[KS] President Reagan's letter to Chun Doo-hwan: a forgery?

don kirk kirkdon at yahoo.com
Sun Dec 4 14:42:45 EST 2011


Richard Allen, who as Reagan's national security adviser engineered commutation of DJ's death sentence and Chun's state visit to DC a few weeks later, should know all about such a letter if there was one. He's still around -- in DC and a retirement place in New Zealand. Someone should ask him. He likes to talk about his role in the whole thing.
Don Kirk

--- On Sun, 12/4/11, Mark Peterson <mark_peterson at byu.edu> wrote:

From: Mark Peterson <mark_peterson at byu.edu>
Subject: Re: [KS] President Reagan's letter to Chun Doo-hwan: a forgery?
To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
Date: Sunday, December 4, 2011, 10:26 AM



 



Interesting question -- did Ronald Reagan circumvent his representatives in the field, the USIS in Seoul, and write and sign the letter anyway?



I doubt it.  But it's possible.



When the Chun government got no cooperation from the Embassy in Seoul, they may have gone through their Embassy in Washington.  I don't know enough about diplomatic practice or history to know how governments use their dual contacts with other governments.
  



If the KorEmbassy in Washington contacted the US government, they would first contact the State Department, who should be in synch with the USEmb. in Seoul.  Could the KorEmb go straight to the White House?  I wonder what kinds of lines of contact were
 in place.



Early Reagan gave full and unabashed support to Chun, but later Reagan pressured Chun to step down at the end of his term and to not try to extend his terms as Park had done.  Was RR still enamored with Chun, one year into it?  When did the bloom begin
 to fall from the rose?



Just wondering….



best regards,
Mark



Mark Peterson
BYU









On Dec 3, 2011, at 5:39 PM, sung oak wrote:




Dear,

Can we check those letters at the RRPR?

I think that they are not open to the public yet.

Does anyone know about this?

Sung Deuk Oak

UCLA







 



From: katsiaficasg at wit.edu

To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws

Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2011 16:05:01 +0000

Subject: [KS] President Reagan's letter to Chun Doo-hwan: a forgery?



Mark and all,



Before we take a USIS official's partial knowledge of events as truth that the Chun regime forged RR's signature, shouldn't we at least check the RR Presidential Library?



From discussions with colleagues from Gwangju, it appears RR may have signed such a letter after all. Previous discussions with persons who know the State Department quite well have indicated
 that the Reagan administration negotiated with Chun to insure Kim Dae Jung would not be executed (he did receive the death penalty was but it was commuted and he was released to the US). In exchange, Chun was one of the first heads of state to be invited to
 visit the RR White House. 



Despite the change in the US administration after the elections in 1980, the White House continued its approval of the new dictatorship
 in Korea. In appreciation of his solid support from US backers, Chun commuted Kim Dae Jung’s death sentence, lifted martial law, and was invited to visit Nancy and Ronald Reagan—all within a 48-hour period. As one of the first foreign heads of state to visit
 Reagan’s White House, Chun was greeted in an elaborate ceremony, understood in Korea as a highly visible endorsement of his regime, even though he had not yet been officially elected President under the country’s new constitution.




Give the RR administrations' foreign policy, it may be no accident that a congratulatory was sent by his team a year later.



George Katsiaficas



On 12/2/11 11:57 AM, "Mark Peterson" <mark_peterson at byu.edu>
 wrote:




Don,



Shouldn't the last line of your quote be "to manipulate Korean public opinion"  ?   Or "determined to manipulate American public policy"?



I don't know what efforts the Chun clique would have used to manipulate American public opinion???



I know plenty of things they did to manipulate American policy.



I visited USIS a year after Chun formally took office, and the USIS staff were talking about an odd request that came from the Korean government for the President Reagan to send a letter of congratulations on the first anniversary of the new regime.  And the
 USIS staff thought that highly unorthodox and clearly manipulative and rejected the request, saying that as a matter of course the U.S. government does not issue congratulatory messages from the President on the first anniversary of a new political administration.



A short while later, on another visit to the USIS offices (as Fulbright director I had frequent contact with USIS people since they funded Fulbright) they were all buzzing about a press release from the Chun Blue House, a booklet of things, congratulatory messages
 and the like, in colorful booklet form.  And the first letter in the booklet was from President Reagan -- the bastards had forged it.  And USIS was snuttering about trying to decide how to protest such a thing, whether to go public (not a serious option),
 and how big of a diplomatic stink to make of forging the signature and a letter from the President of the United States.



