[KS] UN in Korea, Korea in VN

[Kent Davy]

They were volunteers, but (in the overwhelming number of cases) they
volunteered for service in their respective country's authorized forces;
(there were volunteers into the forces of countries other than that of the
volunteers' citizenship, e.g., Canadians in the US Forces; but in that case
they still were under the orders of the authorized forces of a combatant
Party).
____________________________________________________________
"The purpose of today's training is to defeat yesterday's understanding."




On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 9:13 PM, Jiyul Kim <jiyulkim at gmail.com> wrote:

>  One more point with regard to "Brian Hwang's Discussion Question" is to
> consider the UN coalition that fought in Korea. With the exception of
> American and British forces, all other units were mad of volunteers. Their
> reasons for volunteering were similar to why Koreans volunteered for
> Vietnam: economic (Europeans in particular were still suffering from the
> impact of WWII), adventure (more common then you think), anti-communism,
> idealism (belief in the UN), and patriotism and sense of duty (support for
> their government). Should we call them "mercenaries?"  This is based on
> recent research on what I call the "Uncommon Coalition."
>
> Jiyul Kim
>
>
> On 4/16/2012 2:02 AM, Kent Davy wrote:
>
> It's certainly not necessarily dispositive, especially considering that
> various countries, including the US have not subscribed to it; but a good
> starting place for any consideration of the issue whether the ROK Forces in
> Vietnam were "mercenaries" is the Geneva Convention. The *Protocol
> Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
> Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts*, (Protocol 1), 8
> June 1977, stipulates in pertinent part as follows:
>
>  Art 47. Mercenaries
>  ... 2. A mercenary is any person who: (a) is especially recruited
> locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in
> fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take
> part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in
> fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material
> compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants
> of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is
> neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
> controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed
> forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State
> which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its
> armed forces.
>  For what it's worth, its quite clear, especially if one parses the
> various components of this protocol, that the ROK soldiers in Vietnam were
> not mercenaries under this international law definition.
>  ____________________________________________________________
>  "The purpose of today's training is to defeat yesterday's understanding."
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 1:26 AM, KimcheeGI <kimcheegi at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> George, Don, Kevin and Brian:
>>
>> Let's also take a look at what the US Army says about the matter of
>> "Mercenary Payments" and economic benefits (From Chapter 4 of Allied
>> Participation in Vietnam<http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch06.htm#b1>by Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier General James
>> Lawton Collins, Jr. 1985):
>>
>>
>>> On 23 June 1965 Defense Minister Kim again met with Commander in Chief,
>>> United Nations Command, this time in the tatter's capacity as Commander, US
>>> Forces, Korea, to discuss the problems connected with the deployment of the
>>> Korean division to Vietnam. Before concrete plans could be drawn up,
>>> however, the Korean Army needed to obtain the approval of the National
>>> Assembly. Although approval was not necessarily automatic, the minister
>>> expected early approval and tentatively established the date of deployment
>>> as either late July or early August 1965.
>>>
>>> The minister desired US agreement to and support of the following items
>>> before submitting the deployment proposal to the National Assembly:
>>>
>>> 1. Maintenance of current US and Korean force ceilings in Korea.
>>> 2. Equipment of the three combat-ready reserve divisions to 100 percent
>>> of the table of equipment allowance and the seventeen regular divisions,
>>> including the Marine division, with major items affecting firepower,
>>> maneuver, and signal capabilities to avoid weakening the Korean defense
>>> posture.
>>>
>>> [124]
>>>
>>>
>>> 3. Maintenance of the same level of Military Assistance Program funding
>>> for Korea as before the deployment of the division.
>>> 4. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac area, command channels, and
>>> logistical support for Korean combat units destined for service in Vietnam.
>>> 5. Establishment of a small planning group to determine the organization
>>> of the Korean division.
>>> 6. Provision of signal equipment for a direct and exclusive
>>> communication net between Korea and Korean forces headquarters in Vietnam.
>>> 7. Provision of transportation for the movement of the Korean division
>>> and for subsequent requirements such as rotation and replacement of
>>> personnel and supplies.
