[KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and language policy

Balazs Szalontai aoverl at yahoo.co.uk
Sat Oct 26 21:11:53 EDT 2013


Dear Frank,

I think we are somewhat missing each other's messages. What I wanted like to stress is that in post-colonial Korea, aversion to metropolitan cultural and linguistic influence seems to have been longer and more pronounced than in most other post-colonial societies in Asia (and elsewhere). The first comparison was with Algeria, following Dr. Babicz's lead. One cannot really see in post-colonial Korea that wide social strata cannot expect a successful career if they are not fluent in Japanese, and that the government unsuccessfully tries to introduce wholesale Koreanization in education and administration. The second was with Taiwan. I fully agree with the point that in the colonial era, Taiwan also experienced resistance. What I meant by "softened" reaction was that the post-colonial authorities seem not to have pursued such a systematic policy to bar the import of Japanese culture as their South Korean counterparts (though I might be mistaken). Of course,
 this may have been caused by other factors than the identity question. For instance, the ROC could not really afford to alienate Japan, having faced far more formidable diplomatic competition for Japanese favors from the PRC than the ROK from the DPRK.  


All the best,
Balazs  



>________________________________
> From: Frank Hoffmann <hoffmann at koreanstudies.com>
>To: koreanstudies at koreanstudies.com 
>Sent: Sunday, 27 October 2013, 2:16
>Subject: Re: [KS] Japan-Korea, France-Algeria: Colonialism and language policy
> 
>
>Dear Balazs:
>
>Two things, very short:
>
>1. We do not necessarily always have to understand similar developments 
>as a kind of "copy" of some model. After all we do talk about the same 
>wider East Asian cultural and historical Sino-centric world here that 
>both Korea and Japan belonged to. The Koreans were certainly inspired 
>by the Meiji period reforms, no doubt. But then, given the similar 
>cultural past, and also given that, when talking about cultural purism, 
>which I just called the lowest common denominator model, we may see the 
>very point that this was an easy step! That cannot be compared with the 
>adaptation of a far more complicated political model such as Marxism 
>with its theories about society and economics (and culture), that a man 
>like Kim Il Sung seems not to have understood until long after he was 
>in power. It really just does not "take much" to get to what you call 
>cultural purism.
>
>2. You just wrote:
>> I wonder if it was Taiwan's more ambiguous identity/identities 
>> (Chinese? or Taiwanese? or Fujianese/Hakka?) that somehow "softened" 
>> Taiwanese emotional reactions to naisen ittai. 
>
>I doubt that this statement about a "softened" Taiwanese reaction can 
>factually be sustained. Taiwanese history may not be very well known in 
>Korea. But I see no such "softened" Taiwanese reaction -- what I see is 
>the same fights, resistance, and collaboration issues as in Korea. 
>Except, Taiwan is an island with no Manchuria or Russian Far East in 
>the neighborhood where resistance troops could operate from or flee to 
>for a hiding, or where they could create an alternative system and 
>culture, more or less independent communities (so it was easier for the 
>Japanese to control). ... And also, the differences I was talking about 
>in my last message was more with those South East Asian countries in 
>mind that had been British or French colonies. Books hardly make you/us 
>understand these differences, but once we see how people talk about the 
>colonial period and their own part in it, then there is a huge 
>difference there. 
>
>Best,
>Frank
>
>
>
>On Sat, 26 Oct 2013 17:48:03 +0100 (BST), Balazs Szalontai wrote:
>> Dear Frank,
>> 
>> I certainly agree with most of your observations, particularly with 
>> regard to Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Still, I think that we should 
>> distinguish between the various phases of Japanese cultural influence 
>> in Korea. Your model is fully applicable not only to the 1880s and 
>> 1890s (with Kim Ok-kyun as a notable example) but also to the 
>> "cultural policy" in the 1920s. 1937-45 is another matter, however. 
>> In my opinion, the Japanese cultural impact that Korean society 
>> encountered in these periods probably would not have triggered a 
>> long-term policy of cultural purism, but the policy of naisen ittai 
>> did (see South Korea's official import ban on Japanese films, pop 
>> music, etc., which persisted until 1998, and which had no real 
>> equivalent in other post-colonial countries in Asia). I wonder if it 
>> was Taiwan's more ambiguous identity/identities (Chinese? or 
>> Taiwanese? or Fujianese/Hakka?) that somehow "softened" Taiwanese 
>> emotional reactions to naisen ittai.  
>> 
>> All the best,
>> Balazs Szalontai
>> 
>> 
>
>--------------------------------------
>Frank Hoffmann
>http://koreanstudies.com
>
>
>
>
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