[KS] Varieties and taxonomy of evolving Korean (post-)nationalisms

[Afostercarter at aol.com]

Many thanks for these very helpful  responses.
 
The article below is useful too; although it  still
leaves me in some confusionism as to what  exactly
is new, or post-, about the 'new' Korean  nationalism(s).
 
cheers
Aidan
 
 
AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER 
Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Sociology & Modern  Korea, Leeds 
University  
Home  address: 17 Birklands Road, Shipley, West Yorkshire,  BD18 3BY, UK  
tel: +44(0)  1274  588586         (alt) +44(0) 1264 737634          mobile:  
+44(0)  7970  741307   
fax: +44(0)  1274  773663         ISDN:   +44(0)   1274  589280 
Email: _afostercarter at aol.com_ (mailto:afostercarter at aol.com)      (alt) 
_afostercarter at yahoo.com_ (mailto:afostercarter at yahoo.com)       website: 
_www.aidanfc.net_ (http://www.aidanfc.net/)  
[Please use @aol; but if  any problems, please try @yahoo too – and let me 
know, so I can chide  AOL] 

_________________________________________
 
_http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/shinsedae-conservati
ve-attitudes-of-a-new-generation-in-south-korea-and-the-impact-on-the-korean-p
residential-election/_ 
(http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/shinsedae-conservative-attitudes-of-a-new-generation-in-south-korea-and-the
-impact-on-the-korean-presidential-election/) 
 
 
Shinsedae: Conservative Attitudes of a  ‘New Generation’ in South Korea and 
the Impact on the Korean Presidential  Election

The East-West Wire is a news, commentary and analysis service  provided by 
the East-West Center in Honolulu. Any part or all of the Wire  content may be 
used by media with attribution to the East-West Center or the  person quoted. To 
receive the East-West Center Wire, please contact Karen  Knudsen at (808) 
944-7195 or _EastWestWire at EastWestCenter.org_ 
(mailto:EastWestWire at EastWestCenter.org) .  
East-West Center Insights is a forum  that provides East-West Center staff, 
seminar participants, visiting fellows,  speakers and degree fellows the 
opportunity to reflect on issues beyond the  headlines. As with all material 
distributed on the East-West Wire,  Insights commentaries may be used by journalists, 
policymakers and  academics interested in the subject. This Insights was 
written by Park  Sun-Young, a journalist on the International Affairs Desk at 
Hankook  Ilbo in Seoul, South Korea. She delivered this presentation at an 
East-West  Center Seminar held in Honolulu in June 2007.  It was translated from  
Korean into English for this publication.     

By Park Sun-Young, International Affairs Desk, Hankook  Ilbo


HONOLULU (Sept. 5) -- Who are the new generation  called Shinsedae? Since the 
early 1990s the term Shinsedae, which means “new generation” in Korean, has 
come to be used to refer to a  specific group of people in Korean society. 
Though there were other terms for  this new or younger generation -- such as the 
X-generation and the N-generation  -- they all share a common denominator of 
being the “post-386 generation,” which  means they are free from ideological 
or political bias.

The “386  generation,” named after 386 computers, was coined in the 1990s to 
describe  those in their late 30s and 40s who were “born in the 1960s and 
attended  university in the 1980s.” It is the 386 generation who spent most of 
their youth  fighting for democracy under authoritarian rule and who had a 
shared  generational experience and culture for the first time in Korean history. 
They  are now in decision-making positions in all fields, including political,  
economic, social and cultural areas. The 386 generation will go down in 
history  as a very active and passionate group of people who toppled a military  
dictatorship of more than three decades and built democracy in Korea.

The  1990s was an era of a widening generation gap. Farewell to ideology, a 
new  generation emerged – a generation that is heavily immersed in consumption. 
This  group of Koreans was born during a time of rapid economic growth, spent 
their  childhood in a prosperous environment and experienced the 1997 Asian 
financial  crisis. They are substantial beneficiaries of the nation’s 
democracy, which was  achieved by the blood, sweat and tears of the 386 generation. And 
they are the  first generation who went abroad for travel and study with the 
liberalization of  overseas travel and the advent of an era of information and 
communications.  

Unlike the 386 generation who fought for democratization and ideological  
issues, what worries this new generation most is the high unemployment of  
university graduates. While the 386 generation enjoyed a booming economy with  
plenty of jobs available, the new generation is struggling with unemployment and  
riding the tide of “fierce competition.”

