[KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and language policy

[Edward Kim]

I am not so sure one can say that 30% of Korea's population was fully fluent in Japanese by 1945.  I would say that the number is closer to 20%, with perhaps 10% more having some functional knowledge of Japanese, but not being fluent or even being able to write the language, per se.


________________________________
 From: "Robinson, Michael E." <robime at indiana.edu>
To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com> 
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2013 11:37 AM
Subject: Re: [KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and language policy
 

I would like to second Ross' argument here.  Yes, one can interpret the data two ways.  The fact remains that retrospective attitudes about whether or not it would be considered a good thing for a good Korean to have learned Japanese colors the interpretation that the language policy failed.  As with much analysis about what the observed facts are about the colonial experience, so much remain captive to a post-1945 mind-set of Korean nationalism.  Realistically, any educated person or any person wanting to participate in modern urban culture/life/work in the colony probably felt it necessary to try to become bilingual, or just absorbed Japanese as a part of living in portions of Korea dominated by Japanese language at the time.  I only might or might not have had something to do with one's ethnic/national identification.  

Mike Robinson

-----Original Message-----
From: Koreanstudies [mailto:koreanstudies-bounces at koreanstudies.com] On Behalf Of King, Ross
Sent: Friday, October 25, 2013 12:38 PM
To: Korean Studies Discussion List; Balazs Szalontai
Subject: [KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and language policy

I was pleased to see Balazs Szalontai raise the issue of language and assimilation/colonialism, but wanted to add a footnote. 

Most Korean sources (and western sources following them) tend to emphasize that Japanese language spread policy (kokugo education, etc.) had little impact long-term effect in Korea, and typically trot out the same colonial government statistics about kokugo proficiency over the years. 

Such accounts remind readers that by 1932, less than 10% of Korean knew Japanese, that by 1942 the percentage had climbed to 19.9%, and that by 1945 it was close to 30%. They invariably conclude that, by the time of Liberation, "overall 'barely 30%' of Koreans" had proficiency in kokugo (however defined) and that kokugo penetration therefore always remained at a low level. 

I would point out, though, that this is bizarre reasoning. If, in the short space of less than 50 years (being generous with when kokugo education starts), as many as 30% of the population had some sort of proficiency in Japanese, and that very 30% comprised the overwhelming bulk of the urban population and the educated class, and if by that point inter-translatability between Korean and Japanese had reached the point where public posters and documents were all being printed in essentially bilingual format, with all shared content words in kanji and only noun particles and verb endings written in smaller print side-by-side on the assumption that most intellectual vocabulary was shared between Japanese and Korean (kanji-based following Japanese wasei kango models), that to my mind bespeaks a _phenomenally_ 'successful' language spread policy. Moreover, its legacies (linguistic and otherwise) ran and run deep to this day. 

So my point is that while most Korean accounts are eager to dismiss Japanese colonial language policy as somehow a foolhardy and failed enterprise insofar as spreading kokugo was concerned, I think the evidence can be read in quite the opposite way. Are there any other historical examples on record where the metropole has succeeded within 50 years of getting as much as 30% of the colonized populace to read, speak and write its language?

Ross King
Professor of Korean and Head of Department Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia Asian Centre, 1871 West Mall Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
vox: 604-822-2835
fax: 604-822-8937
ross.king at ubc.ca
________________________________________
From: Koreanstudies [koreanstudies-bounces at koreanstudies.com] on behalf of Lionel Babicz [lionel.babicz at gmail.com]
Sent: October-25-13 2:11 AM
To: Balazs Szalontai; Korean Studies Discussion List
Subject: Re: [KS] Japan-Korea,  France-Algeria: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism

Thank you for your kind words and helpful remarks, Balasz.

The language issue is indeed very important, and should be part of the comparison. It is well-known that the Japanese tried actively to suppress the use of the Korean language. As for the French, they tried to impose the French language upon their colonial subjects through the education system, and the word "francophonie" was coined in 1880 by Onésime Reclus, an enthusiast supporter of imperial expansion. As for the results, I agree with you that the time factor must have played here an important role.

