[KS] UN in Korea, Korea in VN
Jiyul Kim
jiyulkim at gmail.com
Mon Apr 16 08:13:27 EDT 2012
One more point with regard to "Brian Hwang's Discussion Question" is to
consider the UN coalition that fought in Korea. With the exception of
American and British forces, all other units were mad of volunteers.
Their reasons for volunteering were similar to why Koreans volunteered
for Vietnam: economic (Europeans in particular were still suffering from
the impact of WWII), adventure (more common then you think),
anti-communism, idealism (belief in the UN), and patriotism and sense of
duty (support for their government). Should we call them "mercenaries?"
This is based on recent research on what I call the "Uncommon Coalition."
Jiyul Kim
On 4/16/2012 2:02 AM, Kent Davy wrote:
> It's certainly not necessarily dispositive, especially considering
> that various countries, including the US have not subscribed to it;
> but a good starting place for any consideration of the issue whether
> the ROK Forces in Vietnam were "mercenaries" is the Geneva Convention.
> The /Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
> and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
> Conflicts/, (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977, stipulates in pertinent part as
> follows:
>
> Art 47. Mercenaries
>
> ...
> 2. A mercenary is any person who:
>
> (a) is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to
> fight in an armed conflict;
> (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
> (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially
> by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by
> or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation
> substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants
> of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
> (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a
> resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
> (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
> conflict; and
> (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the
> conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
>
> For what it's worth, its quite clear, especially if one parses
> the various components of this protocol, that the ROK soldiers
> in Vietnam were not mercenaries under this international law
> definition.
>
> ____________________________________________________________
>
> "The purpose of today's training is to defeat yesterday's
> understanding."
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 1:26 AM, KimcheeGI <kimcheegi at gmail.com
> <mailto:kimcheegi at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> George, Don, Kevin and Brian:
> Let's also take a look at what the US Army says about the matter
> of "Mercenary Payments" and economic benefits (From Chapter 4 of
> Allied Participation in Vietnam
> <http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/allied/ch06.htm#b1> by
> Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier General
> James Lawton Collins, Jr. 1985):
>
> On 23 June 1965 Defense Minister Kim again met with Commander
> in Chief, United Nations Command, this time in the tatter's
> capacity as Commander, US Forces, Korea, to discuss the
> problems connected with the deployment of the Korean division
> to Vietnam. Before concrete plans could be drawn up, however,
> the Korean Army needed to obtain the approval of the National
> Assembly. Although approval was not necessarily automatic, the
> minister expected early approval and tentatively established
> the date of deployment as either late July or early August 1965.
> The minister desired US agreement to and support of the
> following items before submitting the deployment proposal to
> the National Assembly:
> 1. Maintenance of current US and Korean force ceilings in Korea.
> 2. Equipment of the three combat-ready reserve divisions to
> 100 percent of the table of equipment allowance and the
> seventeen regular divisions, including the Marine division,
> with major items affecting firepower, maneuver, and signal
> capabilities to avoid weakening the Korean defense posture.
> [124]
> 3. Maintenance of the same level of Military Assistance
> Program funding for Korea as before the deployment of the
> division.
> 4. Early confirmation of mission, bivouac area, command
> channels, and logistical support for Korean combat units
> destined for service in Vietnam.
> 5. Establishment of a small planning group to determine the
> organization of the Korean division.
> 6. Provision of signal equipment for a direct and exclusive
> communication net between Korea and Korean forces headquarters
> in Vietnam.
> 7. Provision of transportation for the movement of the Korean
> division and for subsequent requirements such as rotation and
> replacement of personnel and supplies.
> 8. Provision of financial support to Korean units and
> individuals in Vietnam, including combat duty pay at the same
> rate as paid to US personnel, gratuities and compensations for
> line-of-duty deaths or disability, and salaries of Vietnamese
> indigenous personnel hired by Korean units.
> 9. Provision of four C-123 aircraft for medical evacuation and
> liaison between Korea and Vietnam.