>>> 8. Provision of financial support to Korean units and individuals in
>>> Vietnam, including combat duty pay at the same rate as paid to US
>>> personnel, gratuities and compensations for line-of-duty deaths or
>>> disability, and salaries of Vietnamese indigenous personnel hired by Korean
>>> units.
>>> 9. Provision of four C-123 aircraft for medical evacuation and liaison
>>> between Korea and Vietnam.
>>> 10. Provision of a field broadcasting installation to enable the Korean
>>> division to conduct anti-Communist broadcasts, psychological warfare, and
>>> jamming operations and to provide Korean home news, war news, and
>>> entertainment programs.
>>>
>>>  Some years later, in January 1971, General Dwight E. Beach, who had
>>> succeeded General Howze as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on 1
>>> July 1965, commented on the list.
>>>
>>>
>>>> The initial Korean bill (wish-list) was fantastic. Basically, the ROK
>>>> wanted their troops to receive the same pay as the Americans, all new US
>>>> equipment for deploying troops and modernization of the entire ROK Army,
>>>> Navy and Air Force. I told them with the Ambassador's concurrence that
>>>> their bill was completely unreasonable and there was no chance whatever of
>>>> the US agreeing to it. The final compromise included a very substantial
>>>> increase in pay for the troops deployed, as much good equipment as we could
>>>> then furnish and a US commitment that no US troops would be withdrawn from
>>>> Korea without prior consultation with the ROK. The latter, to the Koreans,
>>>> meant that no US troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval. Obviously,
>>>> the latter was not the case as is now evident with the withdrawal of the
>>>> 7th US Division from Korea.
>>>>
>>>  The US Department of State and Department of Defense ultimately
>>> resolved the matter of the Korean requirements.
>>
>>
>> So as Don mentioned, a form of Overseas Pay was given, but nowhere near
>> what the Korean Government requested or what is whispered in conspiracy
>> theories and in Internet chat rooms as a secret fund:
>>
>>
>>> The request for financial support to Korean units and individuals in
>>> Vietnam met with disapproval. The US commander in Korea did not favor
>>> combat duty pay--especially at the same rate paid to US troops-but was in
>>> agreement with the payment of an overseas allowance. If the United States
>>> had to pay death benefits or make disability payments, the rates should be
>>> those presently established under Korean law on a one-time basis only. The
>>> United States would not pay directly for the employment of Vietnamese
>>> nationals by Korean forces but was in favor of including such expenses in
>>> the agreements between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam.
>>> Since the request for four C-123 aircraft appeared to overlap a previous
>>> transportation request, the commander felt that the United States should
>>> provide only scheduled flights to Korea or reserve spaces on other US
>>> scheduled flights for Korean use.
>>>
>>
>> And for the total cost savings to the Korean Government we can go on:
>>
>>
>>> The United States agreed to suspend the Military Assistance Program
>>> transfer project for as long as the Korean government maintained
>>> substantial forces in Vietnam. The United States also agreed to offshore
>>> procurement from Korea for transfer items such as petroleum, oil,
>>> lubricants, and construction materials listed in the fiscal year 1966
>>> Military Assistance Program. Subsequently, and during the period of the
>>> transfer program, the United States would determine offshore procurement
>>> from Korea on the basis of individual items and under normal offshore
>>> procurement procedures.
>>>
>>> These concessions to the Korean government were made, however, with the
>>> understanding that the *budgetary savings accruing to Korea from the
>>> actions taken would contribute to a substantial military and civil service
>>> pay-raise for Koreans*. Actually, the Korean government would not incur
>>> any additional costs in deploying the division to Vietnam but would secure
>>> a number of economic benefits. On the other hand, the cost to the United
>>> States for Koreans already in Vietnam approximated $2,000,000 annually, and
>>> first year costs for the operation of the Korean division in Vietnam were
>>> estimated at $43,000,000.
>>>
>>   Brian:
>>
>> Also if you can't get to Korea but you can read Korean a good place to
>> start is http://www.vietvet.co.kr/ The Vietnam War and Korea Website.
>> There are many Korean first hand narratives and some are also in English if
>> you follow the links.  But as Don mentioned, the Vietnam War Vets from
>> Korea are a proud bunch, so ask accordingly.