I'm not sure this account is written anywhere by anyone, but I am an eyewitness and I'm sure we could find the documents in some files somewhere.  Perhaps some government officers on one side or the other have a memory of the event?



best,

Mark








From: Don Baker <ubcdbaker at hotmail.com>

Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 13:53:27 -0800

To: Bulletin Board Electronic <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising







I want to thank Jim for putting the Kwangju Resistance into a broader historical context. I still remember my conversation with a top political officer at the US embassy in Seoul when I returned from Kwangju in early June, 1980. He has well aware
 that hundreds had been killed in Kwangju. However, when I suggested to him that the US refusal to speak out openly against what had happened there might spark anti-Americanism among Koreans, he replied that South Koreans would never become anti-American! I
 wanted to ask him, but held my tongue, if his last tour of duty had been in Tehran.  



Don Baker 
Professor
Department of Asian Studies 
University of British Columbia 
Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Z2 
don.baker at ubc.ca






From: jimpthomas at hotmail.com

To: aoverl at yahoo.co.ukkirkdon at yahoo.comkoreanstudies at koreaweb.ws

Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 14:33:29 -0500

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising



In all of the discussions of Kwangju, US involvement, and US-Korea relations in 1980, Iran has never been mentioned once (at least according to the global search I just did). For those who
 were conscious of such events at the time, let's not forget that May 18, 1980 was day 197 of the hostage crisis in Tehran, which plagued Carter throughout the last third of his presidency and, according to many analysts, is probably the single most important
 factor leading to Reagan's victory in November, 1980.

 



George H.W. Bush, ex-Director of the CIA who was running against Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination at the time, had a “paramilitary plan” to free the hostages in Iran. Unfortunately,
 Carter listened and a clandestine military rescue attempt was hatched. On April 24th, 1980, it failed, ending in the death of eight American soldiers in the Iranian desert.

 
Iran was a great distraction--pushing Korea and most of the rest of the world off of the political radar
 screen--at least for the Carter administration. The hostage crisis severely compromised Carter's hard line on human rights abuse and soft line on military interventionism (which, as we all know, was aggressively used by Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and then
 triumphed under the three or four administrations that succeeded Carter). In mid-May 1980, "security" was the name of the game, not the least of which because American military readiness and Carter were both widely portrayed as "weak."

 

And no, "bastards" is not too harsh a word to use in Chun's case. It is a word I reserve only for the most egregious abuse. And, I believe, so does Mark.

jim



 



Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 14:44:21 +0000

From: aoverl at yahoo.co.uk

To: kirkdon at yahoo.comkoreanstudies at koreaweb.ws

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising




In a sense, we may say that Chun's strongest card was to create a fait accompli. I would not overemphasize the legal context (that is, the specific legal constraints which could or could not have enabled
 General Wickham to prevent Chun from making one military move or another), because it did happen on several occasions that some influential American policy-makers, such as Philip Habib or Kissinger, succeeded in dissuading Park Chung Hee from assassinating
 Kim Dae Jung or pursuing a nuclear weapon option, not so much because the U.S. had a specific legal basis for such interference but mostly by raw political pressure that Park could not ignore. Both Habib and Kissinger were very tough and no-nonsense guys when
 it came to deal with Park, but I would not characterize Gleysteen as such, not least because he tended to disagree with Carter's human rights policy. Such an attitude might have worked in 1980, too, but only if the U.S. could have known in advance that the
 paratroopers were to be dispatched to Kwangju and authorized to use lethal force "if necessary." I think that even an advance warning might not have dissuaded Chun from staging his coup, but it might have prevented the tragedy in Kwangju. But once Chun succeeded
 in dispatching the paras to Kwangju and stirred up a hornet's nest there, he could justify his actions by pointing at the resulting upheaval. I wonder if he purposefully provoked a localized crisis, or "merely" badly mishandled the situation_terribly badly,
 in fact.
 
All the best,
Balazs   








From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>

To: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>; Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws> 

Sent: Friday, 2 December 2011, 7:03

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

 




Actually, the State Department was trying mightily during that period to curb excesses. Donald Ranard, on the Korea desk, formerly at the U.S. embassy in Seoul, crusaded on the topic. Jimmy Carter, then the US president, was the least likely
 US leader to advocate harsh tactics. Shorrock's FOIA request turned up these quotes from the minutes of a meeting chaired by Secy of State Muskie, also a soft-liner: "There was general agreement that the first priority is the restoration of order in Gwangju
 by the Korean authorities with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later. Once order is restored, it was agreed we must press the Korean government, and the military in particular, to allow a greater degree of political
 freedom to evolve." Further, Shorrock quoted Ambassador Gleysteen as saying "We did not want the special forces used further" and criticized Chun for ignoring warnings against a "political crackdown" while complaining of "a deliberate effort on the part of
 the Chun Doo Hwan group who are determined to manipulate American public opinion." 