> 10. Provision of a field broadcasting installation to enable
> the Korean division to conduct anti-Communist broadcasts,
> psychological warfare, and jamming operations and to provide
> Korean home news, war news, and entertainment programs.
> Some years later, in January 1971, General Dwight E. Beach,
> who had succeeded General Howze as Commander in Chief, United
> Nations Command, on 1 July 1965, commented on the list.
>
> The initial Korean bill (wish-list) was fantastic.
> Basically, the ROK wanted their troops to receive the same
> pay as the Americans, all new US equipment for deploying
> troops and modernization of the entire ROK Army, Navy and
> Air Force. I told them with the Ambassador's concurrence
> that their bill was completely unreasonable and there was
> no chance whatever of the US agreeing to it. The final
> compromise included a very substantial increase in pay for
> the troops deployed, as much good equipment as we could
> then furnish and a US commitment that no US troops would
> be withdrawn from Korea without prior consultation with
> the ROK. The latter, to the Koreans, meant that no US
> troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval. Obviously,
> the latter was not the case as is now evident with the
> withdrawal of the 7th US Division from Korea.
>
> The US Department of State and Department of Defense
> ultimately resolved the matter of the Korean requirements.
>
> So as Don mentioned, a form of Overseas Pay was given, but nowhere
> near what the Korean Government requested or what is whispered in
> conspiracy theories and in Internet chat rooms as a secret fund:
>
> The request for financial support to Korean units and
> individuals in Vietnam met with disapproval. The US commander
> in Korea did not favor combat duty pay--especially at the same
> rate paid to US troops-but was in agreement with the payment
> of an overseas allowance. If the United States had to pay
> death benefits or make disability payments, the rates should
> be those presently established under Korean law on a one-time
> basis only. The United States would not pay directly for the
> employment of Vietnamese nationals by Korean forces but was in
> favor of including such expenses in the agreements between the
> Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the
> request for four C-123 aircraft appeared to overlap a previous
> transportation request, the commander felt that the United
> States should provide only scheduled flights to Korea or
> reserve spaces on other US scheduled flights for Korean use.
>
> And for the total cost savings to the Korean Government we can go on:
>
> The United States agreed to suspend the Military Assistance
> Program transfer project for as long as the Korean government
> maintained substantial forces in Vietnam. The United States
> also agreed to offshore procurement from Korea for transfer
> items such as petroleum, oil, lubricants, and construction
> materials listed in the fiscal year 1966 Military Assistance
> Program. Subsequently, and during the period of the transfer
> program, the United States would determine offshore
> procurement from Korea on the basis of individual items and
> under normal offshore procurement procedures.
>
> These concessions to the Korean government were made, however,
> with the understanding that the */budgetary savings accruing
> to Korea from the actions taken would contribute to a
> substantial military and civil service pay-raise for
> Koreans/*. Actually, the Korean government would not incur any
> additional costs in deploying the division to Vietnam but
> would secure a number of economic benefits. On the other hand,
> the cost to the United States for Koreans already in Vietnam
> approximated $2,000,000 annually, and first year costs for the
> operation of the Korean division in Vietnam were estimated at
> $43,000,000.
>
> Brian:
> Also if you can't get to Korea but you can read Korean a good
> place to start is http://www.vietvet.co.kr/ The Vietnam War and
> Korea Website. There are many Korean first hand narratives and
> some are also in English if you follow the links. But as Don
> mentioned, the Vietnam War Vets from Korea are a proud bunch, so
> ask accordingly.
> Good luck and best wishes in your research endeavors.