>>
>> Good luck and best wishes in your research endeavors.
>>
>> Charlie,
>> the KimcheeGI
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 15, 2012 at 11:15 PM, Katsiaficas, George <
>> katsiaficasg at wit.edu> wrote:
>> >
>> > The larger context has bearing on your question. The government of
>> South Korea received tremendous economic benefits from the Vietnam
>> War. Park Chung-hee's grandiose scheme to build heavy industry required
>> enormous amounts of money, but he had only limited domestic sources. As
>> much as he squeezed workers and devalued the currency to stimulate exports,
>> he still needed farmore capital. Between 1953 and 1962, US aid funded 70%
>> of Korea’s imports and 80% of its fixed capital investments—about 8% of its
>> GNP.Once the US needed its monies to fight the war in Vietnam, however, it
>> began to cut back. In order to find new international sources of money,
>> Park endorsed a key US proposal: closer ROK ties with Japan. Staunch
>> domestic opposition to normalization prevented a treaty from simply being
>> finalized. On June 3, 1964, Park declared martial law in Seoul and
>> dismissed dozens of professors and students. The US Combined Forces
>> Commander approved the release of two combat divisions to suppress the
>> protests. Despite thousands of students threatening to storm the Blue House
>> (the presidentialresidence), Park rammed the treaty through the rubber
>> stamp legislature of the Third Republic. When the opposition went on a
>> hunger strike to protest the treaty, the ruling party took one minute to
>> ratify it, and at the same time, it also approved sending 20,000 troops to
>> Vietnam to fight on the side of the US. In exchange for normalization of
>> relations, Japan paid $300 million in grants (for which Park indemnified
>> Japan for all its previous actions) and made available another
>> half-a-billion dollars in loans.
>> >
>> > Sensing an opportunity to channel public sentiment against the
>> communist enemy as well as a second avenue to raise capital, Park
>> immediately offered thousands more troops for deployment to Vietnam.
>> Despite scattered student protests, war with Vietnam proved less
>> controversial than his settling of accounts with Japan. Park’s movement of
>> troops was so fast, that according to figures released by the US State
>> Department, there were more South Korean soldiers fighting in southern
>> Vietnam in 1965 than North Vietnamese.[1] South Koreans soldiers were
>> widely reported to be even more brutal than their US counterparts. At the
>> end of 1969, some 48,000 ROK military personnel were stationed in Vietnam,
>> and by the time they completed their withdrawal in 1973, some 300,000
>> veterans had fought there. ROK casualties included 4,960 dead and 10,962
>> wounded. Wars provide experiences for military officers who go on to
>> inflict future casualties. Lieutenant No Ri-Bang served in Jeju in 1948 and
>> went to Vietnam. Future dictators Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo served
>> together in Vietnam, before brutally ruling South Korea after Park’s
>> assassination in 1979.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > The economic benefits of military intervention in Vietnam were
>> extraordinary. From 1965-1970, the South Korean government received $1.1
>> billion in payments—about 7% of GDP and 19% of foreign earnings.[3] More
>> than 80 Korean companies did lucrative business in Vietnam—from
>> transportation to supply, construction to entertainment—from which the
>> country accrued another $1 billion for exports to and services in Vietnam.
>> Secret US bonuses paid to Park’s government for Korean soldiers who fought
>> in Vietnam totaled $185 million from 1965-1973. When we add all these funds
>> to the $1.1 billion in direct payments, the total US allocations to Park’s
>> regime amounted to about 30% of the ROK’s foreign exchange earnings from
>> 1966-1969.[4] Altogether US aid to South Korea totaled $11 billion by
>> 1973—more than to any other country except South Vietnam—some 8% of
>> worldwide US military and foreign monies.[5] Regimes friendly to the US in
>> Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand also benefited greatly from
>> the tidal wave of dollars that flooded the region during the Vietnam War.
>> >
>> >
>> > Excerpted from my book, Asia's Unknown Uprisings: Vol. 1 South Korean
>> Social Movements in the 20th Century
>> >
>> >
>> > George Katsiaficas
>> >
>> >
>> > ________________________________
>> >
>> > [1] See the discussion in the volume I edited, Vietnam Documents:
>> American and Vietnamese Views of the War (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p.