When Korea was hit by the Asian  financial crisis, they were in high school 
or college. Raised in an affluent  society with full access to the Internet, 
this new generation witnessed their  fathers being kicked out of jobs and their 
families collapsing. After having to  submit resumes without success, they 
have faced the grim reality that getting a  job is crucial but never easy. The 
Asian financial crisis changed the mindset of  this new generation in Korea to 
put the economy before anything else.

A  series of events, such as the Asian financial crisis, the 2002 World Cup 
where  the Korean national soccer team reached the Final Four and the 
candlelight vigil  after two middle school girls were killed by a U.S. Forces Korea 
military  armored vehicle, clearly demonstrated the identity of the younger 
generation.  These young people, who are open-minded, practical and confident, are 
often  indifferent to politics. 

Conservative Shinsedae and  post ideology

Traditionally, the younger generation represented  by college students was 
considered to be liberal and progressive. Yet the long  belief that college 
students are always progressive has collapsed. According to  a joint survey by the 
Hankook Ilbo and school newspapers at Seoul  National University, Yonsei 
University, Korea University and Ewha Women’s  University conducted with 1,089 
university students, more respondents answered  they are conservative than 
replied they are liberal, 23% to 21%. While a  majority responded they are moderate, 
on the question of whether to participate  in a democratic movement if they 
were in a situation where there was a  democratic movement as in June 1987, 
more than 60% of the respondents answered  “no,” showing a significant setback 
in participation of the younger generation  in social issues.

Although it is said that being rebellious is a  privilege of youth, the 
younger they are, the more conservative they seem to be  in Korea at the moment. 
According to the survey conducted by the Korea Society  Opinion Institute last 
November, more respondents in their early 20s regarded  themselves as 
conservative than respondents in their late 20s.

The  conservative attitude of the new generation is also apparent in their 
changing  preference for political parties. The Woori Party has lost the support 
of voters  in their 20s. Since 2004 support fell about 18% to a support rate 
of just over  21% in 2006. In the meantime, the approval rating of the Grand 
National Party  (GNP) rose in 2006, with almost one-quarter of the younger 
generation favoring  the party.  

In fact, the support gap between the two parties  appears to be wider with 
university students. In a poll conducted with 1,925  college students across the 
country by Campus Plus, a monthly magazine  for college students, more than 
one-third of those polled favored the GNP by a  big margin. The Woori Party 
received less than 10 percent support and the Korea  Democratic Labor Party less 
than 5 percent.

Moreover, Lee Myung-bak, the  former Seoul mayor, took the lead among all 
presidential candidates by garnering  support from more than half of the students 
polled. Trailing behind were former  GNP chairwoman Park Geun-hye (15.8%) and 
Sohn Hak-kyu (14.5%), who has recently  withdrawn from the GNP.

As unemployment among the young has emerged as a  core problem in Korea, what 
matters most to this generation is economic  wellbeing. Now, their slogan is: 
“It’s the economy, Stupid.” According to a  survey conducted by the 
Federation of Korea Trade Unions, seven out of ten  university students surveyed 
support capitalism. In a poll conducted by the  University News Network, students 
said they value economic growth more than  narrowing down disparity in wealth, 
which is quite a different opinion from that  of the 386 generation.

Practical  nationalism

Shinsedae, the new  generation, would go to McDonald’s for hamburgers after 
burning the U.S. flag at  a candlelight vigil in a protest against America. 
They do not think it is  contradictory to accept the American culture on one 
hand, while claiming to  condemn a U.S. action. These young people, the first 
beneficiaries of  globalization in Korea, have strong confidence and pride in 
their country,  especially after the Korean national soccer team performance in 
the 2002 World  Cup and with overseas travel and study much more common. 

Their version  of nationalism -- which is based on the belief that Korea is 
not inferior  whatsoever to the United States or Japan -- is fundamentally 
different from the  nationalism of past generations with vestiges of Japanese 
colonial rule of  Korea. 

Here we can see the emergence of “confident nationalism” for the  first time 
in Korea, strikingly different from the previous “resistant  nationalism.” 
Hence, it may not be an exaggeration to call this new generation  full of 
national pride, “the new people” or “the new race.”

Yet to these  young people, nationalism never takes precedence over their 
pursuit of pragmatic  interest, meaning they become nationalistic only when it 
serves their interest.  If there is a conflict between nationalism and 
pragmatism, the former never  trumps the latter. Such a tendency is even more visible 
when it comes to North  Korean issues. According to a survey conducted by the 
Chosun Daily in  August 2005 with 813 young people, when asked the question 
about which side to  support if a war breaks out between Washington and 
Pyongyang, close to  two-thirds of respondents said they will support North Korea, 
while less than  one-third answered they will be on the U.S. side. The survey 
suggests that young  people today no longer view North Korea as an enemy or a 
competitor.  

