-sung in late 1966).
>     Nixon's
>     detente policy and specifically his decision to visit and establish
>     relations with China, coming as it did when SK
>     social-economic-political
>     situation was becoming increasingly troubled, seems to have been the
>     final straw. By the end of 1972 PCH perceived SK's circumstances as
>     dire: there were domestic troubles a plenty, but the external
>     situation
>     was even more compelling: NK provocations, betrayal of Taiwan by
>     US and
>     Japan, betrayal of Vietnam, rise of NK's legitimacy (because of
>     China's
>     stature), and potential betrayal of SK by US (Guam doctrine and troop
>     withdrawal, reduction of aid, etc.).
>
>     In the "crumbling" regional situation of 1971/72, the image of a weak
>     Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19th century
>     with
>     disastrous results was often evoked. Internal documents show that
>     this
>     was not simply rhetoric, but believed at the highest levels. The
>     establishment of national mobilization movements during this
>     period was
>     thus directly the result of the perceived crises: most importantly
>     the
>     Homeland defense reserve force & system in 1968, and the Saemaul
>     Movement in 1971. Both concepts had been in working for some time
>     but it
>     was Both of these movements must also be seen more importantly as
>     spiritual mobilizations, one that was joined by other moral suasion
>     campaigns.
>
>     One dimension of this history that may be of specific interest to Dr.
>     Levkowitz is the role that Israel played, materially but more
>     importantly as a symbol. Much of this thought is based on the
>     recently
>     declassified documents on SK-Israel contacts as well as public
>     rhetoric.
>     Israel resonated deeply for PCH and seemingly for ordinary South
>     Koreans. Both modern states were founded in 1948, both were small and
>     surrounded by powerful threats, and both were poor in natural
>     resources
>     and thus human resources were emphasized. On a different
>     dimension, and
>     one that continues to operate today, is a religious one. The
>     spread of
>     Christianity made the land of Bible significantly meaningful. Some
>     Koreans even imagined a shared heritage liking the Koreans to the
>     Jews
>     of the Exodus. Other nations occupied a similar symbolic position
>     such
>     as Switzerland, but Israel was the most powerful, not only because of
>     this "shared" history and circumstances, but Israel's stunning
>     victory
>     in the Six-Day War (June 67) made a deep impression on the success of
>     the Israel nation building project. It must be said that Israel also
>     seemed to have looked at SK in a special way. It was one of the first
>     nation to send assistance when the Korean War broke out (a modest
>     amount
>     of medical supplies, but diplomatic documents show that it was never
>     forgotten and had a deep symbolic significance). We must remember
>     that
>     Israel was mounting an international effort to establish ties with
>     nations in competition with the Arab nations. There were
>     embarrassingly
>     few who chose Israel over the oils and markets provided by the
>     infinitely larger Arab community. Despite the resonant symbolism of
>     Israel SK practiced pragmatic diplomacy simply because Israel's
>     one UN
>     vote was less important than the dozen or more Arab UN votes in
>     the days
>     when the Korea Question came up for annual referendum at the UN, but
>     that's another story. On a material level I just want point out
>     that the
>     Israeli reserve and the kibbutz system were used as models for SK's
>     Homeland reserve system and the establishment of "strategic villages"
>     near the DMZ (the strategic village system in Manchuria during the
>     colonial period also probably served as a model although I have not
>     found any direct evidence of that linkage - it is plausible given
>     PCH's
>     service in Manchuria).
>
>     So, to answer Dr. Levkowitz's first question, yes "Yusin" was
>     chosen for
>     the specific goal of national
>     restoration/renovation/revitalization that
>     was seen, by 1972, as vital for national survival and continued
>     construction. The need to fight and build simultaneously was neatly
>     summarized in a popular slogan of the time that exists in many
>     variations "fight while you build and build while you fight."
>
>     With regard to Dr.Levkowitz's second question, on the valuation of
>     the
>     term, my opinion is that it is quite ambiguous and divided especially
>     among South Koreans. On the one hand, the searing memory of the
>     mobilization campaigns (spiritual, physical, material) and the
>     oppression and suppression of dissent and democracy created an
>     instant
>     connection between "Yusin" and dictatorship and oppression of the
>     people
>     (minjung). On the other hand, in as much as most South Koreans still
>     say that PCH was the one person most responsible for South Korea's
>     development and that the Saemaul movement was the most important
>     national project that contributed to development, Yusin may not have
>     such polemical and essentialized negative connotation. There is a
>     certain sense of "well, it was necessary then."