>> 63.
>> >
>> > [2] Chae-Jin Lee, pp. 55, 70.
>> >
>> > [3] Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 321.
>> >
>> > [4] Martin Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.
>> >
>> > [5] Han Sung-joo, “Korean Politics in an International Context,” in
>> Korean National Commission for UNESCO (editor) Korean Politics: Striving
>> for Democracy and Unification (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym, 2002) p. 620.
>> >
>> >
>> > From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com>
>> > Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> > Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 15:04:41 -0700
>> > To: Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>, Korean Studies Discussion
>> List <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> >
>>   > Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
>> >
>> > The question is whether or not they got bonuses in order to "volunteer"
>> for Vietnam. If they got no bonuses, then obviously they wouldn't be
>> "mercenaries." Even if they got bonuses, it would be difficult to pin the
>> mercenary label since soldiers in any army generally get combat pay when
>> fighting overseas. Also, I'm not sure ordinary draftees had any say in
>> where they were sent.
>> >  All told, 300,000 Koreans served in Vietnam over nearly a ten-year
>> period. Five thousand of them were KIA, many more WIA. The White Horse and
>> Tiger divisions were the principal units. Korean special forces were also
>> in Vietnam. Those whom I have met are proud to have served there. Many of
>> them, grizzled old veterans, turn up at demonstrations in Seoul protesting
>> leftist demos, NKorean human rights violations, North Korean dynastic rule
>> etc. They love to wear their old uniforms with ribbons awarded for Vietnam
>> service, including acts of individual heroism.
>> > Some of them also talk quite openly about what they did in Vietnam --
>> and could provide material supporting your thesis re "the type of warfare
>> that they had to fight in Vietnam,
>> > including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare." Strongly suggest you
>> come here and interview some while they're still around. They'd tell you a
>> lot, good and bad. Sorry to say, one of them once boasted to me of a
>> personal "body count" of 300 victims -- would doubt if all of them were
>> "enemy." On the other hand, they were also known for high levels of
>> efficiency and success in their AO's.
>> > Good luck on the project.
>> > Don Kirk
>> >
>> > --- On Sat, 4/14/12, Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > From: Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>
>> > Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
>> > To: "koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> > Date: Saturday, April 14, 2012, 1:40 PM
>> >
>> > I think you will be hard-pressed to justify calling individual soldiers
>> mercenaries - the Korean government may have received funds from the US,
>> but ROK soldiers were drafted into mandatory service. If you come across
>> documentation that individuals volunteered for Vietnam in order to receive
>> funds from the US, please send such documents to me.
>> >
>> > Kevin Shepard, Ph.D.
>> > Strategist
>> > UNC/CFC/USFK
>> > UCJ 5 Strategy Div.
>> >
>> > ________________________________
>> > From: "koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws" <
>> koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws>
>> > To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>> > Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 1:00 AM
>> > Subject: Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9
>> >
>> >
>> > Today's Topics:
>> >
>> >   1. Discussion Question (brianhwang at berkeley.edu)
>> >   2. March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and
>> >       Culture Review" Available Online (Center for Korean Studies)
>> >
>> >
>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> >
>> > Message: 1
>> > Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:15:24 -0700
>> > From: brianhwang at berkeley.edu
>> > To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
>> > Subject: [KS] Discussion Question
>> > Message-ID:
>> >     <7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel at calmail.berkeley.edu>
>> > Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
>> >
>> > Hello all:
>> >
>> > I am a history student at University of California, Berkeley. Currently
>> I
>> > am working on a paper regarding Korean involvement in the Vietnam War.
>> My
>> > argument is that although Korean soldiers were 1) mercenaries (because
>> > they were paid predominantly by US dollars to go) and 2) anti communists
>> > (because of past history), the atrocities that they are accused of
>> > committing are not primarily due to the aforementioned reasons, but
>> > because of the type of warfare that they had to fight in Vietnam,
>> > including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare.
>> >
>> > Do you all think this is a valid argument? Are there any primary sources
>> > that would help me in my argument, including ones that attribute Korean
>> > atrocities to their mercenary and anticommunist nature?