> Charlie,
> the KimcheeGI
> On Sun, Apr 15, 2012 at 11:15 PM, Katsiaficas, George
> <katsiaficasg at wit.edu <mailto:katsiaficasg at wit.edu>> wrote:
> >
> > The larger context has bearing on your question. The government
> of South Korea received tremendous economic benefits from the
> Vietnam War. Park Chung-hee's grandiose scheme to build heavy
> industry required enormous amounts of money, but he had only
> limited domestic sources. As much as he squeezed workers and
> devalued the currency to stimulate exports, he still needed
> farmore capital. Between 1953 and 1962, US aid funded 70% of
> Korea’s imports and 80% of its fixed capital investments—about 8%
> of its GNP.Once the US needed its monies to fight the war in
> Vietnam, however, it began to cut back. In order to find new
> international sources of money, Park endorsed a key US proposal:
> closer ROK ties with Japan. Staunch domestic opposition to
> normalization prevented a treaty from simply being finalized. On
> June 3, 1964, Park declared martial law in Seoul and dismissed
> dozens of professors and students. The US Combined Forces
> Commander approved the release of two combat divisions to suppress
> the protests. Despite thousands of students threatening to storm
> the Blue House (the presidentialresidence), Park rammed the treaty
> through the rubber stamp legislature of the Third Republic. When
> the opposition went on a hunger strike to protest the treaty, the
> ruling party took one minute to ratify it, and at the same time,
> it also approved sending 20,000 troops to Vietnam to fight on the
> side of the US. In exchange for normalization of relations, Japan
> paid $300 million in grants (for which Park indemnified Japan for
> all its previous actions) and made available another
> half-a-billion dollars in loans.
> >
> > Sensing an opportunity to channel public sentiment against the
> communist enemy as well as a second avenue to raise capital, Park
> immediately offered thousands more troops for deployment to
> Vietnam. Despite scattered student protests, war with Vietnam
> proved less controversial than his settling of accounts with
> Japan. Park’s movement of troops was so fast, that according to
> figures released by the US State Department, there were more South
> Korean soldiers fighting in southern Vietnam in 1965 than North
> Vietnamese.[1] South Koreans soldiers were widely reported to be
> even more brutal than their US counterparts. At the end of 1969,
> some 48,000 ROK military personnel were stationed in Vietnam, and
> by the time they completed their withdrawal in 1973, some 300,000
> veterans had fought there. ROK casualties included 4,960 dead and
> 10,962 wounded. Wars provide experiences for military officers who
> go on to inflict future casualties. Lieutenant No Ri-Bang served
> in Jeju in 1948 and went to Vietnam. Future dictators Chun Doo
> Hwan and Roh Tae-woo served together in Vietnam, before brutally
> ruling South Korea after Park’s assassination in 1979.
> >
> >
> >
> > The economic benefits of military intervention in Vietnam were
> extraordinary. From 1965-1970, the South Korean government
> received $1.1 billion in payments—about 7% of GDP and 19% of
> foreign earnings.[3] More than 80 Korean companies did lucrative
> business in Vietnam—from transportation to supply, construction to
> entertainment—from which the country accrued another $1 billion
> for exports to and services in Vietnam. Secret US bonuses paid to
> Park’s government for Korean soldiers who fought in Vietnam
> totaled $185 million from 1965-1973. When we add all these funds
> to the $1.1 billion in direct payments, the total US allocations
> to Park’s regime amounted to about 30% of the ROK’s foreign
> exchange earnings from 1966-1969.[4] Altogether US aid to South
> Korea totaled $11 billion by 1973—more than to any other country
> except South Vietnam—some 8% of worldwide US military and foreign
> monies.[5] Regimes friendly to the US in Japan, Taiwan, the
> Philippines, and Thailand also benefited greatly from the tidal
> wave of dollars that flooded the region during the Vietnam War.
> >
> >
> > Excerpted from my book, Asia's Unknown Uprisings: Vol. 1 South
> Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century
> >
> >
> > George Katsiaficas
> >
> >
> > ________________________________
> >
> > [1] See the discussion in the volume I edited, Vietnam
> Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War (Armonk, NY:
> M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 63.
> >
> > [2] Chae-Jin Lee, pp. 55, 70.
> >
> > [3] Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 321.
> >
> > [4] Martin Hart-Landsberg 1993, 147-8.
> >
> > [5] Han Sung-joo, “Korean Politics in an International Context,”
> in Korean National Commission for UNESCO (editor) Korean Politics:
> Striving for Democracy and Unification (Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym,
> 2002) p. 620.