Don Kirk





--- On Thu, 12/1/11, Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:




From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk>

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Date: Thursday, December 1, 2011, 1:47 AM






I think that it might not be sufficient to focus solely on the Kwangju events to explain why Gleysteen & Co. adopted such an attitude. After all, on several previous occasions the U.S. government acted otherwise. For instance, in April 1960 the U.S.
 disapproved Rhee's use of force against demonstrators, and in 1961 it briefly withheld recognition from Park Chung Hee's junta. NB, in 1960-61 South Korea's economic situation, if compared with North Korea, was far more unfavorable than in 1980, and still
 the U.S. did not automatically accept the argument that force should be used for the sake of "security" because of the potential North Korean threat. Let me ask what you found in the U.S. documents about the State Department's and DoD's evaluation of the internal
 political situation in the months preceding Chun's May 1980 coup. If these institutions were in an alarmist mood already before Chun's takeover, and criticized student protests, etc., they were more likely to approve both the coup and the suppression of the
 Kwangju uprising than to disapprove them. Or it may have been the State Department's general (implicit or explicit) interpretation of post-1960 South Korean history along the following lines: "The brief democratic period in 1960-61 failed to yield considerable
 results in political stability and economic development, whereas Park's authoritarian rule did; therefore, dictatorship is better suited for South Korea in general, and for our interests in particular, than an unstable democracy; hence, we should consider
 Chun the lesser evil, and hope that he will evolve into a second Park, preferably without the latter's disagreeable actions" (my hypothetical summary). I may be mistaken, however.
 
All the best,
Balazs Szalontai   
 





From: "Katsiaficas, George" <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>

To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws> 

Sent: Thursday, 1 December 2011, 9:49

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising




Dear Don and all,
 
If we permit everyone to be judged by the standard of evaluating their actions only by their own self-description, then all prisons would be empty. The US Embassy may or may not have used the word "suppression"
 in the hundreds of pages of declassified documents the City of Gwangju received. They are not digitized. If the "restoration of order" is not clear enough (which the White House meeting called for), how about Gleysteen's meeting
 with Korean Prime Minister Park Choong-hoon ion
 May 23 in Seoul, when the US Ambassador
 acknowledged that “firm anti-riot measures were necessary.”

–May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement Materials, hereafter
 GDMM, Gwangju City May 18 Historical Materials Compilation Committee (광주광역시 5-18사료편찬위원회,
 5-18 광주 민주화운동자료총서),
 December 17, 1997 p. 235 (State Department document 80Seoul 006610).


Or "subdue the crowds": On May 22, 1980, a  US DOD spokesperson stated that US Commanding Gen. 

Wickham “has
 accepted and agreed to the request by the Korean government to allow the use of certain 

selected Korean armed forces under his operational control in operations to subdue the crowds."

 

I could go on but I think, again, if we want the prisons empty, then let's apply universally the standard of 

taking people at their own self-description

 

George

 

 



From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>Reply-To: Korean
 Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 01:07:10 -0800To:Korean
 Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in
 the Gwangju Uprising
 




You're going a step beyond what was said. The U.S. interest, as noted in a message from a long-time observer, was indeed "stability." The U.S. also was no doubt interested in "liberalization of the economy from tight central control" -- a goal actually
 that many of the protesters shared. Did the material that Shorrock picked up via FOIA contain the word "suppression" as such or is that your interpretation? The real problem was U.S. analysts, intel people etc. had little comprehension of the forces at work
 on either side -- that is, the concerns of the protesters, their willingness to defy central authority, or the extent to which Chun Doo-hwan was willing to go to, yes, "suppress" them. Another far more abstract issue is whether Park, had he been alive, would
 have been so blatantly heavy-handed -- or would have been more skilled in going after adjudged foes earlier, thereby "suppressing" dissent and protest before they took over the city. But Park also had shown he was out of touch by bloody suppression of labor
 dissent in the industrial centers of Masan and Changwon in the southeast -- a response to a different form of protest.
Don Kirk
 
--- On Mon, 11/28/11, Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu> wrote:



From: Katsiaficas, George <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>, "J.Scott Burgeson" <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>

Date: Monday, November 28, 2011, 11:58 PM





I suspect that Don Kirk and I would agree that anecdotal evidence based upon experiences in 1980 is not by itself sufficient to evaluate whether or not Washington insisted upon suppression
 of the Gwangju Uprising. Not until years later did US government documents become publicly available (thanks to a Freedom of Information Act by citizens of Gwangju and investigation by reporter Tim Shorrock). After reading hundreds of pages of formerly classified
 documents, two things became evident to me:

The US did, indeed, insist on suppressing the uprising, especailly then US Ambassador Gleysteen, who mistakenly reported executions and people's courts in Gwangju. The White House meeting at
 4 pm on May 22 was the decisive point. At that same time, North Korea, it was noted by Washington, was interested in building a "Rainbow Bridge" to the US.President Carter told a
 CNN interviewer on May 31 that security interests must sometimes override human rights concerns. Gleysteen and New York bankers insisted upon stability and liberalization. Only a few days after the final  onslaught against Gwangju, Gleysteen penned
 an article for the US Chamber of Commerce. He stated clearly: "The next crucial step in the country’s
 economic development —liberalization of the economy from tight central control to a greater reliance on market forces—is
 one which has been accepted in principle and is being pursued as conditionspermit.” (my
 emphasis)


All of this and more (including scans of US declassified documents) is in the Power Point. I encourage people to have a look at the slides. Graduate students on at least four continents have found them useful,
 and I suspect  so will people who were in Gwangju and have long years of experience in Korean studies.


Englsih version: http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf


"Neoliberalism and the Gwangju Uprising," an article published by Harvard's Kennedy School Korea Policy Review is available at: http://eroseffect.com/articles/neoliberalismgwangju.htm


George Katsiaficas

 



From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>Reply-To: Korean
 Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Date: Mon,
 28 Nov 2011 04:00:47 -0800To: "J.Scott Burgeson" <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>,
 Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>Subject: Re:
 [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising




I was in Seoul and Kwangju during that whole period. The U.S. was caught by surprise by the whole thing -- there was no "insistence" on suppressing anything. At the same time, General Wickham made the mistake of rubber-stamping, at the request
 of the ROK military, the transfer of Roh Moo-hyun's 20th division from duty under U.S. command near the DMZ to ROK command in or around Gwangju. Wickham had no idea the ROK would then dispatch special forces to Kwangju to suppress the revolt. Obviously the
 U.S. command, under Wickham, was too close to the ROK command, out of touch with political and social forces and had no clear comprehension of the significance of what it was doing, much less the takeover of Kwangju and mass protest in Seoul, which I witnessed.
 Later, Wickham was unhappy to learn that Chun Doo-hwan (in power but not yet president) used the authorization of transfer to say the U.S. was on his side. 

Don Kirk





--- On Sun, 11/27/11, J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com> wrote:




From: J.Scott Burgeson <jsburgeson at yahoo.com>

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising

To: "Korean Studies Discussion List" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>

Date: Sunday, November 27, 2011, 9:25 PM






From: "Katsiaficas, George"
 <katsiaficasg at wit.edu>



To: Korean
 Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>;
 Balazs Szalontai <aoverl at yahoo.co.uk> 

Sent: Saturday,
 November 26, 2011 11:35 PM

Subject: Re: [KS] U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Uprising






A Power Point precisely on topic, is available at:
http://eroseffect.com/powerpoints/NeoliberalismGwangju.pdf



A main argument, now fairly widely accepted in Korea, is that US insistence on the crushing of the Gwangju Uprising, like its support for the coup in
 Chile in 1973 and in Turkey later in 1980, was aimed at imposition of neoliberal economic policies. 







Did the U.S. really "insist" that the Kwangju Uprising be "crushed"? 



I am by no means an expert on the Kwangju Uprising, but have done enough research and interviewing over the years to know that such irresponsible language is simply not supported by the historical record.



Having previously tussled with Dr. Katsiaficas on this Listserve over the 2008 beef protests, I am all too aware how history can easily be rewritten by individuals with a preexisting ideological framework through which
 to view such events.



I am no fan of the U.S. military-industrial complex nor neoliberalism. However, I think it only fair to note that Dr. Katsiaficas' Power Point presentation relies on selective quotation and time bending to construct
 a narrative that strays dangerously at times into the realm of fiction. I can only imagine how many young students in Korea have seen his presentation, which in its own small way no doubt contributes to more recent phenomena such as the 2008 beef protests.



Brother Anthony has already mentioned independent researcher Matt VanVolkenburg in this thread. I include below the original English-language text of part of an interview I did with him for my 2009 book, "더 발칙한 한국학,"
 if only because it clearly and concisely addresses the issue of U.S. "complicity" in the "crushing" of the Kwangju Uprising, and directly contradicts a number of statements, or really "suggestions" and "innuendoes," made by Dr. Katsiaficas' in his Power Point
 presentation. If nothing else, the presentation should be read by all with a highly skeptical eye.