However, when asked if they are willing to bear the cost and burden for  
reunification, the responses turned negative. The students said it is desirable  
for the two Koreas to be unified only without sacrifice from their side. A  
survey of university students in January of this year showed barely a fifth of  
the respondents think unification is an urgent matter that should be pursued at 
 the expense of national interest. Almost 80% of students either answered  
unification should take place cautiously to avoid any kind of setback and  
negative impact on the national economy or preferred remaining divided.  

The new generation tends to be fiercely nationalistic particularly  toward 
events combined with sports or the Internet. As seen in the cases of  China’s 
distortion of Northeast Asia history, Japan’s claim of sovereignty over  Dokdo 
islet and whitewashing of history textbooks, and the tragic death of two  
school girls by a U.S. army vehicle in 2002, Internet-savvy young people  exploded 
with rage and shared and spread their nationalistic messages by  leveraging 
the Internet. Global sporting events such as the World Cup and the  Olympics 
have also witnessed how patriotism of these confident young people  turned to 
nationalism.

Still they express nationalism only when it suits  their pragmatic interests. 
To them, economy and culture are major drivers to go  nationalistic. A key 
example is their shifting support from a traditional ally,  the United States, 
to a rapidly emerging China. When asked which nation will  help the development 
of Korea most a decade down the road, twice as many  university students said 
China will be more helpful than the United States,  according to a survey by 
the Korea Economic Daily. The survey also  showed that almost twice the number 
of respondents answered they have become  increasingly favorable to China, 
compared to the number  expressing their  growing preference towards the United 
States. 

A survey conducted by the  Chosun Daily also showed that more than a third of 
this new generation  has a positive impression of Japan, often associating it 
with its computer games  and comic strips. With regard to the question of 
where they want to immigrate or  work, apart from Korea, Australia was ranked 
first, followed by the U.S. and  Japan, respectively.

Politics as a Product, New Generation as  Consumers

The new generation does not show a consistent tendency  of liberalism or 
conservatism. Rather to those young people who increasingly go  global and 
digital, all issues are intertwined between individuals and society,  production and 
consumption, and politics and personal life, which lead to more  complicated 
patterns regarding their stance and beliefs. 

The same goes  for their political attitudes. Most of them are apathetic 
toward politics, yet  actively participate in political events. They don’t read 
newspapers but are  intensely interested in contacting and building relations 
with politicians  through their mini homepages and the Internet. To them, 
politicians are just  celebrities to take photos with when they bump into them on 
the street. Truly,  we are now living in an era where politics has become a kind 
of product or  entertainment. 

Then, which presidential candidate will have the greatest  value as a 
product? According to a survey conducted by Campus Plus,  two-thirds of respondents 
selected the “strong drive” of candidates as an  important factor in deciding 
whom to vote for. Much less important were  morality, previous achievements 
and political affiliation, which ranked at the  bottom, which again demonstrates 
their ideology-free pragmatism. 

Those  aged between 26 and 35, also known as the “2635 Generation,” 
represent 17% of  the national population and 24% of the working population, which 
indicates the  strong influence they will have in the next presidential election. 
Between older  conservative people or those over 46 and the progressive 386 
generation between  ages 36 and 45, this 2635 generation will hold a deciding 
vote. Even though they  are more conservative, it doesn’t mean more votes to a 
conservative party since  they are indifferent to politics. During the 2002 
presidential election, only  about 57% of these young people turned out to vote 
despite their strong craze  over then presidential candidate, Roh Mu-hyun. 

Stronger conservatism of  this generation will be a benefit to the Grand 
National Party. With the next  presidential election only six months away, the GNP 
is now cementing its solid  basis for victory. Candidates enjoying high 
popularity among the public are all  members of the GNP, whereas the ruling party 
has not even come up with  candidates who are able to compete with them. Worse, 
taking into consideration  serious public disappointment over the current 
administration and extreme  fatigue against reform efforts and progressivism, it 
may be difficult to expect  any sudden changes as were seen in the 2002 
presidential election. 

That  said, there is still room for unexpected changes in votes among the new 
 generation in the election slated for December 19. That may hinge on the 
image  of candidates. 