> >
> >
> > From: don kirk <kirkdon at yahoo.com <mailto:kirkdon at yahoo.com>>
> > Reply-To: Korean Studies Discussion List
> <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>>
> > Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 15:04:41 -0700
> > To: Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com
> <mailto:kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>>, Korean Studies Discussion List
> <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>>
> >
> > Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
> >
> > The question is whether or not they got bonuses in order to
> "volunteer" for Vietnam. If they got no bonuses, then obviously
> they wouldn't be "mercenaries." Even if they got bonuses, it would
> be difficult to pin the mercenary label since soldiers in any army
> generally get combat pay when fighting overseas. Also, I'm not
> sure ordinary draftees had any say in where they were sent.
> > All told, 300,000 Koreans served in Vietnam over nearly a
> ten-year period. Five thousand of them were KIA, many more WIA.
> The White Horse and Tiger divisions were the principal units.
> Korean special forces were also in Vietnam. Those whom I have met
> are proud to have served there. Many of them, grizzled old
> veterans, turn up at demonstrations in Seoul protesting leftist
> demos, NKorean human rights violations, North Korean dynastic rule
> etc. They love to wear their old uniforms with ribbons awarded for
> Vietnam service, including acts of individual heroism.
> > Some of them also talk quite openly about what they did in
> Vietnam -- and could provide material supporting your thesis re
> "the type of warfare that they had to fight in Vietnam,
> > including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare." Strongly
> suggest you come here and interview some while they're still
> around. They'd tell you a lot, good and bad. Sorry to say, one of
> them once boasted to me of a personal "body count" of 300 victims
> -- would doubt if all of them were "enemy." On the other hand,
> they were also known for high levels of efficiency and success in
> their AO's.
> > Good luck on the project.
> > Don Kirk
> >
> > --- On Sat, 4/14/12, Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com
> <mailto:kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Kevin Shepard <kevin_shepard at yahoo.com
> <mailto:kevin_shepard at yahoo.com>>
> > Subject: Re: [KS] Brian Hwang's Discussion Question
> > To: "koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
> <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>" <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws
> <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>>
> > Date: Saturday, April 14, 2012, 1:40 PM
> >
> > I think you will be hard-pressed to justify calling individual
> soldiers mercenaries - the Korean government may have received
> funds from the US, but ROK soldiers were drafted into mandatory
> service. If you come across documentation that individuals
> volunteered for Vietnam in order to receive funds from the US,
> please send such documents to me.
> >
> > Kevin Shepard, Ph.D.
> > Strategist
> > UNC/CFC/USFK
> > UCJ 5 Strategy Div.
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: "koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws
> <mailto:koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws>"
> <koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws
> <mailto:koreanstudies-request at koreaweb.ws>>
> > To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
> > Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 1:00 AM
> > Subject: Koreanstudies Digest, Vol 106, Issue 9
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> > 1. Discussion Question (brianhwang at berkeley.edu
> <mailto:brianhwang at berkeley.edu>)
> > 2. March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and
> > Culture Review" Available Online (Center for Korean Studies)
> >
> >
> >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:15:24 -0700
> > From: brianhwang at berkeley.edu <mailto:brianhwang at berkeley.edu>
> > To: koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>
> > Subject: [KS] Discussion Question
> > Message-ID:
> > <7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel at calmail.berkeley.edu
> <mailto:7cb59ce69b486f3c15e6bba3e396a6d4.squirrel at calmail.berkeley.edu>>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8
> >
> > Hello all:
> >
> > I am a history student at University of California, Berkeley.
> Currently I
> > am working on a paper regarding Korean involvement in the
> Vietnam War. My
> > argument is that although Korean soldiers were 1) mercenaries
> (because
> > they were paid predominantly by US dollars to go) and 2) anti
> communists
> > (because of past history), the atrocities that they are accused of
> > committing are not primarily due to the aforementioned reasons, but
> > because of the type of warfare that they had to fight in Vietnam,
> > including guerrilla warfare and civilian warfare.
> >
> > Do you all think this is a valid argument? Are there any primary
> sources
> > that would help me in my argument, including ones that attribute
> Korean
> > atrocities to their mercenary and anticommunist nature?
> >
> > Thank you!