It is also exact that the existence of two Koreas complicated the postcolonial relationship. We can clearly see this in the 1965 Japan-ROK normalisation, when Japan was reluctant to recognise ROK sovereignty on the whole peninsula, and wished to leave the door open for eventual negotiations with the North.

As for the length of the normalisation talks, it was certainly due, as you point out, to the Rhee LIne issue, and also to other factors, such as insensitive Japanese comments on the benefits the Japanese colonial rule, made at the beginning of the talks. Yet, I still think one of the main factors was a general Japanese indifference toward the Korean peninsula. I realise I should have added here a reference, as these remarks are based on a Japanese book by Chung Daekyun, "Kankoku no Imeji" (The image of Korea) (Chuko Shinsho, 1995).

Lionel



On 23/10/2013, at 2:23 PM, Balazs Szalontai wrote:

Dear Professor Babicz,

thanks a lot for sending us your illuminative article! I certainly agree with the view that the French-Algerian relationship was one of the closest analogy to the colonial and post-colonial Japanese-Korean relationship. The specific elements of similarity, as highlighted by the article, were well selected, all the more so because they help to explain why the trauma of the colonial past still affects Japanese-Korean and French-Algerian relations. For instance, the factors of geographical closeness and persistent economic interdependence clearly distinguish these two cases from, say, the relationship between Britain and Burma, which had been extremely traumatic for the Burmese in the colonial era but became fairly cordial by the 1970s. Still, I am inclined to think that the article might have devoted more attention to a few major differences between the two cases:

(1) The relative significance of the metropolitan language in the post-colonial countries. In colonial Algeria, French became so prominent in educated circles that even some of the nationalist FLN leaders, most notably Ahmed Ben Bella, found it easier to speak French than standard Arabic. In independent Algeria, the governments made great efforts to implement Arabization in the field of education, culture, and administration, but a good command of French is still more or less a sine qua non for those Algerians who seek to obtain a highly qualified position. Resentment against the underprivileged position of non-francophones was often intertwined with social and political protest, as one could observe in the emergence of FIS. Despite the Japanese policy of naisen ittai, Japanese language did not acquire such prominence in Korea, either in the Korean nationalist movement or in post-colonial society. The time factor, which is correctly emphasized by the
 author, must have played an important role in this difference.

(2) The existence of two competing Korean national governments greatly complicated Japan's relations with post-colonial Korea, and so did the post-1952 territorial dispute. These problems had no analogies in French-Algerian relations. Specifically, I am inclined to disagree with the following statement: "Incidents directly involving Japan - such as the capture of fishing boats that entered Korean waters - aroused only indifference among the general public. This disinterest helps explain why the conversations toward a normalisation of relations, which opened in 1951, concluded only in 1965." Actually, Japanese-South Korean talks started as early as 1948-50, at which time Syngman Rhee visited Japan twice, but the issue of the "Rhee line" created a new and definitely serious obstacle. It was far more because of these conflicts than because of indifference that normalization was postponed until 1965.

With best regards,
Balazs Szalontai
Kwangwoon University, Seoul


________________________________
From: Julien Mahuzier <julien.mahuzier at gmail.com<mailto:julien.mahuzier at gmail.com>>
To: Korean Studies Discussion List <koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com<mailto:koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com>>
Sent: Tuesday, 22 October 2013, 22:43
Subject: Re: [KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism

Dear professor Babicz,

Thanks for the article, the comparison is extremely relevant and interesting. Through your researches, have you, by any chances, stumbled upon similar comparisons with regards to the policies of "economic development" (infrastructures built with underlying purposes and industrialization, notably) implemented by the colonizing powers?

Sincerely,

Julien


On 22 October 2013 14:23, Lionel Babicz <lionel.babicz at gmail.com<mailto:lionel.babicz at gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear list members,

You may be interested  in my latest article in Japanese Studies 'Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism.'

It has been chosen by Routledge as the free featured article of the issue, and can be accessed through this page:
http://tandf.msgfocus.com/q/17KQ865XUxlx6R3nxjfs8c/wv

Lionel Babicz
The University of Sydney
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