As seen by surveys cited above, young people put personal  image over 
political ideology or political party affiliation when deciding whom  to vote for. 
Not only in politics but in commercial arenas, image now  constitutes an 
important value that drives the sales of products. That leads us  to predict heated 
cyber campaigns and promotions to win the hearts and minds of  the younger 
generation during the next election. Yet, building an image that  meets the 
pragmatic desire of the new generation will require more than  fine-sounding 
rhetoric, especially after the serious disillusionment of voters  who followed image 
and rhetoric in deciding their votes in the election of 2002.  

Park Sun-Young is a staff reporter on the International Affairs Desk  at 
Hankook Ilbo in Seoul, South Korea. She has mainly covered Korean ministries  and 
government agencies during her reporting career at the newspaper, including  
the National Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Government 
Administration,  the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the Ministry of Gender and Family. 
She has  also written news articles on film and literature. 

Currently Ms. Park  covers international news, focusing mainly on foreign 
affairs and national  security. She writes articles on the politics of North 
America, South America  and Europe. She delivered this presentation on the “new 
generation” in South  Korea during the “Northeast Asia Journalists Dialogue: 
Meeting Regional  Challenges in the Media,” an East-West Center Seminar held in 
Honolulu in June  2007.  It was translated from Korean into English for this  
publication.     


A PDF version of this  INSIGHTS commentary is available at:  
_www.eastwestcenter.org/pubs/2229_ 
(http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/shinsedae-conservative-attitudes-of-a-new-generation-in-south-korea-and-the-impa
ct-on-the-korean-presidential-election/pubs/2229) 


The  East-West Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous and just Asia 
Pacific  community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, 
education and  dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific 
region and the  United States. 


For daily news on the Pacific Islands, see _www.pireport.org_ 
(http://www.pireport.org/) . For links to all East-West Center  media programs, fellowships 
and services, see  
_www.eastwestcenter.org/seminars-and-journalism-fellowships/journalism-fellowships/_ (http://www.eastwestcenter.o
rg/seminars-and-journalism-fellowships/journalism-fellowships/)  
 
______________________
 
In a message dated 06/09/2007 01:19:48 GMT Standard Time,  
hoffmann at koreaweb.ws writes:

Yes, this is an interesting topic, and that short newspaper article you  
quote seems right on, at first sight:


Quote from that article:
  "As far as large social  currents are concerned, it's clear that both 
intellectuals and  the
  general public are now  moving from leftwing nationalism to rightwing 
post-nationalism,²
  Kim Ho-ki  said.


It is a newspaper article, after all -- and I am not too sure any of the  
mentioned scholars mentioned in there (some are on this list) would be very  
happy with the markers given to them. The terminology being used seems  somewhat 
trivialized, or popularized, if you like that term better.  "Post-nationalism" 
is of course closely related to globalization.  Globalization, however, is in 
Korean newspapers, magazines, and the general  public being used to equal 
something like "having international trade  relations with nations around the 
world." It is exactly this trivialized  version of the term that makes it so 
tremendously popular in Korea. Going from  here I see that many of these newspaper 
debates that one way or the other  relate to globalization are often hard to 
understand if these specific Korean  definitions of such terms are not being 
considered as what they really mean. I  don't think that "post-nationalism" in 
that article is indeed the same  "post-nationalism" that Carter Eckert talks 
about in the chapter Will Pore  mentioned.


"Rightwing post-nationalism" seems particular problematic. That quote  
somehow indicates that there is no leftwing or liberal post-nationalism, and  that 
post-nationalism is a 'rightwing' political affair. That's where the  entire 
statement stops to make sense to me, and I understand why you say that  such 
articles are frustrating. You probably know the book _Empire_, a  publication by 
Harvard U Press (2000), by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.  Negri, an Italian 
philosophy professor and former colleague of Derrida,  Foucault and Deleuze 
at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, but  also a terrorist and 
member of the Red Brigates who spent a long prison for  his involvement in 
the Aldo Moro assassination, collaborted with his former  student Michael Hardt, 
now teaching at Duke U., on redefining globalization.  One of the main points 
that the authors make is that there is no right or left  anymore. 
Globalization and post-nationalism are in Negri's and Hardt's  analysis not right or 
left, and they are not something that create a  right-wing or neoliberal world 
either. (For a good summary and longer review  see: 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000717/aronowitz.) The old terms of right  and left have stopped to apply in 
this new reality. It just is not very  helpful to use these terms anymore. 
Such newspaper and magazine articles  certainly show the amazing appetite to use 
hip language. I understand. We all  wanna be hip.


Frank      








-- 

--------------------------------------
Frank  Hoffmann
http://koreaweb.ws




 
Aidan



   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://koreanstudies.com/pipermail/koreanstudies_koreanstudies.com/attachments/20070906/9b365fa4/attachment.html>