   --Scott Bug







버거슨:  And what’s your basic position about U.S. involvement, for example? Was the U.S. responsible for it?
매트밴:  Well, you kind of have to look at the micro and macro view. The U.S. probably could have
 done something about 전두환 before it happened, like when he had his coup in December of 1979, but their options then were basically either economic sanctions or military sanctions. But because of the U.S.’s relationship with Korea, especially during the Cold
 War, that was simply never going to happen. From their point of view, they couldn’t possibly use sanctions or do anything that would weaken South Korea, so they just had to allow Chun to do as he pleased – though they did protest along the way. One thing that
 often gets misunderstood is that the paratroopers who were sent to Kwangju – and whose violence set off the Uprising – were never under U.S. control. The Combined Forces Command, which was headed by U.S. General [John A.] Wickham, had no say in how and when
 those troops were used. Before the Kwangju Uprising happened, the U.S. knew that special forces troops were being set aside to be used as reinforcements if student protests got out of hand, but those exact same paratroopers had been used in Busan and Masan
 right before 박정희 was killed. And, I mean, they might have been a bit violent, but no one had died. There was reason to worry, and the U.S. warned them to use “care and restraint” when using these troops, but there was nothing in the past that would have suggested
 the brutality that occurred in Kwangju, which was basically because of completely different orders. In Busan and Masan, they were ordered to just get people off the streets, but in Kwangju they were ordered to capture protesters – to arrest them – which made
 things much more brutal. So the U.S. did not have any control over the troops that were sent in initially, and likely did not realize that there were paratroopers being sent to Kwangju, because the main focus was on what was happening in Seoul. They didn’t
 realize what was happening in Kwangju for quite a while, and didn’t know the enormity of it for several days – it didn’t hit them till quite a bit later.



Another thing worth noting is that the U.S. did not have to approve or disapprove the use of troops under the joint command. They couldn’t “approve” or “disapprove” – they could just “suggest.” “Oh, if you’re going
 to take these troops out, then you should move other troops to replace them.” They did need
 to be notified that they were going to be moved – but they couldn’t approve or disapprove it. But then the problem was that the American Ambassador [William H. Gleysteen, Jr.] didn’t really understand the use of that language, so he did use the word “approve.”
 And a number of other people like in the [U.S.] State Department used it in media releases, which really confused things. Also, the Combined Forces Command was notified on May 16th, two days before the Kwangju Uprising began, that the ROK Army was going to
 remove the 20th Division from CFC control, and the response was, “Your request is approved.” A book I read seized on this response, saying, basically, “See? The U.S. does have to approve everything.” Except
 the problem is that General Wickham was in the U.S. at the time, so it couldn’t have been him – it was his Korean second-in-command, 백석주, who gave the response. As for the U.S. allowing the 20th Division to be
 moved down to Kwangju to end the Uprising, that was a lot of smoke and mirrors on Chun Doo-hwan’s part. The point is, the 20th Division had already been removed from the Combined Forces Command on May 16th, but then Chun still went about and asked if it was
 OK to send them down to Kwangju. He didn’t need to do that – he already had them under his command – but I think he did that to make it look like
 he needed permission. At the same time, the U.S. asked that fliers be printed up and distributed showing the U.S. position, which called for “calm on both sides,” but
 Chun did not distribute them – he instead put out an announcement saying that the U.S. had approved the initial crackdown using the paratroopers.



So I don’t think the U.S. is to blame for the Uprising, or for the brutality of the paratroopers which set off the Uprising. I’d lay responsibility for that at the feet of Chun Doo-hwan. Perhaps they can be criticized
 for not putting more pressure on the Korean military to find a peaceful way to end the Uprising, but at the same time, Chun controlled the press and controlled most of the information coming out of Kwangju, so they may have believed the military’s propaganda
 that these “hooligans are running around and they have guns,” and “Oh my God,” so that lack of information may have played into Chun’s hands. But, still, I don’t think they’re completely blameless, especially in how the U.S. embraced Chun after the Uprising.
 Because of the need for stability, the U.S. made a decision to back Chun Doo-hwan, essentially saying, “In the short term, support, in the longer term, pressure for political evolution.” Much as when they did little but complain to Chun after his coup in December
 of 1979, stability was the most important thing for the U.S. during and after the Kwangju Uprising. So you can certainly criticize that, and many did. For example, Horace G. Underwood III was talking to U.S. Embassy personnel at a meeting in 1980, and saying,
 “Chun is wrapping himself in the American flag, and if the U.S. does not do something about it, the U.S. will have hell to pay in the future.”






























 


















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