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2012 11:00:21 -0700
> > From: "Center for Korean Studies" <cks at berkeley.edu
> <mailto:cks at berkeley.edu>>
> > To: <koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws <mailto:koreanstudies at koreaweb.ws>>
> > Subject: [KS] March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian
> History
> > and Culture Review" Available Online
> > Message-ID: <037401cd199f$4b410820$e1c31860$@berkeley.edu
> <http://berkeley.edu>>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> >
> > March 2012 Issue of "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and
> Culture Review" now online
> >
> > The second issue of IEAS's new, interactive e-journal
> "Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review" is now
> online. The theme of the March 2012 issue is "Japanese Imperial
> Maps as Sources for East Asian History: The Past and Future of the
> Gaih?zu" (guest edited by K?ren Wigen, professor of History at
> Stanford). Visit
> http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2 to read the
> articles, a review essay written by Timothy Cheek (University of
> British Columbia) about Ezra Vogel's new book on Deng Xiaoping,
> and abstracts of important new scholarship in Chinese. The March
> issue of the e-journal also features a photo essay by Jianhua Gong
> documenting Shanghai's longtang alleyways.
> >
> > A joint enterprise of the Research Institute of Korean Studies
> at Korea University (RIKS) and the Institute of East Asian Studies
> at the University of California at Berkeley (IEAS),
> "Cross-Currents" offers its readers up-to-date research findings,
> emerging trends, and cutting-edge perspectives concerning East
> Asian history and culture from scholars in both English-speaking
> and Asian language-speaking academic communities.
> >
> >
> > * * ** **
> >
> >
> > March 2012 issue of "Cross-Currents" e-journal
> > (See http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-2)
> >
> > *Co-Editors' Note*
> >
> > Building an Online Community of East Asia Scholars
> > Sungtaek Cho, Research Institute of Korean Studies (RIKS), Korea
> University
> > Wen-hsin Yeh, Institute of East Asian Studies (IEAS), University
> of California, Berkeley
> >
> > *Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East Asian History: The
> Past and Future of the Gaihozu*
> >
> > Introduction to "Japanese Imperial Maps as Sources for East
> Asian History: The Past and Future of the Gaihozu"
> > Guest editor K?ren Wigen, Stanford University
> >
> > Japanese Mapping of Asia-Pacific Areas, 1873-1945: An Overview
> > Shigeru Kobayashi, Osaka University
> >
> > Imagining Manmo: Mapping the Russo-Japanese Boundary Agreements
> in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, 1907-1915
> > Yoshihisa T. Matsusaka, Wellesley College
> >
> > Triangulating Chosen: Maps, Mapmaking, and the Land Survey in
> Colonial Korea
> > David Fedman, Stanford University
> >
> > Mapping Economic Development: The South Seas Government and
> Sugar Production in Japan's South Pacific Mandate, 1919--1941
> > Ti Ngo, University of California, Berkeley
> >
> > *Forum*
> >
> > Asian Studies/Global Studies: Transcending Area Studies and
> Social Sciences
> > John Lie, University of California, Berkeley/
> >
> > Defenders and Conquerors: The Rhetoric of Royal Power in Korean
> Inscriptions from the Fifth to Seventh Centuries
> > Hung-gyu Kim, Korea University
> >
> > *Review Essays and Notes*
> >
> > Of Leaders and Governance: How the Chinese Dragon Got Its Scales
> > Timothy Cheek, University of British Columbia
> >
> > A Note on the 40th Anniversary of Nixon's Visit to China
> > William C. Kirby, Harvard University
> >
> > *Photo Essay*
> >
> > "Shanghai Alleyways" by photographer Jianhua Gong
> > Essay by Xiaoneng Yang, Stanford University
> >
> > *Readings from Asia*
> >
> > Ge Zhaoguang , Dwelling in the Middle of the Country:
> Reestablishing Histories of "China" [????:????"??"???]
> > Abstract by Wennan Liu, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
> >
> > Wang Qisheng, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Republican
> Politics in Social-Cultural Scope [???????????????????]
> > Abstract by Bin Ye, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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