[KS] FW: South Korea's Rollback of Democratic Rights

[Jim Thomas]

Dear All,
 Having been cited in a recent thread by Frank, I feel compelled to to offer my two cents worth--or ten cents worth, as the case may be.
 
Vladamir writes: "I was myself a sort of observer-participant in an anti-beef demo in July 
last year, while majority of my Korean friends participated for 
sustained periods of time. One thing I really was impressed was the 
degree to which the absolute majority of the demonstrators were acutely 
aware of the detrimental character of the anti-police violence above the 
level of simple self-defense. Almost every time somebody tried, for 
example, to beat up an isolated riot policeman, it usually was stopped 
by loud cries of "Pip'ongnyOk!" (Non-violence!) from all the sides." 
   Based on my own first-hand observations, I concur 100% with Vladamir's account of these demonstrations.
 
Scott asks: "How long must one live within another culture before one is allowed to have an "autonomous" voice that is able to engage within local discourses and debates?"
   Through my experience in Korea and elsewhere (including in political actions I have been involved with in Berkeley and elsewhere), I have come to expect little or no allowance for "autonomous" voices in such debates and political struggles. In political engagements in Korea, those who are conspicuously non-Korean are generally lumped together as "Americans" or "foreigners," and not taken very seriously--unless they reiterate the nationalist cause.  
 
And "Doesn't the South Korean government itself claim to welcome the development of contemporary South Korea as a "multicultural society"?" 
  Surely, we cannot take this at face value--LMB Inc. is playing lip service to "multiculturalism" as a means of putting a positive spin on its neo-liberal programs and agenda.
 
Scott: "I understand why certain Western intellectuals would be disposed to defend last year's protests here, and even serve as apologists for them in extreme cases, but I wonder how useful or productive such an approach really is. In order for South Korea's progressive social movements to advance forward and further develop here, surely they should welcome debate from all sides and address inconsistencies were they are pointed out. For example, a central trope of the protesters was to safeguard "democracy" and "freedom of speech," and yet those with differing viewpoints were often silenced either verbally or physically by these same progressive groups."   
   Having attended the candle light demonstrations last June and having followed Korean politics for some 30 years now, I must say that I count myself among those "certain Western intellectuals" and "apologists" who are "disposed to defend" those political actions. I have seen dissenting women students' voices being drowned out by the majority at a womens college in the late 1980s. And I in the Anti-Apartheid divestment campaign of the mid 1980s in Berkeley and Santa Cruz, I myself was drowned out as a "dissenting voice." This is the nature of political actions and movements. It is unfortunate, but it should not be the basis to discredit the movement as a whole. 
   Having seen the effects of confrontation between police and citizens in the late 1980s, I was in fact hopeful during the candlelight vigil that "something would happen." That is, some action (by demonstrators or the riot police) would take place that might lead to change of or within the ROK government. This is because I, like most of those in attendance at the vigil, do not regard the present administration to be representative of the needs or will of the people.
 
Scott: "Meanwhile, Lee Myung-bak was repeatedly attacked by the protesters for being "deceptive" and "dishonest," and yet the protesters often had a difficult time living up to their own standards of honesty and truthfulness."
  Even if there's a double standard, it's apples and oranges. Private citizens do not have the same burden of responsibility that government officials have, because they do not hold power and control the purse strings of government. Further, does anyone believe that LMB is honest and honorable?

Scott: "As for the issue of "police brutality," the main reason I think it is important to critique that aspect of last year's (and this year's) protests is because I consider it to be a huge distraction, quite apart from it being a largely fake, manufactured controversy. Last year's protests became so focused on the issue of "police violence" that I feel they lost focus and dissipated the energy of their movement, energy which could have been used in more positive, productive ways." 
  Yes, but historically in Korea, many of the major gains of the movement came after revelations of police brutality, abuses during interrogation, police torture, etc. which completely discredited the government. 
 
Scott: "The lasting message of last year's protests here was a rather reactionary and not terribly inspiring "no." "No" to US beef, "no" to Lee Myung-bak, "no" to the terrible police. 
  I do not believe that all of the public sentiment in June (as represented in front of City Hall) was all negative. And in many ways, it was quite hopeful. It was the first time since 2002 when that number of people had taken to the streets in Korea. And it was the first time in a generation when a popular movement in Korea sought to force change in government. Remember that the pro-democracy movement of the late 1980s was largely a no movement: "No" to martial law, "no" to Chun, no to his hand-picked successor, "no" to Gulag-like "re-education camps," "no" to business as usual--and for a moment "no" to the '88 Olympics. And keep in mind that every university student since 1990 has been shamed for not being like the 386 generation, actively demonstrating out on the streets for social and political change. In the summer of 2008, their chance finally came.
 
Scott: "The leaders of last summer's protests failed to articulate a stronger and more positive message of how they think they could better lead society, in part because they were so focused on the trope of "police violence" and exploiting it for all it was worth. In short, they squandered a great opportunity that I doubt will come round again in the near future." 
  I agree whole heartedly, here. But this has to do with vision and leadership, rather than with being misguided or representing false interests. 
 
 Re differences in political culture and cultures of conflict, Frank states: 
 "The whole conflict as well as the consequences will very likely look completely different, depending on the country and area this happens and what set of rules applies for conflict situations in each culture."

  I would go further to say that, during the era of militant confrontation up until 1990 (when rocks and Molotov cocktails were regularly used by certain students and activists) and large numbers of demonstrators were carted off by the riot police, there was a certain choreographed quality to almost every demonstration--which was rather unsettling to me. Unsettling because, for me, demonstrations involving violent confrontation are not supposed to be so routinized and predictable. Cat and mouse confrontations would go on for hours at Seoul National or in front of the gates MyOngdong Cathedral, in which the rules of confrontation always seemed pre-scripted, as though it were a contact sport with set rules and a foregone result.
 The best evidence now available indicates that the uppermost leadership of the student movement at the time actually assigned a certain number of their rank and file to harass and provoke the riot police and get arrested if it served the cause, while that leadership remained free to organize the next set of tactics and operations. From the organizational perspective, for both student and riot police conscripts, getting hit or injured or captured was rather like a rite of passage or getting "hazed" to earn full membership into the group. And the rock throwing was not altogether different from rock throwing battles waged between neighboring Korean villages as a form of competition dating from pre-modern times. 
  Squatter demonstrations seemed no less scripted, with each such demonstration having more-or-less the same time table and the same outcome. Almost exclusively, women protesters ("the rank and file") were the ones who were carted off by the riot police--some passively, others kicking and screaming. But none of the women I followed in several different settlements were ever detained, interrogated, or formally arrested. After the official warning that "those who remained would be taken away," men, and at least one well meaning foreigner (yours truly), generally broke ranks and went to the sidelines, based on the assumption that our involvement would have much greater repercussions for us. 
 
Frank: "the post-Kwangju pro-democracy movement of the 1980s did not exactly move anything because anyone followed American middle-class ideas of political engagement either."
  I would say that the in the years following 1987-88 the movement for democratization had serious limitations because, following the quite considerable heavy hitting and heavy lifting of the previous period, the movement adopted a much less confrontational, almost "wait and see" approach to politics, along the lines of "American middle-class ideas of political engagement."  Of course the real downturn came in the early 1990s, when at a very well televised demonstration encampment at Yonsei University, students took a hostage and destroyed campus property, and, according to public opinion, essentially resorted to the same violent tactics that they accused the riot police of. 
yours,
jim 
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