>> >
>> > Thank you!
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > ------------------------------
>> >
>> > Message: 2
>> > Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 11:00:21 -0700
>> > From: "Center for Korean Studies" <cks at berkeley.edu>
>> > To: <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
>> > Subject: [KS] March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History
>> >     and    Culture Review" Available Online
>> > Message-ID: <037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu>
>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>> >
>> > March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture
>> Review" now online
>> >
>> > The second issue of IEAS's new, interactive e-journal "Cross-Currents:
>> East Asian History and Culture Review" is now online. The theme of the
>> March 2012 issue is "Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East Asian
>> History: The Past and Future of the Gaih?zu" (guest edited by K?ren Wigen,
>> professor of History at Stanford). Visit
>> http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2 to read the
>> articles, a review essay written by Timothy Cheek (University of British
>> Columbia) about Ezra Vogel's new book on Deng Xiaoping, and abstracts of
>> important new scholarship in Chinese. The March issue of the e-journal also
>> features a photo essay by Jianhua Gong documenting Shanghai's longtang
>> alleyways.
>> >
>> > A joint enterprise of the Research Institute of Korean Studies at Korea
>> University (RIKS) and the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University
>> of California at Berkeley (IEAS), "Cross-Currents" offers its readers
>> up-to-date research findings, emerging trends, and cutting-edge
>> perspectives concerning East Asian history and culture from scholars in
>> both English-speaking and Asian language-speaking academic communities.
>> >
>> >
>> > * * ** **
>> >
>> >
>> > March 2012 issue of "Cross-Currents" e-journal
>> > (See http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2)
>> >
>> > *Co-Editors' Note*
>> >
>> > Building an Online Community of East Asia Scholars
>> > Sungtaek Cho, Research Institute of Korean Studies (RIKS), Korea
>> University
>> > Wen-hsin Yeh, Institute of East Asian Studies (IEAS), University of
>> California, Berkeley
>> >
>> > *Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East Asian History: The Past and
>> Future of the Gaihozu*
>> >
>> > Introduction to "Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East Asian
>> History: The Past and Future of the Gaihozu"
>> > Guest editor K?ren Wigen, Stanford University
>> >
>> > Japanese Mapping of Asia-Pacific Areas, 1873-1945: An Overview
>> > Shigeru Kobayashi, Osaka University
>> >
>> > Imagining Manmo: Mapping the Russo-Japanese Boundary Agreements in
>> Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, 1907-1915
>> > Yoshihisa T. Matsusaka, Wellesley College
>> >
>> > Triangulating Chosen: Maps, Mapmaking, and the Land Survey in Colonial
>> Korea
>> > David Fedman, Stanford University
>> >
>> > Mapping Economic Development: The South Seas Government and Sugar
>> Production in Japan's South Pacific Mandate, 1919--1941
>> > Ti Ngo, University of California, Berkeley
>> >
>> > *Forum*
>> >
>> > Asian Studies/Global Studies: Transcending Area Studies and Social
>> Sciences
>> > John Lie, University of California, Berkeley/
>> >
>> > Defenders and Conquerors: The Rhetoric of Royal Power in Korean
>> Inscriptions from the Fifth to Seventh Centuries
>> > Hung-gyu Kim, Korea University
>> >
>> > *Review Essays and Notes*
>> >
>> > Of Leaders and Governance: How the Chinese Dragon Got Its Scales
>> > Timothy Cheek, University of British Columbia
>> >
>> > A Note on the 40th Anniversary of Nixon's Visit to China
>> > William C. Kirby, Harvard University
>> >
>> > *Photo Essay*
>> >
>> > "Shanghai Alleyways" by photographer Jianhua Gong
>> > Essay by Xiaoneng Yang, Stanford University
>> >
>> > *Readings from Asia*
>> >
>> > Ge Zhaoguang , Dwelling in the Middle of the Country: Reestablishing
>> Histories of "China" [????:????"??"???]
>> > Abstract by Wennan Liu, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
>> >
>> > Wang Qisheng, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Republican Politics in
>> Social-Cultural Scope [???????????????????]
>> > Abstract by Bin Ye, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>> > End of Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9
>> > *********************************************
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>
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