>
>     This brings me to my final point and one of my biggest challenges
>     in the
>     dissertation. The perception of national crisis and that the measures
>     (mobilization, Yusin) taken were appropriate seem to have been
>     shared by
>     the people. For now I can only suggest circumstantial and indirect
>     evidence for this for now: the "success" of South Korea's development
>     that can only happen with national effort, the retrospective and
>     relatively positive evaluation of PCH in current polls (it is no
>     accident in these terms that PCH became a powerful symbol of what
>     South
>     Korea had to do in response to the 97 financial crisis), the relative
>     absence of resistance in "ordinary" places like Kangwon province
>     (indeed
>     there seemed to have been wide support, but Kangwon can also be
>     seen as
>     a smaller version of the national crisis because it was the target of
>     most of the NK incursions, it was one of the least developed
>     areas,and
>     it lacked a powerful political patron in Seoul). One emerging
>     discourse
>     in SK is the notion of mass/popular dictatorship, one that has been
>     directly influenced by recent studies on European fascism. The
>     thesis of
>     course,and simplified, is that the authoritarian rulers were able to
>     stay in power because the people allowed it. I think there is a
>     significant measure of truth in this.
>
>     An aside on NK: It should also be pointed out that at about the same
>     period, late 60s and early 70s, NK also went through a similar
>     period of
>     perceived national crisis (Mitchell Lerner's book on the Pueblo
>     Crisis
>     has a succinct treatment of this in a chapter) and responded
>     essentially
>     in identical manner - the need to simultaneously fight and build.
>
>     RE: Prof Baker's comment on Yusin and Meiji ishin, it is precisely
>     because of the above situation that his speculation that he
>     suspects "he
>     [PCH] used that term to show that he wanted to do with Korea what the
>     Meiji oligarchs did with Japan, that is, turn it into a rich and
>     powerful nation." is I think off the mark. If Prof. Baker's
>     thought is
>     correct why didn't PCH evoke the term much earlier in his regime?
>     As far
>     as I know there is not yet any historical evidence of a conscious
>     connection with Meiji ishin. I suspect Prof. Ledyard's analysis is
>     closer to the mark, the use of a long existing and accepted
>     traditional
>     term and concept.
>
>     Sorry for the lengthy comment.
>
>     Jiyul Kim
>
>
>     Ruediger Frank wrote:
>
>     > Dear Mr. Levkowitz and all,
>     >
>     > on a side note, I was always struck by the similarities
>     > between the Saemaeul Undong (New Village Movement), evolving
>     > around the same time as the Yushin Constitution, and Mao's
>     > Cultural Revolution. If you read some of Park Chung-hee's
>     > speeches from that time, he stops short of talking about
>     > "the most beautiful characters" that could only be written
>     > "on a blank sheet of paper", to paraphrase the Great
>     > Helmsman who wanted to erase all traces of old thought to
>     > make room for new thinking in the minds of his Chinese
>     > subjects. Park, too, emphasizes the alleged "backwardness"
>     > of Koreans and their attitudes and calls for a thorough
>     > ideological modernization. Institutionalists such as
>     > Clarence E. Ayres would say that he tried to fight
>     > ceremonialism and supported technlogical dynamism. On a
>     > smaller scale, this is a process that repeats itself quite
>     > frequently in Korean politics until present time. The
>     > renaming of political parties, for example, is one
>     > expression of this continuous desire to "renew" or
>     > "revitalize". The official slogan "Dynamic Korea" fits
>     > perfectly into this way of looking at the issue.
>     >
>     > Best,
>     >
>     > Ruediger Frank
>     >
>     > William Brown wrote:
>     >
>     >>
>     >> For some reason I seem to remember they translated yushin into
>     >> "revitalizing reforms" in English.
>     >>
>     >> Bill Brown
>     >>
>     >> From: "Alon Levkowitz" <levko at smile.net.il>
>     >> Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
>     <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>     >> To: <Koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>     >> Subject: [KS] question
>     >> Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2006 22:24:21 +0200
>     >>
>     >> Dear group.
>     >> I would like to consult the group about a word - Yushin
>     (Yusin). Was
>     >> the term Yushin for the yushin constitution under Park's regime
>     was
>     >> chosen for a specific goal. Does the word, without the problematic
>     >> applications of the constitution by Park, means positive or
>     negative?
>     >> Thanks
>     >> Alon
>     >> Dr. Alon Levkowitz
>     >> Email: levko at smile.net.il
>     >> Tel/Fax: 972-3-6133045
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >
>
>
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